Zhao Long on China’s vision for a fairer multipolar order

Shanghai-based scholar emphasises Beijing’s commitment to the established UN-centred system, highlighting its vision of a multipolar order that prioritises mutual empowerment over hegemonic control

This is our fifth article translated from the special series in this year’s 16th issue of 世界知识 World Affairs, a Chinese-language magazine published by World Affairs Press under China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The series features contributions from some of China’s “foremost scholars,” according to the magazine, on the theme “The Multipolar World Is Coming at Speed.”

This article is written by Zhao Long, Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, a think tank affiliated with the Shanghai Municipal People's Government. It is also available on World Affairs’ official WeChat blog.

We would also recommend Zhao Long’s Why China Is Not Interested in Great Power Carve-ups - Understanding Beijing’s strategic rejection of a “Yalta 2.0” arrangement published at the end of May in The Diplomat.

赵隆：推动国际秩序变革既要有“破”更要有“立”

Zhao Long: Transforming the International Order Requires Not Only “Abolishing the Old,” But Also “Establishing the New”

The post-war international order is not a static historical relic; rather, it is continually shaped and transformed by evolving objective conditions and institutional norms in response to changes in the international landscape, the reconfiguration of power dynamics, and shifts in the prevailing themes of the era.

The “post-war international order” commonly referenced today refers to two temporal dimensions: the post-World War II era and the post-Cold War era. The most significant and deserving of preservation within the post-WWII international order is the international system centred around the United Nations. This framework effectively upheld global peace, even amid the intense U.S.-Soviet bipolar rivalry. The post-Cold War international order, on the other hand, is chiefly characterised by multipolarity and economic globalisation, and demands steadfast safeguarding.

Eight decades have passed, and the Yalta System, a crucial element of the post-war international order, along with the bipolar world, has long since become a part of history. Mechanisms born from Cold War rivalry, such as the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, no longer exist. In their place, peace, development, cooperation, and win-win outcomes have emerged as the prevailing themes of the era.

However, both post-war international orders—post-World War II and post-Cold War—are now confronted with unprecedented challenges. In particular, the strategic competition among major powers, spearheaded and vigorously promoted by the United States, threatens to push the world back toward bloc confrontation. The Trump administration’s revival of “great power determinism” and its pursuit of “spheres of influence” in foreign policy risk ushering the world back into a “law of the jungle” scenario. Meanwhile, deficits in peace, development, security, and governance are erupting simultaneously across the globe, generating deep-seated doubts within the international community about the authority of the United Nations, the efficacy of international law, and the functionality of multilateralism. These doubts do not stem from the failure of the core principles of the existing order, but from the manipulation of established institutional frameworks by the dominant global power.

Reforming the international order requires efforts in both “abolishing the old” and “establishing the new.” However, in today’s world, there is far more “abolishing” than “establishing.” Moreover, it is primarily regressive forces that are dismantling the positive elements of the international order, rather than progressive forces eliminating the negative ones. What the U.S. and Europe frequently refer to as a “rules-based international order” has, in practice, become a shield for certain countries to pursue unilateral actions. The “rules” these countries emphasise are unilaterally devised and interpreted, differing significantly from the fundamental norms of the post-war international order and international relations that China supports and upholds.

The current international landscape is deeply concerning. Is the global order nearing a tipping point of structural transformation? If major powers fail to reach consensus on critical issues such as war and peace, turmoil and stability, the international order may collapse beyond this threshold. The Ukraine crisis, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the Iran-Israel war have already set the stage. How can a systematic collapse of the international order be avoided? While there are multiple rallying points to leverage, determining how to utilise them and what pathway and strategy to adopt requires deeper reflection.

For instance, can reforming the United Nations and enhancing the governance authority and effectiveness of the UN-centred international system be achieved solely by upholding the authority of the Security Council? It must be recognised that, although the UN has faced considerable criticism over the years, it possesses one strength that compensates for its lack of effectiveness: its full representativeness. No other international multilateral mechanism ensures the universal participation of 193 member states like the UN, playing an irreplaceable role in safeguarding world peace and development. At the same time, against major events such as the Ukraine crisis and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over the past three years, the role of the UN General Assembly has been significantly elevated. How to promote better coordination and complementarity between the Security Council and the General Assembly in responding to major crises has become an important area for discussion.

Furthermore, any transformation of the international order is, in essence, a restructuring of the global power landscape. Given the significant shifts in the balance of international forces, it is more crucial than ever to acknowledge the fundamental trend toward multipolarity. While emphasising great-power coordination and cooperation, it is equally important for China to engage with the Global South in diverse ways, fostering mutual empowerment and advancing a fair and orderly multipolar process.

Although the international community has broadly reached a consensus on rejecting unilateralism, resisting power politics, and guarding against bloc confrontation and zero-sum games, there remain differing preferences regarding multipolarity. First, there is the U.S.-preferred model of “multipolar competition” under hegemonic dominance, aimed primarily at better allocating resources to sustain hegemony. Second, certain countries advocate for “multipolar coexistence” within the context of imperial spatial order, which strongly inclines toward redefining spheres of influence. Third, China advocates for “equal and orderly” multipolarity, which I will refer to for now as “multipolar complementarity.” These three models differ significantly in terms of philosophy, institutional vision, and practical approach. It is essential to place trust in the broader trajectory of human progress, the overarching logic of historical advancement despite setbacks, and the prevailing trend of a shared future for the international community. Ultimately, it will be a constructive multipolarity that fosters consensus, rather than a destructive multipolarity based on isolation and exclusion, that prevails.

While firmly upholding the post-war international order, China is actively forging new paths without dismantling the established structure. Rather than pursuing radical changes to “start all over,” it seeks to optimise existing mechanisms while preserving the core framework of the United Nations system. This, in itself, represents a profound historical responsibility. From the Belt and Road Initiative to the three global initiatives, and from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to the New Development Bank of the BRICS and the International Organisation for Mediation, China has consistently worked to provide institutional public goods to the world, offering practical models for safeguarding multilateralism. This approach fundamentally contrasts with the “systemic dominance” of hegemonic powers and the “back-to-the-drawing-board” model of radical change. In my view, it represents a constructive reconstruction grounded in historical continuity.

History has shown that any country that seeks only to take from the world and appropriates nearly all resources for itself will ultimately see the collapse of its world order due to the erosion of that order’s legitimacy. China’s approach, inspired by the wisdom that “Peaches and plums do not speak, but they are so attractive that a path is formed below the trees,” embodies a paradigm shift away from traditional hegemonic logic. This vision of order, founded on equality and sustained through cooperation, offers effective solutions to a world marked by instability.

Check out also Zhao Long’s Why China Is Not Interested in Great Power Carve-ups - Understanding Beijing’s strategic rejection of a “Yalta 2.0” arrangement at the end of May in The Diplomat