Hu Bo: de-hegemonisation of the international maritime order and the risk of regression

Director of the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI) argues that while rising maritime powers may promote equity and cooperation, entrenched power politics threaten to stall progress.

This is our fourth article translated from the special series in this year’s 16th issue of 世界知识 World Affairs, a Chinese-language magazine published by World Affairs Press under China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The series features contributions from some of China’s “foremost scholars,” according to the magazine, on the theme “The Multipolar World Is Coming at Speed.”

This article is written by Hu Bo, Director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), and Research Professor & Director of the Centre for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University. It is also available on World Affairs’ official WeChat blog.

胡波：国际海洋秩序去霸权化势不可挡

Hu Bo: De-hegemonization of the International Maritime Order Is Irresistible

Before World War II, the central maritime issues were the rise and decline of great powers and sea control. The international maritime order of the time was marked by stark asymmetry and inequality, functioning primarily as an instrument for hegemonic powers and Western colonial and imperial blocs to assert dominance over the world. Weaker nations and oppressed peoples had virtually no voice in this system.

Over the past 80 years since the end of World War II, the international maritime order has generally moved toward greater equity, justice, and democracy. Third World countries, non-Western nations, and Global South countries have played a pivotal role in this transformation. This shift can be primarily attributed to the following factors: First, the establishment of the United Nations system and related institutions, along with the wave of decolonisation and the subsequent independence of Third World countries, created a space for the democratisation of international relations, where nations are, at least formally, considered equal. Second, the scope of international maritime politics has expanded and diversified since World War II, offering greater opportunities for small and medium-sized countries to make meaningful contributions.

In their book Power and Interdependence, American scholars Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye state, “...technology had increased mankind’s ability to exploit the oceans’ space and resources, thus raising questions of scarcity and stimulating countries’ efforts to widen the area under their jurisdiction in order to exclude other countries from the resources.” The growing importance of the ocean as a source of resources has become increasingly evident, with economic and developmental issues such as marine fisheries, oil and gas exploration, and deep-sea mineral extraction gradually entering the agenda of international maritime politics.

Entering the 21st century, global maritime issues have gained increasing prominence. The high connectivity of the oceans has led to security threats and challenges that transcend national borders. Tasks such as combating piracy and transnational crime, protecting the marine environment, and ensuring maritime security have increasingly surpassed the capacity of individual nations or small groups of countries. As a result, ocean governance has emerged as a key focus in international maritime politics.

However, the evolution of the maritime order has followed different paths in various areas. After World War II, the international maritime order began to diverge, with political-economic and security issues evolving along separate trajectories. As global interdependence grew, the role of military force diminished, while the influence of small and medium-sized states increased. Maritime powers could no longer unilaterally shape the direction of the international maritime order, particularly in its political and economic dimensions. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are prime examples of this shift. In the negotiations and treaty-making processes of both conventions, Third World countries were the driving force.

Currently, the international maritime political-economic order, based on UNCLOS, forms a relatively open, equitable, and balanced network of mechanisms and rules. Although these rules retain a distinct Western influence, developing countries also play a significant role. The dominance of maritime powers or major states over the international maritime political-economic order has effectively collapsed.

However, due to disparities in capabilities, the post-World War II movements of national liberation and the democratisation of international relations have had a limited impact on the international maritime security order. To build consensus during negotiations, UNCLOS incorporated many compromises and ambiguities, particularly in provisions related to the regime of islands and dispute settlement mechanisms. These compromises, to some extent, have contributed to the escalation of disagreements and conflicts among certain states. Moreover, due to resistance from maritime powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union, military security issues were largely excluded from UNCLOS. While some provisions touch on military activities, they remain very vague and non-binding.

To this day, this divergence remains unresolved. The institutionalisation of the international maritime political-economic order continues to strengthen, and the UNCLOS system is still evolving. The Agreement under the UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement) has been adopted and has now entered the phase of ratification by individual countries. The BBNJ Agreement, which governs marine resources, the utilisation of maritime spaces, and maritime activities, addresses a range of significant frontier issues in the current development of ocean resources and environmental management, spanning the fields of science and technology, policy, law, economics, and military affairs.

Meanwhile, the contemporary international maritime security order still bears a distinct imprint of power politics. It is dominated by the United States, with its core consisting of the U.S. and its global alliance system, alongside a series of military and security rules shaped by the U.S.

Virtually all nations are, to varying degrees, dissatisfied with the current international maritime order. The United States has yet to formally join UNCLOS, concerned that provisions established by the Convention, such as the exclusive economic zones extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea, could restrict the freedom of global operations for the U.S. military. Additionally, the U.S. argues that the International Seabed Authority regime established by the UNCLOS violates the principles of fair competition. The vast majority of coastal states do not recognise the U.S.-led maritime security order, much less support the United States’ practice of using the maintenance of rules as a pretext for pursuing power politics.

Over the past 80 years, the overall development of the international maritime order has been characterised by institutionalisation. However, the effectiveness of this institutionalisation in the maritime security order remains uncertain, as evidenced by the lack of strict enforcement of various international agreements and regulations, such as UNCLOS. With the strong resurgence of geopolitics and the decline of the liberal international order, the future process of institutionalisation in the international maritime order faces the risk of regression. Deinstitutionalisation or weak institutionalisation may become more prevalent, further exacerbating the uncertainty surrounding the international maritime order.

With the rise of emerging maritime powers such as China, the international maritime order is bound to undergo significant adjustments. China is both a world power and a developing country; both a maritime power and a land-sea composite state. The rise of China’s maritime status itself serves as a counterbalance to Western-style hegemony and power politics. China’s maritime practices are also bound to become a rebalancing effort aimed at constructing a cooperative atmosphere. The future international maritime order will not solely centre on sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, as many developing countries advocate, nor will it become a hegemonic order where the United States enjoys absolute freedom of action, as desired by Washington.