Yan Xuetong: The World is in Reverse

Leading IR scholar at Tsinghua says populist ideologies has led to the severe generalisation and politicisation of the concept of security - framing too many issues as security & political concerns.

History does not walk a straight line; it staggers and turns. As Yan Xuetong (阎学通), Honorary Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, argues, history swings like a pendulum—World War I regression followed by interwar peace, followed again by World War II regression, then Cold War stasis, relative progress. For much of the post-Cold War period, the world has moved toward integration and liberalisation. Today, however, that momentum has again reversed. Populism is rising, de-globalisation is accelerating, and the concept of “economic security” is framing economic interdependence as a liability rather than an asset.

The following essay was originally published in the 国际政治科学 Quarterly Journal of International Politics, 2023, Issue 2, and is thematically similar to another of Yan’s works previously featured on The East is Read. In both pieces, Yan traced the cyclical nature of international order and lamented current geopolitical regression.

However, unlike the Cold War, where ideological expansion dictated geopolitical competition, today’s great power tensions are centred on digital technology and economic leverage. As Yan notes, this suggests the world is not heading for a “new Cold War.” Rather, today’s geopolitical landscape more closely resembles historical moments such as World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the early post-Cold War era—times when observers struggled to grasp the full scope of global transformation.

If history follows a pendulum-like rhythm, Yan asks, how long will this phase of regression last? And what measures will be necessary for the world to swing back towards progress? Yan urges Chinese scholars to study the mechanisms of this regression to help mitigate its consequences.

—Yuxuan Jia

The following essay is also available on the official WeChat blog of the World Peace Forum, an annual security forum organised by Tsinghua University.

阎学通：世界已经掉头

Yan Xuetong: The World is in Reverse

In the sci-fi TV series The Three-Body Problem, a video game is designed to represent the Three-Body civilisation. In this game, the Three-Body civilisation constantly advances technologically, far surpassing humanity’s 21st-century capabilities. However, despite its high-tech progress, the civilisation remains trapped in a cycle between the Stable Era and the Chaotic Era. As its technology advances, so does its authoritarianism, and the levels of democracy, freedom, happiness, and diversity of life choices fall far behind those of 21st-century human civilisation.

Although human civilisation differs from the Three-Body civilisation, there are two notable similarities. First, human civilisation also undergoes cycles of progress and regression. Second, each technological advancement in human history does not necessarily lead to improvements in democracy, freedom, or happiness.

The emerging phrase “the world at a crossroads” in recent years reflects a doubt about whether history is regressing. The Chinese government’s assessment of the trends in international political changes is: “Today, our world, our times and history are changing in ways like never before, and the international community is confronted with multiple risks and challenges rarely seen before. Regional security hotspots keep flaring up, local conflicts and turbulence occur frequently, the COVID-19 pandemic persists, unilateralism and protectionism have risen significantly, and traditional and non-traditional security threats are entwined. The deficits in peace, development, security and governance are growing, and the world is once again at a crossroads in history.”

The severe threat of the global COVID pandemic has now passed, and the future direction of the world has become relatively clear. Rather than continuing its progress at the crossroads, the world has chosen to turn back and move toward regression. Where will the world regress to? This is becoming an important issue for academic research.

When comparing the starting point and endpoint of human history over the past thousand years, it is often observed that the world at the endpoint is far more advanced and civilised than at the beginning. However, when examining the entire process of historical change over the last millennium, it becomes clear that the world cycles between periods of progress and regression.

Taking the past 120 years, from the 20th century to the present, as an example, it is evident that these cycles of progress and regression have occurred frequently. In the early 20th century, the world experienced the regression of World War I, followed by a period of peace. Twenty years later, the world faced another regression with World War II. After World War II, the world entered the Cold War, where proxy wars replaced full-scale wars—an era of relative progress that lasted more than forty years.

At the end of the 20th century, with the conclusion of the Cold War, proxy wars continued, but the number of casualties sharply decreased. Meanwhile, a trend of globalisation, centred around democratisation and marketisation, emerged, and the world took a step toward greater cooperation. However, this phase of globalisation lasted little more than 20 years before being replaced by a rise in anti-globalisation. The world has once again turned, entering a period of regression.

Scholars have mostly analysed world regression through specific historical events, rather than from the perspective of abstract commonalities. The theory of moral realism attributes the causes of world regression to changes in the type of leadership in the international system. Specifically, it suggests that the moral quality of international leadership shifts from high to low, or from present to absent.

However, despite offering an abstract theoretical perspective, moral realism does not explain the underlying mechanism behind the transformation of international leadership types. In other words, under what conditions will the type of international leadership change? What factors determine the direction of this transformation? And what is the process through which types of international leadership evolve?

At present, scholars are still unable to explain the reasons behind the transformation of international leadership types. However, it is widely acknowledged that there is a symbiotic relationship between the transformation of international leadership types and the rise of new international political ideologies. This phenomenon has been repeatedly observed in modern international politics.

At the beginning of the 20th century, imperialist ideologies were widespread, with imperialist leaders from multiple countries formulating war policies, which culminated in World War I. In the 1930s, fascist ideologies gained traction, and fascist leaders in several countries initiated wars, leading to the outbreak of World War II. After the war, communist ideologies gained prominence, and communist leaders engaged in power struggles and revolutionary wars in various countries. By the 1960s, anti-colonialism rose, and leaders of national liberation movements fought for independence across many regions.

In the 1990s, liberal ideologies emerged, with liberal leaders advocating for globalisation and waging wars in the name of democratisation. Today, populist ideologies are on the rise, with populist leaders adopting de-globalisation policies under the banner of safeguarding economic security, while also engaging in proxy wars.

Whether the relationship between the rise of new international political ideologies and the transformation of leadership types is symbiotic or causal remains unresolved. However, it is certain that ideas and beliefs influence foreign policy decisions. From a decision-making perspective, ideas serve as the foundation for choices, meaning beliefs precede actions. Based on this sequence, the rise of populist ideologies may not directly cause the transformation of leadership types, but it at least contributes to prompting decision-makers to adopt populist foreign policies.

Populist ideologies lack systematic structures; they express dissatisfaction with elite politics and can provide theoretical support for opposing current policies, but they do not offer better alternatives. As a result, decisions based on populist ideals tend to be more destructive than constructive, with failures outnumbering successes and inconsistency overshadowing policy continuity. As the influence of populist ideologies increases in the decision-making processes of major countries, the uncertainty of their decisions becomes more pronounced. This, in turn, leads to greater uncertainty in international politics, which has become a defining feature of the current global regression.

The rise of populist ideologies has led to the severe generalisation and politicisation of the concept of security. That is, framing issues from various domains as security concerns, and treating non-political matters as political problems. The most prominent example of this trend is how economic security has significantly influenced major countries' foreign policy decisions, thereby affecting global international relations.

The concept of “economic security” gained prominence in the 1970s but faded with the easing of U.S.-Soviet tensions. After the Cold War, the trend of globalisation accelerated global economic cooperation, leading to the diminishing significance of “economic security.” However, with the rise of populist ideologies, the concept has regained international relevance—now even more influential than during the Cold War. Decision-makers in major countries now worry that the interdependence created by international cooperation could be exploited by others to exert strategic pressure. Consequently, they are scaling back international economic cooperation and shortening global supply chains to bolster economic security—essentially embracing de-globalisation. When most major countries adopt de-globalisation policies, this creates a historical trend of anti-globalisation.

At present, it is still difficult to determine to what extent the concept of “economic security” will drive the de-globalisation trend. For now, it remains an independent concept and has not yet formed a theoretical system, lacking the ideological influence of communism or capitalism. Although the concept of economic security is intensifying strategic confrontation between major powers, the current intensity of competition does not rise to the level of the Cold War-era confrontation, which was driven by ideological expansion.

The Cold War resulted in a comprehensive strategic standoff between superpowers, whereas de-globalisation driven by economic security remains largely confined to high-end technology sectors and has not severed broader economic and social ties between major powers. Therefore, de-globalisation policies are unlikely to trigger a “new Cold War.”

The rise of anti-globalisation ideologies is accompanied by a new form of great power competition, distinct in both nature and strategy from the Cold War. In terms of the nature of competition, the Cold War’s ideological confrontation was a zero-sum game that ultimately led to the Soviet Union’s collapse. In the digital age, however, economic security competition is centred on digital technology supremacy. Although there will be winners and losers, the losing side risks losing international leadership rather than facing existential collapse.

Regarding the strategy of competition, ideological expansion during the Cold War was mainly pursued through proxy wars and supporting ideologically aligned factions in other countries. In contrast, competition for digital technology supremacy depends on international cooperation and market dominance. Therefore, strategic competition among major powers centred on digital technology supremacy, both in nature and in strategy, does not pose the risk of plunging the world into a new Cold War.

If the ongoing war in Ukraine were to be defined as a Cold War between Russia and NATO member countries, it would, in fact, demonstrate the opposite—that the world has not entered a “new Cold War.” This proxy war was triggered by traditional security concerns rather than economic security issues or de-globalisation policies. It remains geographically confined within a single country, with competition limited to Europe, and has not expanded beyond the region. Regardless of the outcome, the war remains an internal European conflict rather than a defining global trend with worldwide significance.

From a global perspective, particularly when analysing international politics through the lens of great power competition, it is evident that the global order is shifting in an unpredictable direction. This resembles historical moments such as World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the early post-Cold War era, when most observers failed to accurately assess the true nature of the transformations shaping the world order.

The cyclical nature of international politics, oscillating between progress and regression, is an undeniable reality, as is the fluctuation of global order between stability and turbulence. If human history advances in a pattern of two steps forward and one step back, then scientific research must focus on understanding the conditions and duration of both progress and regression.

Amid the growing uncertainty of the current international order and the far-reaching global impact of Sino-American strategic competition, it is imperative for Chinese scholars to examine the principles and extent of the world’s current regression. Even if this regression cannot be prevented, it remains crucial to explore ways to minimise its extent and to identify strategies for guiding the world back onto a trajectory of progress as soon as possible.