Moral Idealism: The Political Logic of China’s Diplomacy by Ren Jiantao

Tsinghua professor traces China's diplomacy to historical self-perception as a weaker nation and its Confucian-inspired emphasis on virtue, even as it transitions into a major global power.

Moral Idealism: The Political Logic of China’s Diplomacy 道义理想主义：中国外交的政治逻辑, the following 2020 essay by Ren Jiantao of Tsinghua University, analyzes the evolution of China’s diplomatic strategy since 1949, tracing its shift from ideological isolation to pragmatic engagement while emphasizing the enduring influence of moral idealism. The article argues that China’s diplomatic logic has been shaped by its historical self-perception as a weaker nation and its Confucian-inspired emphasis on virtue, even as it transitions into a major global power. While acknowledging the pragmatism that fueled China’s post-1978 reforms, the analysis highlights tensions between moral principles and realpolitik, suggesting that rigid adherence to ideological frameworks risks limiting diplomatic flexibility.

The People’s Republic of China’s diplomatic history is framed as a 70-year journey from strategic seclusion to global integration, with 1978 marking a decisive turning point. Prior to reform and opening up, China’s foreign policy oscillated between partial openness and near-total isolation, particularly during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when opposition to “imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary forces” dominated its international engagements. This period saw limited diplomatic activity beyond solidarity with Third World nations, reflecting Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds Theory (1974), which positioned China as a leader of developing countries against superpower hegemony. The earlier Zhou Enlai-era Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (1953) established foundational ideals—non-interference, mutual respect, and equality—that continue to inform China’s diplomatic rhetoric. However, the article notes that pre-1978 engagement lacked substantive economic or political integration with developed nations, resulting in costly developmental delays and diplomatic stagnation.

Deng Xiaoping’s reforms catalyzed a paradigm shift, replacing ideological confrontation with pragmatic engagement. The normalization of U.S.-China relations (1979) and Sino-Soviet détente (1989) symbolized this transition, aligning foreign policy with domestic modernization goals. Deng’s “Three Orientations” (面向现代化、面向世界、面向未来) redefined diplomacy as a tool for accessing global capital and technology, enabling China’s economic ascent. The article stresses that meaningful openness required engagement with advanced economies, particularly the U.S., without which China’s rise would have been “impossible to explain”. This pragmatic turn, however, coexisted with unwavering ideological commitments, exemplified by Deng’s Four Cardinal Principles (1979), which enshrined socialism, proletarian dictatorship, Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership, and Marxism-Leninism as non-negotiable tenets. Xi Jinping’s later reinforcement of Marxist theory as China’s “powerful ideological weapon” is framed as a continuation of this duality, blending economic pragmatism with doctrinal rigidity.

Central to the analysis is the concept of “moral idealism”—a diplomatic mindset forged through China’s historical experience as a vulnerable state confronting Western and Soviet dominance. Rooted in Confucian ethics that prioritize righteousness over utility (“正其义不谋其利”), this approach cast China as a champion of weaker nations against hegemonic powers. The article observes that such idealism fostered solidarity with the Global South but strained relations with stronger states, as China interpreted power-based diplomacy as inherently exploitative. Even during periods of openness, moral principles subtly guided policy, as seen in generous aid to developing countries and rhetorical emphasis on equality. However, the critique embedded in this analysis suggests that moral idealism risks rigidity: by framing international relations as a binary struggle between virtue and hegemony, China historically struggled to balance principled stances with strategic flexibility.

The essay identifies a persistent tension between domestic ideological imperatives and diplomatic pragmatism. It argues that China’s foreign policy remains an extension of internal politics, where the CPC’s commitment to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and socialist modernity shapes international conduct. For instance, the Four Cardinal Principles are portrayed not merely as political tools but as moral imperatives, with socialism framed as inherently just and capitalism as exploitative. This fusion of ideology and morality, the article suggests, complicates efforts to depoliticize diplomacy, as seen in the lingering suspicion of Western intentions despite economic interdependence. The critique here is subtle but clear: excessive ideological entrenchment, even when couched in moral terms, may hinder adaptive strategies in a multipolar world.

While acknowledging the successes of China’s reform-era diplomacy, the article underscores the costs of earlier isolationism. The late Qing dynasty’s self-imposed seclusion and the Cultural Revolution’s radical inward turn are cited as cautionary examples, contrasting sharply with the developmental leaps achieved through post-1978 globalization. A pointed critique emerges in the discussion of moral idealism’s limitations: the article notes that while China’s virtuous image won admiration in the Global South, it often failed to translate into substantive influence among major powers. The implicit argument is that unyielding moral postures, though symbolically resonant, can obscure pragmatic national interests—a challenge compounded by the integration of domestic ideology into foreign policy.

In conclusion, Ren’s analysis presents Chinese diplomacy as a dynamic interplay between historical moralism and contemporary pragmatism. While crediting ideological coherence for sustaining domestic legitimacy and Third World partnerships, it cautiously questions whether rigid adherence to virtue-driven frameworks can accommodate the complexities of great-power diplomacy. The essay ultimately advocates for a more nuanced approach that harmonizes moral principles with strategic realism—a balance yet to be fully realized in China’s evolving global role.

The last part of the essay, Part VI, offers carefully worded but deep, substantial, and comprehensive criticism and advice. If you don’t have the time for the whole thing, just read this part:

Moral idealist diplomatic thinking prioritises grand, long-term, and in-depth considerations over short-term, superficial, or immediate concerns. Sometimes, these more immediate concerns can create vast space for realist diplomatic actions, even if they are moral realistic ones. This space can lead observers to mistakenly classify China’s diplomacy as realist, pragmatic, or utilitarian. Such judgments also risk misinterpreting the win-or-lose, life-or-death, and winner-takes-all mentality often observed in Chinese society extending to the nation’s foreign policy approach.

Indeed, such opinions are often seen in foreign policy discussions within China, but they stem from a misreading of the surface in China’s diplomatic actions. It is true that China does not shy away from safeguarding its national interests in diplomacy, international exchanges, and global competition; and since the reform and opening-up period, this focus on national interests has become increasingly prominent in China’s external behaviour. However, a closer examination reveals that China’s strategy in international affairs—particularly in its competition with Western nations—is not centred on short-term victories or setbacks in isolated issues. Rather, China is convinced that it is destined for grander, deeper, and longer-term success. This conviction arises not only from its moral standing rooted in idealism but also from the legitimacy of its proletarian revolution and the Communist Party’s commitment to governing for the people. Together, these elements represent an unparalleled advantage globally. Achieving this advantage will require time, resources, and recognition, but the ultimate outcome is already assured.

For China’s diplomacy today, moral idealism serves as a guiding vision that sustains both the grander strategic framework and future aspirations. Just as China’s revolution had to pass through two stages—the New Democratic Revolution and the Socialist Revolution—before it could hope to realise its communist ideals, China’s diplomatic goals must also navigate the immediate realities of the international environment. This requires crafting rational diplomatic concepts in response to these realities and implementing practical policies. Only in this way can China progress toward the eventual realisation of its ideal objectives.

Therefore, while moral idealism—often disconnected from current realities—remains a noble aspiration that requires nurturing, it is crucial for China’s diplomatic concepts to be grounded in reality and practically implemented. Without this foundation, the effectiveness of diplomatic actions will diminish, and the risk of setbacks in international relations will increase. Such outcomes would hardly bode well for the continuity of China’s moral idealistic diplomatic thinking, which is anchored in a grand, long-term vision.

To develop a more practical, reality-oriented diplomatic mindset, China must be clear on several key points: First, China is just one of over 200 nation-states and regions that have gradually emerged since the Peace of Westphalia. Therefore, China must learn to engage with the various members of the world of nation-states. This understanding of the nature of countries is fundamental to China’s national diplomacy. Without it, China will be in a state of internal confusion, struggling to define its own nation's nature in interactions with other countries.

Currently, some view China as a civilisation-state that has been consistent throughout history, rejecting the classification of a nation-state. Others see it as a self-contained Tianxia system, arguing that it should neither be regarded as a Western-style empire nor a rapidly rising modern power. While these arguments have some basis, they ultimately confuse China’s diplomatic positioning. Particularly in the eyes of other nation-states, as long as China denies its identity as a nation-state, it is effectively seeking global privileges and hegemony. This will undoubtedly pose significant obstacles for China in conducting normal diplomatic activities.

Second, China must recognise the importance of engaging with great powers. As China achieves remarkable economic growth, the country must also accumulate rational experience in interacting with other major powers. Historically, due to the strict Haijin (海禁) or maritime trade ban during the Ming and Qing dynasties, China endured a prolonged period of self-imposed isolation and remained relatively detached from the outside world. As a result, China’s understanding of foreign countries has been limited, leading to a natural state of timidity when engaging internationally. Furthermore, after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the national policy of opposing imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary forces pushed China back into a tense state of isolation, further reducing its diplomatic exchanges. Consequently, China’s experience in dealing with both strong and weak nations has been notably insufficient.　

Historically, starting with the Ming dynasty’s ban on maritime trade and the prohibition of missionaries entering China’s core areas, China developed a national habit of narcissism in isolation. Later, when the Chinese emperor resolutely rejected the request of George Macartney, Britain’s first envoy to China, to open British trade during the Qing dynasty, it further entrenched the policy of self-isolation. In the late Qing period, China’s disregard for international trade norms sparked commercial conflicts with the West. During the Republic of China era, Chiang Kai-shek’s rejection of both Soviet-style socialism and Western capitalism became another kind of isolationist ideology. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, this isolationist and narcissistic mindset reached an extreme.

It can be said that China had a very brief period of adaptation to the modern world of nation-states, and its experience in engaging with other countries remains limited, particularly when it comes to the diplomatic skills needed to interact with major powers. What is meant to be noble moral idealism in diplomacy became, for a time, a self-isolationist stance that rejected engagement with the outside world. Moreover, the founders of the People’s Republic were adamant that “diplomacy has no small matter 外交无小事,” elevating it to the highest levels of importance and making it a highly specialised concern for the top leaders of the state. Meanwhile, the general public lacked both recognition of this matter and the information, channels, or willingness to engage in or evaluate diplomacy. This created significant barriers to the development of public diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges—critical components of modern diplomacy.

Third, China’s diplomacy needs to establish a mechanism that integrates grand strategy with specific policies. At the grand strategic level, particularly in terms of long-term objectives, moral idealism may temporarily retain its place. However, the primary focus of China’s diplomacy should be on how to steadily advance and secure victories in areas where it can and should win, before achieving grander, deeper, and longer-term success. In this regard, Shi Yinhong’s warning about China needing to avoid “strategic overdrawing” is an important issue that warrants attention. Strategic overdrawing refers to the severe imbalance between a country’s goals and its means, and between its objectives and available resources—pursuing goals that are too grand to be supported by available means or objectives that are too numerous for the resources at hand.

Shi Yinhong, Professor at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China, clearly noted that, following China’s significant achievements during the reform and opening-up period, it has recently “opened up or consolidated so many ‘new battlefields’ or ‘new fronts,’ none of which can deliver a conclusive victory in the short term. As a result, China will be engaged in multiple or multi-front ‘battles’ in the foreseeable future.” From a strategic perspective, Shi saw this as a concerning development. Furthermore, the persistently slow growth of China’s economy in recent years, coupled with the sharp increase in its international involvement and overseas expansion, could exacerbate the situation. Shi emphasised, “To use an analogy, China’s ‘savings’ are likely to be slowly but persistently decreasing, while its expenditures are increasing at a rapid pace. The fundamental risk of ‘strategic overdrawing’ may, therefore, be rising.”

Therefore, Shi emphasised, “China becoming a great world power is an undertaking that will require the efforts of several generations, each continuously advancing and making sustained efforts. What is the best achievement that each generation can hope for? It is to roughly complete the basic tasks of the historical stage they are in.” This perspective aligns perfectly with my earlier point that China must balance upholding the grand, in-depth, and long-term focus of moral idealism while addressing its current complex foreign affairs.

It can be said that, given the current international environment China faces, its moral idealism in foreign policy needs to undergo some adjustments and, on that basis, establish fundamental guidelines for managing foreign affairs.

First, China must politically desensitise foreign affairs. Foreign affairs are highly complex, involving various domains such as politics, economy, military, culture, society, and technology, each offering opportunities for engagement. Among these, political exchanges between countries are the most significant. Foreign affairs take different forms, including official diplomacy, power diplomacy, public diplomacy, and people-to-people diplomacy. As noted earlier, the most important form is state-to-state diplomatic exchange.

When diplomacy is treated as a highly sensitive state matter, it becomes a political issue that can hinder active engagement. Therefore, it is crucial for China to politically desensitise foreign affairs, allowing for a more pragmatic approach when dealing with countries that have different ideologies, political systems, economic structures, historical traditions, and cultural environments. This is particularly important in interactions with countries and regions like the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Relatively speaking, in dealings with the Islamic world, the rest of the Asian countries, African nations, and the Americas, the need for political desensitisation is less pronounced. This is, of course, intricately tied to factors such as China’s modern history, Sino-Western relations, revolutionary background, camp alignment choices, historical confrontations, and international recognition.

Political desensitisation means approaching international political issues with a nuanced, globalised mindset, rather than hastily drawing enemy lines based on simplistic or rash political value judgments. It is about refraining from treating politics as an all-or-nothing, life-or-death confrontation. In the international community, friction, conflict, and opposition between countries are inevitable, but interdependence, cooperation, and compromise are equally essential. Referring to international rules, engaging in marathon negotiations, nurturing cooperation opportunities, and striving for win-win outcomes are diplomatic principles that must be upheld.

In diplomatic activities, it is crucial to avoid, by all means, the mindset that resorts to disengagement at the first sign of conflict, presuming the inevitability of war or that only one side can prevail. The frequent use of the phrase “destined for war” in China’s public discourse, particularly concerning relations with countries in conflict with China, reflects impulsive rhetoric driven by political sensitisation. Such rhetoric is counterproductive to China’s efforts to maintain positive relations with other nations in the international community. China must avoid slogan diplomacy. Political desensitisation means precisely moving away from slogans—such empty rhetoric holds no practical value when handling foreign affairs.

Second, China needs to cultivate a consciousness of “others.” In the traditional framework of moral idealism, China has developed a way of thinking and acting based on its own moral stance, where the “others” are often regarded as secondary or insignificant. While a foreign policy that centres on “me” and treats the “others” as supplementary may reflect China’s proactive and enterprising approach to foreign affairs, it also makes it difficult to create an international environment for peaceful coexistence where differences are addressed rationally, and cooperation is pursued in a spirit of respect and equality among nations.

For China, the tendency has long been to approach international relations through the lens of political ideologies, state systems, historically established friend-or-foe dynamics, and its own moral judgments. As a result, even when China acknowledges the existence of “others”—especially powerful ones—it remains reluctant to engage with countries that differ ideologically, have different state systems, have historically been antagonistic, or do not align with China’s self-defined moral standards. Even when engagement is unavoidable, such nations are still viewed as hostile forces in terms of values and deeper relations. This can be illustrated by today's Sino-Russian friendship and Sino-American friction.

Learning to engage with diverse, heterogeneous “others” is a crucial step for China in becoming a mature modern nation and truly integrating into the international community.

Third, China needs to cultivate a win-win diplomatic mindset. Since reform and opening up, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation have been core principles guiding China’s foreign relations on paper. However, fully achieving this goal still requires some hard work. The reason is that China has long approached diplomatic relations with both strong and weak countries through a win-or-lose, zero-sum mentality. Win-win cooperation is also a code of international behaviour advocated by Yan Xuetong’s “moral realism,” though his focus tends to be more on the shift in international leadership between established powers and rising ones.

In the international arena, a country must, based on its realistic circumstances, weigh the gains and losses of its interests. However, at the same time, it must be willing to consider the interests of others if it expects the same consideration in return. Under the influence of moral idealism, a country may easily come to see itself as always providing benefits to others. A sense of pride in acting justly, even at the cost of its own resources, can lead to a moral superiority complex, particularly toward countries receiving aid. Ironically, this can result in a double whammy: on one hand, substantial resources are spent aiding the other country, while on the other, the sense of superiority may hurt the recipient’s feelings, preventing them from feeling gratitude and even causing dissatisfaction or resentment toward China.

Thus, only by recognising that every member of the modern international system is a truly equal participant and by treating others rationally and equally can China engage in more expansive, long-term, win-win cooperation with other nations.

The following is Ren Jiantao’s (very, very ) long essay, published in March 2020 in 党政研究 Studies on Party and Government. The essay is available on the official website of the School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, as well as on 爱思想 Aisixiang, a leading Chinese humanities and social sciences intellectual platform.

道义理想主义：中国外交的政治逻辑

Moral Idealism: The Political Logic of China’s Diplomacy

Abstract: China’s diplomacy exhibits a logic rooted in moral idealism. From the perspective of China’s political history and internal evolution, the diplomatic history of the People’s Republic of China shows a trajectory that has shifted from isolationism to openness and development. Throughout this evolution, China, while acknowledging the realities of power politics, has maintained a moral stance grounded in the position of the weaker party. In its current rising status and self-perception as a major power, China has adopted a deontic logic suited to stronger nations. These two perspectives—one rooted in weakness, the other in strength—represent two sides of the same underlying logic.

The deep moral priority within China’s diplomatic ideals makes it challenging to present adept diplomacy. This is largely due to the rigid dominance of virtue in Chinese diplomacy. To keep pace with its rapid national development, Chinese diplomacy must break free from politicisation, particularly by avoiding the direct extension of domestic political decisions—especially ideological choices—into the diplomatic realm. Only by doing so can rational diplomatic thinking be established and a new, flexible diplomatic landscape be developed.

Keywords: China's diplomacy; political logic; moral idealism; moral realism; diplomatic thinking

To understand the political logic of Chinese diplomacy, one can approach it from several aspects.

The first is the historical context. The 70-year diplomatic history of the People’s Republic of China since its founding in 1949 can be divided into two phases, with the year 1978 marking the reform and opening up. The initial three decades were defined by strategic seclusion, while the subsequent four decades shifted towards opening up.

The second aspect is the overall arc of this trajectory. Over the past 70 years, Chinese diplomacy has accumulated valuable experience:

• Firstly, it has gradually explored a diplomatic path with Chinese characteristics.

• Secondly, it has profoundly reshaped its diplomatic thinking, with national interests gradually becoming the guiding principle for diplomacy.

• Thirdly, the values of Chinese diplomacy are anchored in “moral idealism,” which contrasts sharply with an approach centered on economic interests. This diplomatic thinking steadfastly prioritises values-based engagements, with an uncompromising focus on distinguishing friends and foes. Here, economic benefits or losses are not the primary considerations.

• Fourthly, the necessity for transforming diplomacy has become pronounced. Due to changes in China’s national circumstances, diplomacy is shaped by the “post-revolutionary society,” and political desensitisation has become a prerequisite for the formation of new diplomatic strategies. Should this desensitisation succeed, it could herald a new era for Chinese diplomacy; if not, political thinking will continue to dominate both domestic and diplomatic policies in an exclusionary way. In a complex, modern world, establishing a self-consistent political logic for Chinese diplomacy is not only beneficial for safeguarding China’s national interests but also conducive to fostering harmonious relations between China and other countries.

I. Self-Isolation and Diplomacy

The diplomatic history of the People’s Republic of China over the past 70 years can be divided into two stages: before and after the reform and opening up. Based on the chronological dimension and the evolution of internal politics, this division is a widely accepted framework for understanding the nation’s historical trajectory.

However, another perspective on this evolution is to view it as a shift from navigating a regionalised world before 1949 to embracing a globalised era after 1949, with each stage of diplomacy carrying its distinct characteristics. This approach presents a continuous arc of China’s diplomatic history, linking the periods before and after the reform and opening up.

The reason for designating 1978, the year when reform and opening up was launched, as a key turning point in China's diplomatic history is because, from this year onward, China did make significant adjustments to its foreign policy.

From a domestic perspective, this marked a shift in China’s diplomacy from an all-encompassing posture of external struggle to one of pragmatic engagement with major powers. From an international standpoint, the following year saw the most critical breakthrough in modern Chinese diplomacy: in 1979, China and the United States ended a 30-year diplomatic deadlock and formally established diplomatic relations. From that point onward, China’s foreign policy moved away from its previous stance of 批判帝、修、反 “criticising imperialism, revisionism, and reactionaries”—a policy of near-total isolation and confrontation—toward one aligned with reform and opening-up, emphasising 面向现代化、面向世界、面向未来 “the needs of modernisation, the world, and the future,” as Deng Xiaoping put it.

In this sense, the People’s Republic of China only truly began integrating into the international community just over 40 years ago. Taking into account various setbacks along the way, the timeline for China’s full engagement with global affairs is even shorter. Thus, framing reform and opening up as the historical watershed between isolation and broad international engagement is well supported by historical evidence.

The nearly 30 years preceding the reform and opening up can be further divided into two distinct phases: one of relative openness and another of near-total closure. The period before and during the Cultural Revolution represents two separate stages, each with clear defining characteristics.

During the Cultural Revolution, opposition to imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary forces—specifically, resistance to Western imperialism, Soviet revisionism and its allies, and all global reactionary forces—became the rigid political directive guiding China’s foreign relations. Although China maintained limited diplomatic engagement with certain “Third World” nations, it was largely isolated from the world’s major powers. This period can aptly be described as an era of “closed-door policy.”

Beyond this ten-year span, China’s foreign policy can be characterised as one of “partial openness.” This term is appropriate given the broader global context: from 1945 onward, the world was defined by a 50-year Cold War that split it into socialist and capitalist blocs. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, its alignment within this geopolitical divide was inevitable. Mao Zedong’s policy of “leaning to one side” reflected China’s selective engagement with one half of the binary world order—the socialist camp.

From 1949 to 1968, the almost two decades preceding the Cultural Revolution constituted another phase in China’s diplomatic history before the reform and opening up. The year 1949 marks the founding of the People’s Republic, making it an obvious starting point. However, why is 1968 chosen as the endpoint rather than 1966?

Although the “May 16th Notification” issued in 1966 is widely regarded as the official beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the armed conflicts (武斗) that erupted that year remained relatively contained. By 1967, under the slogan “attack with the pen, defend with the sword” (文攻武卫), these armed conflicts intensified, reaching their peak. By 1968, domestic turmoil had become so severe that the country could no longer conduct its foreign affairs in a meaningful way.

Institutionally, the state apparatus, paralysed by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, was restructured through the establishment of “Revolutionary Committees” (革命委员会). On the international stage, China’s diplomatic engagements were largely confined to its traditional stance of opposing both the United States and the Soviet Union, along with issuing political statements on international matters concerning the Third World. Overall, engagement with developing countries and addressing related issues - and good at it - is a defining feature of the PRC’s foreign relations from its founding.

In relative terms, both phases of China’s foreign diplomacy before reform and opening up maintained global perspectives on their agenda.

During the first phase (1949–1968), Zhou Enlai proposed the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” in late 1953: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These specific political principles continue to guide China’s foreign policy today.

In the latter phase (1968–1978), Mao Zedong introduced the differentiation of the Three Worlds in early 1974 during a meeting with leaders of Third World countries. He said: “I hold that the U.S. and the Soviet Union belong to the First World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe, Australia, and Canada, belong to the Second World. We are the Third World.” This framework established China’s approach to categorising countries in its diplomatic strategy and positioned the Third World—specifically, nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—as the primary focus of its foreign policy.

As seen above, China was not completely closed off before reform and opening up, but its external openness and engagement were indeed very limited. This can be confirmed from two perspectives. First, a truly open foreign policy should entail comprehensive engagement with the international community, particularly with developed nations. In this regard, China’s isolation was quite pronounced. Its long-standing conflict with the United States and the increasingly open rift with the Soviet Union after 1960 meant that, even if China had actively engaged with other regions, its interactions would have lacked true global significance. Second, China’s dealings were primarily with less-developed countries. While these nations praised China and viewed it—just as China saw itself—as a beacon for the Third World, China’s own development remained far behind global standards. In these two senses, China’s foreign policy during the first thirty years of the People’s Republic, which was “partially open” to the world, could also be seen as “partially closed.” This approach cost China dearly in terms of both economic development and diplomacy.

It was only after 1978 that China’s diplomacy gradually returned to a normal course. This shift was partly due to China abandoning the concept of class struggle in international relations. At the same time, it was closely tied to the country’s initiation of the modernisation process. Beyond these factors, changes in the international environment and China’s timely response to them also played a crucial role. By relinquishing its stance of opposing imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary forces, China abandoned ideological confrontation on the global stage, thereby becoming a normal state that other countries could engage with. As China prioritised economic development, it inevitably required a stable international environment, which led to a process of learning from the development experiences of other nations, particularly developed ones. During the roughly 20-year period when tensions between the socialist and capitalist blocs eased, China finally realised how extremely detrimental its self-imposed isolation from a peaceful international environment was to its own development. Consequently, adjusting its previously rigid foreign policy became a natural step.

With the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in 1979 and the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989, China—after 40 years under the People’s Republic—finally embarked on a path of fully opening its borders and engaging in normal diplomatic relations with the world’s major powers.

History has shown that China’s prolonged self-isolation—beginning in the late Qing dynasty and persisting until the reform and opening up—led to self-inflicted hardship, leaving the country outside the global tide of modernisation. The brief and partial opening in the late Qing, along with the openness during the “golden decade” (1927–1937) in the Republic of China, fostered active engagement with developed nations and rapid national development. However, these periods of progress were short-lived and quickly stifled. In contrast, the 40 years of reform and opening up, despite facing both domestic and international challenges, leveraged openness to catalyse reform, ultimately propelling China into the ranks of the world’s major economic powers. The stark contrast between self-isolation and openness in shaping China’s development trajectory offers a profound lesson for reflection.

II. Under Pressure from Stronger Countries: The Emergence of Moral Idealism

The first thirty years of the People's Republic of China’s foreign diplomacy should have been a phase in which the country began to engage relatively normally with the international community. However, due to both international and domestic factors, China was unable to develop a normal diplomatic mindset, foreign policy, or diplomatic initiatives. The stubbornness in choosing a bloc, the dominance of a confrontational mindset, the prioritisation of confrontation, and the tension created by survival crises pushed China into self-imposed isolation.

A country’s diplomacy should ideally involve international engagement across different systems, nations, circumstances, peoples, and cultures. However, at the founding of the People’s Republic, China’s policymakers made a firm decision to “lean to one side.” This choice may have had its rationale given the specific conditions of the time, but it deviated from the diplomatic strategy an infant country should have pursued—one that skillfully manoeuvres among various powers to draw on resources for national development.

Particularly, when Western countries were not in direct confrontation with China and even sought to maintain diplomatic relations, China nonetheless resolutely tilted toward the Soviet Union. This left China unable to create a favourable international environment conducive to its survival and growth. Later, as China fully broke with the Soviet Union and remained unaligned with either bloc, the resulting drag on its development was profound and cannot be overstated.

Such a diplomatic predicament has been experienced by many newly established nations. Take the United States as an example. At its founding, the U.S. also struggled to immediately develop mature diplomatic thinking. Having broken free from British colonial rule and gained independence, it soon found itself on the path to direct confrontation with the world’s most powerful country at the time. Although France supported America’s fight for independence, its overall strength was not comparable to that of Britain.

Within the United States, the Founding Fathers were also divided between the French and British models of national development, leading to differing diplomatic preferences. Figures like George Washington leaned toward Britain, while Thomas Jefferson favoured France. At the time of America’s founding, the war with Britain had just ended, making immediate reconciliation between the two countries unlikely. As a result, the U.S. also found itself “leaning to one side”—inclining toward an alliance with France to counter British suppression.

Fortunately, the pro-British faction within the U.S. took appropriate and timely measures, preventing the country from following France's radical democratic path and instead establishing a national development plan in line with the British model. This saved the U.S. from paying a heavy price for its national development.

A key factor in this approach was the foresight of George Washington, the nation’s first president, who understood that the U.S. could not afford to lean too heavily toward either Britain or France. On one hand, Washington worked to unify the political forces of the various states and promote national cohesion. On the other hand, he signed treaties with Britain to end the antagonistic relationship between the two countries. At the same time, he handled relations with France, Spain, and other countries with caution. By adopting a neutral diplomatic stance, he sought to ensure that U.S. foreign policy was guided by principles of justice, with decisions on war and peace determined by national interests.

In the early years of the United States, there was no decisive alignment with either of the two great powers; nor was there a singular focus on engaging only with weaker nations. The Founding Fathers, through trials and collisions of ideas, fortunately, established more rational diplomatic thinking, which helped the country gradually create a favourable international environment for its development.

When the People’s Republic of China was founded, it faced a world of powerful nations poised to exploit its vulnerabilities, and the international environment was highly tense. This had been China’s basic international reality since the Opium Wars. As a result, China developed a mindset centred on counterbalancing, resisting, and even confronting stronger nations, which led to a sense of unease in its interactions with them.

In its long-standing position as a weaker country, China also held a moral belief that stronger countries should respect the weak and should not bully them. At the same time, its long history of dealing with weaker countries further shaped its approach to international relations—one characterised by solidarity, compassion, and mutual support among the weak.

This situation not only reinforced a psychological tendency in the international community to resist hegemonic powers on moral grounds but also nurtured and solidified the belief in moral righteousness—that the weak, when united, could overcome the strong. These two mindsets profoundly shaped China’s national and diplomatic thinking.

When receiving assistance from powerful countries, China regarded it as a moral duty, and therefore, did not feel gratitude. When dealing with weaker countries, China would often offer generous financial aid, seeing it as an expression of virtue. As a result, China earned a good reputation in its diplomatic relations with weaker countries but struggled to move beyond the realm of moral opposition in its relations with the stronger powers.

Because China has consistently engaged with weaker countries in its diplomacy, it has consciously shaped its international moral image. China has deliberately positioned itself as a representative of latecomer nations and, in moral terms, has found it natural to adopt an internationally idealistic policy.

This is closely tied to China’s long-standing Confucian cultural tradition. The core spirit of Confucianism is moral idealism, as reflected in the saying: “正其义不谋其利，明其道不计其功。” “Uphold righteousness and do not seek gain; expound the Way and do not plan for merit.” (Biography of Dong Zhongshu, Han Shu).

This kind of moral idealism, which rejects utilitarian pursuits and focuses solely on upholding virtuous values and principles, can certainly foster a high level of moral excellence in personal conduct. However, for a nation, it risks leading into a non-political, anti-economic moral territory: by resisting self-interest, it may develop an aversion to great powers who prioritise national interests and it may strongly rebuke and reject diplomacy centred on power dynamics.

From the perspective of moral principles in international politics and diplomacy, this approach has its merits. However, in terms of real-world international affairs and the costs and gains of national interests in global interactions, it can create psychological barriers that hinder a country’s ability to compete effectively on the world stage.

Moral idealism in diplomatic thinking and power-based thinking in international politics can, in theory, complement and coexist with each other. The former, as a value benchmark, constrains and guides diplomatic actions, preventing diplomacy from degenerating into a naked struggle for interests. The latter, as a behavioural guide, strategically applies a combination of hard power, soft power, and smart power to steer diplomacy in ways that safeguard national interests. The coordination of these two approaches is a hallmark of a country’s diplomatic maturity and dexterity.

Achieving this level of diplomacy is no easy feat. Most countries, constrained by limited power, can only rely on the former to expand their diplomatic space—a situation China has long faced. The power-based diplomacy of Western countries is perceived by the Chinese as hegemonic diplomacy, and the value-driven principles they uphold in diplomacy are viewed as hypocritical justifications or mere façades.

This perspective is closely tied to China’s historical experiences in modern times. Since the late Qing period, China has suffered greatly in its diplomatic encounters with Western powers. The Chinese people came to believe that the West’s advantage in diplomacy stemmed from its sheer strength and that Western countries had used “strong ships and powerful cannons” to forcibly open China’s doors. This was seen as a blatant and unvarnished example of “power diplomacy.”

In response to Western power-based diplomacy, China had little recourse but to rely on its traditional weapon—moral idealism. As a result, China has been committed to condemning the strong for bullying the weak and the powerful for oppressing the small, while strongly advocating for equality between nations, regardless of size or power. This reflects a classic form of moral idealism in diplomatic thinking, as it is grounded entirely in moral judgments and prescribed behaviours.

Beneath this idealism lies a deeper value system and behavioural tendency: when China’s power grows significantly, under the moral principle it upholds, it is the now-stronger nation and but still enforcing its principle. China’s enduring self-identification as an ally of the weak and an adversary of the strong has long been the foundation of its moral idealism, consistently underpinning its diplomatic values.

However, since the reform and opening-up, this deeply rooted mindset has undergone a significant shift. In 1983, Deng Xiaoping wrote an inscription for Beijing Jingshan School— 面向现代化、面向世界、面向未来 “Education should face modernisation, the world, and the future.” It was more than just a directive for the education system; it signalled a broader shift in China’s domestic and foreign policies.

Each of the three elements carried a specific focus, marking major specific transformations: Facing modernisation meant reversing outdated traditions and truly initiating China’s transition to modernisation. Facing the world signified breaking away from isolationism and fully opening China to global engagement. Facing the future represented moving beyond outdated and rigid ideological rhetoric and truly opening the door for national development.

This shift was not only a correction to the policy of partial integration into the world before the Cultural Revolution but also a definitive end to the isolationist policies during the Cultural Revolution, signalling China’s full engagement with the world. Deng Xiaoping envisioned a complete world, not a partial one—and in terms more familiar to people today, it was "globalisation." In diplomacy, the inscription guided China from the situation where foreign policy was primarily focused on developing countries, and into a new diplomatic landscape aligned with developed countries. This was a major adjustment to the foreign policy orientation established in the first thirty years after the founding of the People's Republic of China.

Opening the door to Western developed countries has profoundly impacted China’s rapid development over the past 40 years. The diplomatic shift toward improving relations with these countries has enabled China’s modernisation to achieve remarkable accomplishments that have garnered worldwide attention. Without the involvement of Western developed countries, it would be impossible to explain China’s rise today. This is the true significance of China’s reform and opening up.

Against the backdrop of adjustments in China-U.S. relations, some have suggested that China could close its door to the U.S. while remaining open to other regions of the world. This is a pipe dream. Opening up is meaningful only when it includes engagement with the world’s most advanced country. Moreover, the U.S. and its allies constitute the very “Western countries” with which China once engaged in full confrontation. Closing the door to the U.S. is, in effect, closing the door to developed nations. To shut out the world’s most advanced economies while remaining open only to less developed countries would be a return to the “diplomatic” situation of the Cultural Revolution. From this perspective, we can better understand the deeper meaning of [Xi Jinping’s] statement, " There are a thousand reasons to make China-US relations a success, but not a single reason to break it."

The shift towards “Modernisation, the world, and the future” not only reshaped diplomatic thinking but also influenced China’s approach to domestic policymaking. However, it is important to recognise that even within this pragmatic policy orientation, China still retains a deeply rooted diplomatic mindset grounded in moral idealism. That said, this thinking has clearly evolved from the pre-reform era: In terms of official policy orientation, China has indeed shifted toward a realistic approach. In terms of fundamental national principles, it continues to adhere firmly to the ideological foundations dictated by its political system.

Regarding the former, even capitalist market economies incorporate elements of planning, and socialist planned economies can benefit from market forces. This pragmatic synthesis has become the defining characteristic of China’s unique “socialist market economy” and the driving force behind its remarkable progress in both domestic and foreign affairs over the past 40 years. Based on this approach, China has continuously adjusted its rigid economic and social systems to sustain rapid economic growth while actively engaging with Western countries to create a more favourable international environment for development.

As for the latter, regardless of whether China’s economy experiences prosperity or adversity, the fundamental principles sustaining the state system must remain unshaken. As early as the first years of reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping most adamantly articulated the “Four Cardinal Principles” (四项基本原则):

1. Keeping to the path of socialism

2. Upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat

3. Upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC)

4. Upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought

These four principles, politically regarded as the “very foundation for building China,” may appear to be a set of power-oriented, realist propositions. However, the underlying assumptions reveal a deeper idealistic meaning:

1. Adhering to the path of socialism is based on the belief that capitalism is inherently exploitative and must be morally condemned, whereas socialism ensures that the people are the masters of the country, making its moral legitimacy indisputable.

2. Upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat is justified by the view that bourgeois dictatorship serves only the interests of a privileged few who control capital, whereas proletarian rule represents the broad masses, whose moral superiority is self-evident.

3. Maintaining the leadership of the CPC is grounded in the argument that other political parties in China represent specific interest groups, while the CPC honours its commitment to “serving the public good and exercising power for the people.”

4. Adhering to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought is based on the conviction that they uncover the fundamental laws of history and contain enduring truths unmatched by any other ideological system.

Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Cardinal Principles” occupy the highest ground in defining China’s fundamental values and system, holding even greater importance than GDP growth in economic terms or improving relations with Western countries in diplomatic terms.

Thus, domestically, any economic, social, or political efforts aimed at strengthening the country must align with its ideological positioning. Diplomatically, the pursuit of equal standing with great powers, the effort to break free from their constraints, and the process of learning how to engage with them must all be guided by values consistent with China’s higher-order principles.

More recently, Xi Jinping has also emphasised the theoretical integrity and advancement of Marxism as China’s guiding ideology:

"Marxism is a scientific theory that reveals the rule of human society development in a creative manner. Marxism is a theory of the people, the first ideology for the liberation of the people themselves. Marxism is a theory of practices that directs the people to change the world. Marxism is an open theory that is constantly developing and always stands at the frontier of the times."

Building on the principle of “Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth,” Xi further reinforced the unshakable establishment of Marxism’s guiding role in China:

“Practice has proven that the fate of Marxism has long been intertwined with the fate of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people, and the Chinese nation. Its scientific nature and truth have been fully tested in China, its people-centred nature and practical application have been thoroughly implemented in China, and its openness and relevance to the times have been fully demonstrated in China. Practice has also proven that Marxism has provided a powerful ideological weapon for China’s revolution, construction, and reform, enabling China, this ancient Eastern nation, to create an unprecedented development miracle in human history. It is perfectly right for history and the people to choose Marxism, as well as for the CPC to write Marxism on its own flag, to adhere to the principle of combining the fundamental principles of Marxism with China’s reality, and continuously adapt Marxism to the Chinese context and the times.”

This serves as a reaffirmation of the value-political principles emphasised by Deng Xiaoping.

Throughout China’s modernisation process, from the late Qing dynasty to the present, China has consistently reconstructed itself and engaged in diplomatic activities under the preying eyes of great powers. This has shaped its historical experience and belief that “weak countries have no diplomacy,” placing China in a passive position, often being pulled along by the actions of stronger nations.

This situation has led to two key outcomes: on one hand, China has strived to become a powerful nation; on the other hand, it has become accustomed to engaging with weaker countries. As a result, this has meant that China’s moral idealism is either directly exposed to the public, or remains subtly hidden quietly guiding both its domestic and foreign policies.

III. The Interaction Between Domestic and Foreign Affairs: The Integration of Moral Ideals in Internal and External Realms

It has become widely accepted that diplomacy is an extension of domestic affairs. Why? There are two fundamental reasons.

First, modern diplomacy originated with the formation of the nation-state. Matters within a country are classified as domestic policy, while interactions between nations are defined as foreign policy. After the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the nation-state gradually solidified its role as the central actor in world politics. Some discussions of the relationship between nations as “diplomatic relations” attempt to trace it back to much earlier periods, such as the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) or the city-states of ancient Greece. However, this argument is untenable.

It must be understood that diplomatic relations are specific to modern nation-states, and a key event marking their rise was the Peace of Westphalia. The relationships between city-states like Athens and Sparta cannot be considered modern diplomatic relations. For example, when Athens engaged in military action with Sparta, was their relationship domestic or diplomatic? Both were city-states within the Greek world, and their interactions often took the form of military alliances for attack and defence. Their relationship was domestic when united against external powers, such as the Persian Empire, and it was only then that their interactions could be seen in a manner resembling modern diplomacy.

Similarly, the relations between vassal states during the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BCE) in China cannot be understood as modern diplomatic relations. In earlier times, these states were all part of a unified central monarchy. Even when the vassal states rose to prominence, they gained prominence, they continued to operate within the framework of “controlling the emperor to command the vassals” for legitimacy, which was far removed from modern diplomacy.

In the medieval period, the West constructed a global society under the unified banner of Christianity, where territorial boundaries of secular states were not the central feature. States often operated within the framework of empires, with occasional interactions between the states and the empire that could be considered diplomatic. In this imperial logic, regions inhabited by ancient nations often lacked the attributes of modern states or were directly viewed as vassal territories. The interactions between these vassal states do not easily align with the concept of diplomacy.

In the Christian society, all believers were considered God’s chosen people, which led to a de-emphasis on ethnic identity and obscured political boundaries based on ethnicity. In this context, the concept of diplomacy is difficult to define. It was only with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia that the modern notion of the sovereign state emerged, establishing the nation-state as the central political entity. With a clear distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, modern diplomacy emerged as a distinct concept: a nation-state independently manages its internal affairs within its sovereign borders, with the government both overseeing domestic governance and representing the country internationally. The modern nation-state thus fulfils the dual roles of “protecting its citizens’ rights domestically and defending against external enemies.” These two functions of the state, regardless of its regime type—whether democratic or authoritarian—remain largely consistent.

“Defending against external enemies” is not the entirety of a nation-state’s diplomatic activities, but it highlights a fundamental characteristic of modern diplomacy. First, a state is established based on a natural condition, where only when individuals agree to participate in a community do they adhere to its commitments and agreements, thus forming a political entity. Without a defined community, individuals exist in an international state of nature. The jurisdiction of a sovereign state is territorial, meaning individuals can enter or leave it. Entering a community implies a commitment to its jurisdiction while leaving means no longer being subject to it. This establishes the boundaries between states and highlights the relationship between a state’s domestic and foreign affairs. Domestically, individuals are compatriots; externally, the state distinguishes between its citizens and foreigners.

Second, to resolve territorial disputes, states must establish treaties and agreements to clarify the geographical scope and effectiveness of their jurisdiction, as well as to determine the ownership of property, such as labour and industry. As a result, states may form alliances. Vast spaces outside these treaties, such as oceans and outer space, are considered the common heritage of humanity.

Third, the external powers exercised by a sovereign government include authority over war and peace, union and alliance, and all matters involving foreign individuals and societies. The dynamic nature of international relations means that no international relationships are permanently stable, which is reflected in the adage, “There are no permanent enemies, and no permanent friends, only permanent interests.” Nevertheless, the option of peace generally outweighs war, confrontation is less effective than cooperation, and inclusive alliances are stronger than exclusionary ones.

The diplomacy of a nation-state is an extension of its domestic affairs for several key reasons. First, domestic affairs are crucial for the survival of the state. If a country’s internal situation is so unstable that it cannot sustain itself, diplomacy becomes irrelevant. In such circumstances, the entity responsible for diplomacy ceases to exist alongside the entity for domestic affairs.

Second, the approach to diplomatic matters is grounded in domestic governance. In the power structure of modern states, external power is no longer a separate third power [in addition to legislative and executive powers] as in John Locke’s theory, but is instead a specific function within the executive branch. Diplomats, therefore, are part of the government apparatus, rather than independent agents representing the state.

Moreover, from the perspective of the functioning of state power, domestic affairs aim to protect the rights of members of the political community, and diplomacy must align with this principle. Therefore, the fundamental tasks of diplomacy—defending national sovereignty, preserving national dignity, and protecting national interests—are all predetermined by domestic policy. True, the execution of diplomacy is distinct from domestic affairs because diplomacy occurs between multiple states and must account for the demands and interests of various parties, distinguishing it from purely internal concerns. However, the guiding principles that shape diplomatic behaviour are firmly rooted in the state’s internal governance.

Diplomacy, as an extension of domestic affairs, means that the logic of domestic politics determines the logic of international behaviour. China is no exception—its domestic logic dictates its diplomatic logic. The domestic logic of the People’s Republic of China has both historical conditions and practical motivations behind its formation and function.

From a historical perspective, the People’s Republic affirms that it inherits both new and old traditions, emphasising the role of these traditions in guiding contemporary politics. “Contemporary China has grown out of the China of the past; we are Marxist in our historical approach and must not lop off our history. We should sum up our history from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen and take over this valuable legacy.” (Mao Zedong, 1938, The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War). Although there have been strong anti-traditional movements in the history of the People’s Republic, these have been intermittent political actions. Traditional Chinese culture, particularly the resilient influence of Confucianism, has continued to shape the politics of the People’s Republic. In present-day China, under the direct advocacy of the leaders of the ruling party, the modern revitalisation of Confucian heritage has been integrated into the country’s political agenda. As a result, Confucian moral idealism continues to exert a spiritual influence on both China’s domestic and foreign policies.

Simultaneously, the ideological foundation of the CPC in founding the state also carries evident moral idealism. The belief that the proletariat represents the highest human morality has shaped the communist ideals set forth for the People’s Republic by its founding leaders. Viewed from this moral high ground, domestic affairs indeed seem to reflect the sentiment expressed by Mao Zedong: “The blue sky on his back, he looks down to survey Man’s world with its towns and cities…” (Mao Zedong, 1965, Two Birds: A Dialogue). These two forms of idealism—Confucian and Marxist—together shape the fundamental character of Chinese politics. With such an idealistic foundation in domestic politics, it is natural that China’s diplomatic activities also bear a similar idealistic imprint.

From a practical perspective, China built its modern nation-state in the context of revolution. The direct goal of the revolution was to overthrow the rule of imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, and feudalism—referred to as the “three mountains”—in China. This created a clear life-and-death division between the revolutionary forces and the “three mountains.”

The Chinese Revolution unfolded in two phases—the New Democratic Revolution (1919-1949) and the Socialist Revolution (1949-1978). The first phase, in Mao’s words, was “the revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism waged by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat -- this is China's new-democratic revolution, and this is the general line and general policy of the Communist Party of China at the present stage of history.” (Mao Zedong, 1948, Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area) This revolution could only be led by the proletariat and the CPC, as they alone stood at the moral and historical high ground—no other class or political party in Chinese society had the capacity to lead such a profound transformation.

The second stage of the revolution aimed to realise the ideal of communism—where goods are abundant and distributed according to need, individuals develop freely and comprehensively, and all the flaws of capitalism are overcome, fulfilling humanity’s long-held ideals. These two revolutions are interconnected: “The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel to the democratic revolution. The ultimate aim for which all communists strive is to bring about a socialist and communist society.” (Mao Zedong, 1939, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party) Naturally, the success of the second revolution could not have been achieved without the leadership of the CPC.

Based on the logic of domestic affairs, when the People’s Republic conducts diplomacy, it assesses the targets of its diplomatic activities through both traditional moral idealism and revolutionary moral idealism, which ultimately shape the basic principles and values of its diplomacy.

During the New Democratic Revolution (1919-1949), having identified imperialism as the primary target, the CPC, which had not yet come to power, considered imperialist countries—particularly Western powers—as hostile forces. After the revolution, China’s foreign policy of “leaning to one side” continued to reflect this division between revolutionary allies and imperialist adversaries. The revolutionaries and their targets were irreconcilable, and thus, post-revolution, China remained in steadfast confrontation with imperialist countries. Unifying all possible allies among the world’s oppressed peoples and confronting the imperialist powers who must be confronted became a central tenet of China’s foreign policy before reform and opening up. As a result, China’s diplomatic focus was primarily on building relationships with Third World countries. Key diplomatic breakthroughs, such as China’s entry into the United Nations, were largely supported by these nations.

After reform and opening up, while China and Western countries appeared to engage in mutually beneficial exchanges, the deeper logic of moral idealism underlying this diplomatic interaction was not immediately apparent—unless conflict arose. In moments of friction or confrontation, this moral idealism would abruptly come to the forefront.

A recent example is the ideological conflict underlying the trade war between China and the U.S. During this conflict, China sought to occupy the moral high ground, condemning U.S. unilateralism and emphasising its stance on globalisation, multilateralism, and free trade as direct expressions of its values. At a deeper level, China positioned itself in contrast to the self-interested and amoral orientation of imperialist powers, asserting its righteousness, moral mission, and higher moral standing. This brought the traditional division between the imperialist camp and the revolutionary camp back into focus. The core domestic principles that China firmly upholds once again played a powerful role in shaping its foreign policy. The integration of moral conviction into both domestic and foreign policies is a defining tool by people for grasping China’s diplomatic approach.

IV. Foreign Policy Based on Domestic Politics: The Extension of Moral Idealism

The logic behind China’s foreign policy is shaped by both the domestic political ideology and traditional moral idealism of the Chinese party-state. Among these, the party-state ideology has been the decisive factor, while traditional moral idealism plays a more supplementary role.

However, in practice, the influence of China’s domestic logic on foreign policy is shaped by the interaction between idealistic positioning and the current realities. When China was weaker in the international arena, moral idealism was the dominant factor, with realism playing a secondary role. As China’s power grew, moral idealism continued to serve as the foundation, with realism emerging more prominently in certain contexts.

This moral underpinning can be explained for two main reasons. First, it aligns with the ideological foundation of the state. After all, China remains the “People’s Republic,” established on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. It is entirely natural that a country’s ideology should guide its political direction. Second, from a practical standpoint, in its earlier, weaker stages, moral idealism was a crucial tool for mobilising national strength. Even though the power mobilised was more spiritual than material, this idealistic appeal was vital for the state’s survival and preferable to an entirely unmobilised national power. Moreover, when facing foreign powers, this moral stance could give China a strong position, casting Western “invaders” in a guilty light.

As China has grown stronger, the moral idealism emphasised by the party-state—including the goal of “liberating all of humanity”—naturally reasserts itself as a guiding principle in its foreign policy actions. The combination of increased national strength and the moral obligation toward humanity as defined by the state has infused China’s diplomacy with a renewed sense of purpose.

Normally, diplomacy is a relatively independent activity within a country’s functions, for it is shaped by a range of factors such as international politics, economics, society, and culture. As a result, it can be challenging for a country to seamlessly translate its domestic logic into its foreign affairs. Diplomacy, being an interaction between states, inherently involves actions and decisions that extend beyond the scope of a nation’s sovereignty or operate at the edges of national sovereignty. This is entirely typical within the context of a standard nation-state.

However, China’s diplomatic activities have a unique characteristic that is often overlooked: China has transcended the conventional framework of a nation-state. The construction of the Chinese state is deeply shaped by ideology, with the idealism embedded in this ideology being unmistakably clear. This results in a binary “us versus them” distinction: those who embrace China’s ideology belong to the “our” camp, while those who oppose it are categorised as part of the “enemy” camp.

This ideological divide profoundly shapes China’s diplomatic strategies. From a strategic perspective, this influence is evident in how China divides diplomatic camps based on ideological alignment. When there is ideological convergence between China and another country, historical conflicts—no matter how deep—potential geopolitical dangers—no matter how severe—or even real economic and trade benefits—no matter how minimal—are often disregarded. In such cases, that country is regarded as a friend, and efforts must be made to strengthen diplomatic relations.

Conversely, if an ideological divide exists, even in the absence of historical conflicts, if the geopolitical gain from establishing relations with that country aligns with the traditional Chinese strategy of “befriending distant states while confronting those nearby,” or if there are already realised or potential economic interests, that country is unequivocally categorised as an enemy of the state. Even when diplomatic relations are unavoidable, China remains vigilant. Beyond mere exchanges of interests, it maintains a clear understanding of the nature of the country and upholds the long-term mission among the country’s leadership. This international approach is determined by the very nature of the Chinese state.

This kind of diplomatic thinking, directly derived from domestic politics, also shaped China’s simplistic and straightforward approach to international relations. At the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the country adopted a “black-and-white” approach to international politics, distinctly distinguishing between enemies and allies. This binary judgment stemmed from domestic politics, as the division between friends and enemies in revolutionary circumstances was critical to the success or failure of the revolution.

As Mao Zedong stated, “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies. A revolutionary party is the guide of the masses, and no revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads them astray. To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution and will not lead the masses astray, we must pay attention to uniting with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies.” (Mao Zedong, 1925, Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society)

When this mentality was extended to foreign policy, the sharp distinction between friends and enemies, driven by a dichotomous mindset, led Mao Zedong to adopt a clear-cut position in establishing foreign policy after the founding of the country—particularly opposing any neutral stance. As Mao stated, “In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.” (Mao Zedong, 1949, On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship)

It is entirely natural for a newly established country that has endured long periods of humiliation and oppression at the hands of Western imperialist powers to harbour strong animosity toward them. Conversely, it is equally logical for such a country to feel gratitude and hope for alliances with nations that sympathised with, supported, and assisted its revolution and nation-building efforts. This “black-and-white” thinking and bloc alignment enable a country emerging from devastation to swiftly establish its diplomatic framework with minimal expenditure of national resources. However, these judgments, deeply woven into the nation’s fabric, inevitably develop into a lasting and influential diplomatic ideology that continues to shape foreign policy.

In the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China, foreign affairs were largely characterised by a “leaning to one side” toward the Soviet Union. During periods of favourable Sino-Soviet relations, the two countries enjoyed broad, friendly ties across ideology, state relations, economic exchanges, and international interactions. However, following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, these exchanges became distinctly antagonistic. What is particularly notable is the persistence of China’s deep ideological alignment with the Soviet Union, even after the split.

The situation is very different regarding China’s diplomatic relations with Western developed countries, largely due to the history of Western imperialist actions against China—invading the country, plundering its resources, and suppressing its sovereignty. As a result, Western powers have been regarded as fierce enemies of China, and this enmity remains difficult to resolve.

The root cause of this enduring hostility lies primarily in the deeply entrenched ideological opposition between political systems. Political ideology serves as the foundation of political action. Just as individuals link their beliefs to their actions, nations do the same. In the stark division between socialism and capitalism, a series of irreconcilable choices leave no room for compromise. These include state control versus market competition, central directives versus individual freedom, state leadership versus social autonomy, and short-term focus versus long-term planning. These opposing approaches require clear, decisive choices—there is no space for a middle ground.

While socialism does need to address the development of productive forces, it is definitely not about yielding to the capitalist model. Instead, socialism focuses on strengthening its own material foundation, which is essential for challenging and ultimately overcoming capitalism. The interplay of a solid material base and the laws of historical development ensures that socialism will prevail in the life-or-death competition between the two systems. This ideological divide explains why China’s relationship with Western powers remains fraught with friction, and why forming genuine alliances with them proves so difficult.

After the reform and opening up, China’s political and social thinking began to diverge, and state power no longer equals public judgment. As a result, there was greater flexibility in social thinking and behaviour within the country. However, it is essential to note that public opinion has never been able to dominate China’s foreign policy, and it is even more unlikely to shift China’s diplomatic approach. In modern states, foreign policy is exercised through state power—public opinion can influence, but it cannot determine foreign policy. China is no exception to this. This allows ideological-driven thinking to continue playing a significant role in shaping China’s diplomatic strategy.

After reform and opening up, China’s foreign policy inherited the binary, us-versus-them, left-or-right, life-or-death mentality from the revolutionary period, which aimed to simplify complex and multifaceted international relations. In China’s contemporary foreign policy, the world dominated by two superpowers, as framed by the three-worlds theory, led China to adopt a two-front strategy. This approach was later wisely adjusted to align with the U.S. against the Soviet Union, marked by Nixon’s 1972 visit to China. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, China saw the world transition from a bipolar to an order with the U.S. as the sole superpower and multiple other poles. As a result, China prioritised managing Sino-American relations. Once China’s GDP ranked among the world’s largest and Europe faced internal turmoil, China viewed the international landscape as evolving into a world order led by both China and the U.S. The concept of “Chimerica” gained traction, and discussions of a “China-U.S. community” began to spread.

However, this international landscape shifted rapidly. As Sino-U.S. trade frictions escalated, the camp mentality—always ingrained in China’s diplomatic thinking—was easily revived. Although the Chinese government adopted a restrained approach, the public, influenced by traditional diplomatic thinking, expressed the sentiment that China and the U.S. were “destined for war.” This discourse was evident not only on public platforms like WeChat and Weibo but also in elite discussions on Sino-U.S. relations. More importantly, the growing diplomatic confrontation between China and the U.S. began to significantly shape China’s foreign policy, becoming a symbolic reflection of the country’s diplomatic mindset.

For some, even China’s proposal of “a community with a shared future for mankind” and its implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative were seen as strategic responses to the U.S. blockade. The belief that China and the U.S. are “destined for war” led to debates over which side would prevail, further escalating Sino-U.S. Relations. So far, the answers to this question have all been framed in moral terms: on the state level, China positions itself as morally superior to the U.S., advocating for multilateralism, free trade, and win-win cooperation; in the eyes of the public, the U.S., an inherent bully, will inevitably lose to China, a nation that upholds virtue. China’s rise is seen as unstoppable, while America’s decline is viewed as inevitable. If diplomatic rationality is maintained at the state level, at the general public level, the moral-driven elements of foreign policy thinking are strikingly evident.

At least among the Chinese public, the “winner-takes-all” diplomatic mindset has had a profound social impact. This mindset originated during the revolutionary era when there was a clear division between enemies and allies. In a life-or-death struggle between opposing forces, as Mao Zedong said, it was indeed difficult to envision a “third road.” The revolution to overthrow imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, and feudalism as the sole correct path was the precondition for the success of the Chinese revolution led by the CPC. Without this ideological certainty, the revolution would not have had the necessary spiritual drive to succeed.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, this mentality continued to profoundly shape the governing mindset, extending into foreign policy ideas such as “leaning to one side” and a readiness to struggle. Consequently, diplomatic relations evolved from cooperation and competition to a more adversarial stance, narrowing into a life-or-death struggle that rejected coexistence. Even more strikingly, driven by traditional moral ideals and supported by revolutionary values of moral justification, the belief that “victory is ours, defeat is the enemy’s” became ingrained in the public consciousness. This mindset significantly shaped China’s diplomacy, which continues to be guided by a “win-or-lose” mentality in its diplomatic actions.

V. China's Diplomatic Thinking: Moral Realism or Moral Idealism?

What kind of value system guides China's international behaviour, or rather, what kind of purpose does China uphold in its diplomatic activities? Yan Xuetong 阎学通, Honorary Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, introduces a novel concept of “moral realism 道义现实主义” to define the value basis of China's international actions.

The central concern of moral realism is how “a rising state is able to replace the dominant state,” or in other words, how “the world power centre” shifts. The core explanation offered by moral realism is that “a rising state’s political leadership surpasses that of the dominant state.” Yan argues from international relations theory that moral conduct in international affairs can align with pragmatic realities and that these realities must be grounded in moral principles. He uses the ancient Chinese maxim yishen zuoze (以身作则, “leading by example”) to illustrate this idea.

Moral realism emphasises that power is the central component of national interests, which drive a nation’s foreign policy. These interests are categorised into four domains: politics, security, economy, and culture. In the realm of international politics, key indicators of national interests include territorial sovereignty, maritime rights, voting power in international organisations, and the right to explore outer space.

Capability, on the other hand, includes both material and nonmaterial resources. It is divided into four domains: politics, military, economy, and culture. In this model, political capability functions as an operational element, and the other three (military, economy, and culture) are resource elements.

Yan’s theory argues that, in international politics, a country seeking to protect its power and enhance its capabilities must adhere to both low-level and high-level moral standards. Low-level moral codes include respecting alliances, honouring commitments, and treating heads of state with dignity. High-level moral codes involve upholding integrity, authority, and credibility. According to Yan, the ability of a rising state to replace a dominant state depends on whether it follows wangdao (王道, the principle of humane authority), badao (霸道, the principle of hegemony), or the principle of tyranny.

Tyrannical leadership operates according to the norm of power, or, in other words, the law of the jungle. A humane authority practices moral principles. Hegemonic leadership follows a double standard—upholding moral principles with allies while adopting the law of the jungle toward nonallies.

Apparently, within the theoretical framework of moral realism, humane authority, deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture, is precisely the form of international leadership that aligns with China’s values.

In the context of modern international political theory, Yan Xuetong’s ideas are coherent and can be supported by empirical evidence from global politics. Based on the framework of realist international relations theory, Yan distinguishes between the elements of power and morality and offers explanations as to how they influence each other. This approach reveals valuable theoretical implications of shifts in international political leadership.

Indeed, hegemonic and tyrannical leaderships cannot win international recognition. As the chapter of Hongfan in the Book of Documents (Shang Shu 尚书) says:

Avoid deflection, avoid partiality;

Broad and long is the path of humane authority.

Avoid partiality, avoid deflection;

Level and easy is the path of humane authority.

Only humane authority in international politics can enable a country to exercise international leadership with both authority and recognition. However, in contemporary China's unique international political actions, Yan Xuetong's explanation may encounter some empirical and theoretical challenges.

First, theoretically, moral principles are inherently idealistic, while realistic principles are definitely grounded in power. If idealistic principles are fully applied, then there is neither room for realistic assessments of strengths and weaknesses, nor any necessity for interests-based considerations. When one is “upholding righteousness and not seeking gain; expounding the Way and not planning for merit.” (Biography of Dong Zhongshu, Han Shu), one is, in fact, instrumentalising morality. In this case, moral realism would not be able to address the challenge of its own logical contradiction: using morality as a pretext for pursuing profit.

Second, in actual international political actions, if the principle of power is the primary realist principle, then the principle of morality should serve merely as a behavioural modifier. Only in this way can the principle of power be consistently realized. On the other hand, if morality becomes the guiding principle, it would necessitate downplaying or even disregarding shifts in power to maintain the consistency of moral principles. These two logics cannot be freely interchanged.

Third, in terms of the logic of actions, although pursuing power while adhering to moral principles is the ideal state of human action--where motivations and outcomes are aligned--in practice, any action guided by moral principles is likely to result in either a sacrifice of interests or a loss of power. This is because only by forgoing material wealth can one prove their true morality; and only by suffering a loss of strength can one prove that their intent is to increase the power or benefits of others. This happens where interests are fixed constants rather than variables. Yet even if the action results in a net increase in material benefits for all parties involved, there remains the question of how these benefits are distributed. If the leading party ends up with a larger share of the increased benefits and their power is enhanced, this will lead to doubts about the moral motivations behind their actions, revealing the true pursuit of profit.

This can be corroborated by the traditional Chinese ideal of humane authority, which is rooted in the principles of “extensively conferring benefits on the people, and being able to assist all,” and “in regard to the aged, giving them rest; in regard to the young, treating them tenderly.” This can also be understood through the characteristics of hegemonic leadership, which, while adhering to some moral principles, tends to focus on machinery, strengthen agriculture, and invest heavily in military power. The former aims to win people’s hearts, while the latter clearly believes in the power of force. The fundamental differences between humane authority and hegemonic leadership are also articulated in Mencius's analysis:

“He who uses force and makes a pretence to benevolence is a hegemon. A hegemon requires a large kingdom. He who uses virtue and practises benevolence is a humane prince. A humane prince need not wait for a large kingdom. Tang did it with only seventy li, and King Wen with only a hundred. When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit because their strength is not adequate to resist. When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts' core they are pleased, and sincerely submit, as was the case with the seventy disciples in their submission to Confucius.” (Gongsun Chou I, Mengzi)

This distinction can be seen as a division of the types of ideals. However, in practical terms, it also serves as a guiding framework for differentiating between two political forms: morality and power, which are evidently mutually exclusive.

China's diplomatic thinking can be termed "moral idealism." Moral idealism consists of two components. One is the ancient element. In ancient times, morality was entirely based on unilateral idealistic motives. As Confucius said, "Is virtue a thing remote? I wish to be virtuous, and lo! virtue is at hand." (Book of Shuo Er, Analects of Confucius). The ideal political system is envisioned as one where governance seeks to ensure that “in their hearts’ core they are pleased,” aiming to earn sincere submission through shared wealth and stability. As Confucius stated, “If remoter people are not submissive, all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil.” (Book of Shuo Er, Analects of Confucius).

In the actual political operation of ancient China, the “international” political logic constructed by the Zhou Dynasty feudal system [which arranged the relationships between the centre and peripheral regions based on geographical proximity] and the Tianxia (天下, all under heaven) system created a world order through the distinction between civilised and barbarian states. Countries incorporated into the Tianxia system were seen as less civilised, or barbarous, compared to China. As a result, China was viewed as the uplifter of their civilisation, the benefactor of their economic interests, and their rescuer in times of crisis. However, how the other ancient countries integrated into the Tianxia system reacted was not a concern for the architects of this system.

Zhao Tingyang 赵汀阳, Academician of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), argues that China’s Tianxia system is a "whirlpool model," where China operates based on its own principles, while other countries have voluntarily become part of its sphere of influence. China did not conquer these nations; it expanded continuously in a peaceful manner. This assertion reflects China’s self-perceived noble motives, much like the way Confucius describes the noble person in the Analects:

Confucius said, "The way of the superior man is threefold, but I am not equal to it. Virtuous, he is free from anxieties; wise, he is free from perplexities; bold, he is free from fear." Zi Gong said, "Master, you are describing yourself." (Book of Xian Wen, Analects of Confucius)

This perspective on the Tianxia system does not account for how the tributary countries within the system perceived China’s role. Even if these countries viewed China as an aggressor, defenders of the Tianxia system still consider it a morally idealistic model for international order.

Second, the modern element. In modern international politics, few countries attempt to win others’ admiration by elevating their own moral standing or through moral persuasion. Instead, hegemonic leadership always focuses on actively seeking power growth, with little emphasis on raising civilisational or moral standards to gain recognition from other nations. This logic has remained consistent from ancient to modern times, reflecting the essential nature of politics.

The fundamental difference between ancient and modern politics does not lie in resolving political issues through counter-political moral methods, but in reducing the likelihood of conflict through institutional constraints. Such institutional frameworks, which align the interests of multiple parties, are seen as morally acceptable. This is a basic conclusion drawn from examining diplomatic activities through the lens of realist diplomacy.

But does moral idealism have an irreplaceable role in the broader context of international politics, where the pursuit of national power predominates? The answer is yes. The reason is simple and clear: it serves to define international politics at a higher level, constraining unchecked competition between states and preventing international politics from devolving into a “law of the jungle” environment. Whether it is the dominant state occupying international hegemony or a rising state vying for it, both, even when driven purely by national interests, must justify their actions through moral idealism. In this context, moral orientation and practical demands can integrate, even though these two distinct logics do not operate at the same level.

Moral idealism is grounded in a deeply stirring sense of moral righteousness, which can be especially empowering when there is a significant disparity in strength between stronger and weaker nations or societies. For the weak, who cannot balance the strong through power, condemning the latter’s bullying or exploitation from a moral standpoint is always a valid stance. At the same time, moral idealism serves to inspire the weaker party to resist the stronger, fighting for their rightful moral stance. It can also motivate the weak to unite, strengthen their resolve, and guide them forward in the struggle for political, economic, military, and cultural rights.

Mao Zedong used this moral appeal to empower China, then at a disadvantage, in its challenge against imperialism, colonialism, and feudalism. He also leveraged it to initiate a new phase in Sino-American diplomacy amid the complex triangular relations between China, the U.S., and the Soviet Union. This shows that moral idealism, even when not backed by power, can still play a functional role in international politics.

From the perspective of moral idealism, people tend to believe they occupy the absolute moral high ground, rendering their every action justifiable and beyond reproach. Moral idealism represents the power of good, while extreme realism symbolises the power of evil. Viewing international politics as a battle between good and evil makes it even easier to inspire a deep moral conviction in people, giving moral idealism a kind of appeal and empowerment that strength-based politics cannot match. Numerous historical instances of the weak prevailing over the strong provide factual support for the power of morality in international politics.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, there has been no structural change in China’s diplomatic thinking; moral idealism has consistently been the core diplomatic philosophy. One might question, however, whether Mao Zedong’s breakthrough in Sino-U.S. relations during the Cultural Revolution was driven by a realist diplomatic mindset. And, since the reform and opening up, China has flourished on the international stage and become the biggest beneficiary of economic globalisation—was this not the result of a realist diplomatic approach? It is true that these outcomes stemmed from a realist diplomatic approach. However, this does not mean that China’s diplomatic thinking model is fundamentally realist.

Realist diplomatic actions at a given moment or in a specific context may indeed reflect decisions influenced by a realist diplomatic approach. However, diplomatic thinking is not shaped by temporary issues; it is the result of the long-term accumulation of diplomatic experience, historical memory, and deeply held values. Over time, these elements merge into a self-sustaining and highly stable framework, and as such, it is not easily shaken. The moral idealism at the core of China’s diplomacy is rooted in centuries of profound moral traditions and values. It is further supported by the foundational principles of the Chinese Revolution and the CPC. As long as these structural conditions undergo no structural changes, China’s moral idealist diplomatic thinking will remain largely unchanged.

VI. Realigning the Values of China’s Diplomacy

Moral idealist diplomatic thinking prioritises grand, long-term, and in-depth considerations over short-term, superficial, or immediate concerns. Sometimes, these more immediate concerns can create vast space for realist diplomatic actions, even if they are moral realistic ones. This space can lead observers to mistakenly classify China’s diplomacy as realist, pragmatic, or utilitarian. Such judgments also risk misinterpreting the win-or-lose, life-or-death, and winner-takes-all mentality often observed in Chinese society extending to the nation’s foreign policy approach.

Indeed, such opinions are often seen in foreign policy discussions within China, but they stem from a misreading of the surface in China’s diplomatic actions. It is true that China does not shy away from safeguarding its national interests in diplomacy, international exchanges, and global competition; and since the reform and opening-up period, this focus on national interests has become increasingly prominent in China’s external behaviour. However, a closer examination reveals that China’s strategy in international affairs—particularly in its competition with Western nations—is not centred on short-term victories or setbacks in isolated issues. Rather, China is convinced that it is destined for grander, deeper, and longer-term success. This conviction arises not only from its moral standing rooted in idealism but also from the legitimacy of its proletarian revolution and the Communist Party’s commitment to governing for the people. Together, these elements represent an unparalleled advantage globally. Achieving this advantage will require time, resources, and recognition, but the ultimate outcome is already assured.

For China’s diplomacy today, moral idealism serves as a guiding vision that sustains both the grander strategic framework and future aspirations. Just as China’s revolution had to pass through two stages—the New Democratic Revolution and the Socialist Revolution—before it could hope to realise its communist ideals, China’s diplomatic goals must also navigate the immediate realities of the international environment. This requires crafting rational diplomatic concepts in response to these realities and implementing practical policies. Only in this way can China progress toward the eventual realisation of its ideal objectives.

Therefore, while moral idealism—often disconnected from current realities—remains a noble aspiration that requires nurturing, it is crucial for China’s diplomatic concepts to be grounded in reality and practically implemented. Without this foundation, the effectiveness of diplomatic actions will diminish, and the risk of setbacks in international relations will increase. Such outcomes would hardly bode well for the continuity of China’s moral idealistic diplomatic thinking, which is anchored in a grand, long-term vision.

To develop a more practical, reality-oriented diplomatic mindset, China must be clear on several key points: First, China is just one of over 200 nation-states and regions that have gradually emerged since the Peace of Westphalia. Therefore, China must learn to engage with the various members of the world of nation-states. This understanding of the nature of countries is fundamental to China’s national diplomacy. Without it, China will be in a state of internal confusion, struggling to define its own nation's nature in interactions with other countries.

Currently, some view China as a civilisation-state that has been consistent throughout history, rejecting the classification of a nation-state. Others see it as a self-contained Tianxia system, arguing that it should neither be regarded as a Western-style empire nor a rapidly rising modern power. While these arguments have some basis, they ultimately confuse China’s diplomatic positioning. Particularly in the eyes of other nation-states, as long as China denies its identity as a nation-state, it is effectively seeking global privileges and hegemony. This will undoubtedly pose significant obstacles for China in conducting normal diplomatic activities.

Second, China must recognise the importance of engaging with great powers. As China achieves remarkable economic growth, the country must also accumulate rational experience in interacting with other major powers. Historically, due to the strict Haijin (海禁) or maritime trade ban during the Ming and Qing dynasties, China endured a prolonged period of self-imposed isolation and remained relatively detached from the outside world. As a result, China’s understanding of foreign countries has been limited, leading to a natural state of timidity when engaging internationally. Furthermore, after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the national policy of opposing imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary forces pushed China back into a tense state of isolation, further reducing its diplomatic exchanges. Consequently, China’s experience in dealing with both strong and weak nations has been notably insufficient.　

Historically, starting with the Ming dynasty’s ban on maritime trade and the prohibition of missionaries entering China’s core areas, China developed a national habit of narcissism in isolation. Later, when the Chinese emperor resolutely rejected the request of George Macartney, Britain’s first envoy to China, to open British trade during the Qing dynasty, it further entrenched the policy of self-isolation. In the late Qing period, China’s disregard for international trade norms sparked commercial conflicts with the West. During the Republic of China era, Chiang Kai-shek’s rejection of both Soviet-style socialism and Western capitalism became another kind of isolationist ideology. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, this isolationist and narcissistic mindset reached an extreme.

It can be said that China had a very brief period of adaptation to the modern world of nation-states, and its experience in engaging with other countries remains limited, particularly when it comes to the diplomatic skills needed to interact with major powers. What is meant to be noble moral idealism in diplomacy became, for a time, a self-isolationist stance that rejected engagement with the outside world. Moreover, the founders of the People’s Republic were adamant that “diplomacy has no small matter 外交无小事,” elevating it to the highest levels of importance and making it a highly specialised concern for the top leaders of the state. Meanwhile, the general public lacked both recognition of this matter and the information, channels, or willingness to engage in or evaluate diplomacy. This created significant barriers to the development of public diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges—critical components of modern diplomacy.

Third, China’s diplomacy needs to establish a mechanism that integrates grand strategy with specific policies. At the grand strategic level, particularly in terms of long-term objectives, moral idealism may temporarily retain its place. However, the primary focus of China’s diplomacy should be on how to steadily advance and secure victories in areas where it can and should win, before achieving grander, deeper, and longer-term success. In this regard, Shi Yinhong’s warning about China needing to avoid “strategic overdrawing” is an important issue that warrants attention. Strategic overdrawing refers to the severe imbalance between a country’s goals and its means, and between its objectives and available resources—pursuing goals that are too grand to be supported by available means or objectives that are too numerous for the resources at hand.

Shi Yinhong, Professor at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China, clearly noted that, following China’s significant achievements during the reform and opening-up period, it has recently “opened up or consolidated so many ‘new battlefields’ or ‘new fronts,’ none of which can deliver a conclusive victory in the short term. As a result, China will be engaged in multiple or multi-front ‘battles’ in the foreseeable future.” From a strategic perspective, Shi saw this as a concerning development. Furthermore, the persistently slow growth of China’s economy in recent years, coupled with the sharp increase in its international involvement and overseas expansion, could exacerbate the situation. Shi emphasised, “To use an analogy, China’s ‘savings’ are likely to be slowly but persistently decreasing, while its expenditures are increasing at a rapid pace. The fundamental risk of ‘strategic overdrawing’ may, therefore, be rising.”

Therefore, Shi emphasised, “China becoming a great world power is an undertaking that will require the efforts of several generations, each continuously advancing and making sustained efforts. What is the best achievement that each generation can hope for? It is to roughly complete the basic tasks of the historical stage they are in.” This perspective aligns perfectly with my earlier point that China must balance upholding the grand, in-depth, and long-term focus of moral idealism while addressing its current complex foreign affairs.

It can be said that, given the current international environment China faces, its moral idealism in foreign policy needs to undergo some adjustments and, on that basis, establish fundamental guidelines for managing foreign affairs.

First, China must politically desensitise foreign affairs. Foreign affairs are highly complex, involving various domains such as politics, economy, military, culture, society, and technology, each offering opportunities for engagement. Among these, political exchanges between countries are the most significant. Foreign affairs take different forms, including official diplomacy, power diplomacy, public diplomacy, and people-to-people diplomacy. As noted earlier, the most important form is state-to-state diplomatic exchange.

When diplomacy is treated as a highly sensitive state matter, it becomes a political issue that can hinder active engagement. Therefore, it is crucial for China to politically desensitise foreign affairs, allowing for a more pragmatic approach when dealing with countries that have different ideologies, political systems, economic structures, historical traditions, and cultural environments. This is particularly important in interactions with countries and regions like the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Relatively speaking, in dealings with the Islamic world, the rest of the Asian countries, African nations, and the Americas, the need for political desensitisation is less pronounced. This is, of course, intricately tied to factors such as China’s modern history, Sino-Western relations, revolutionary background, camp alignment choices, historical confrontations, and international recognition.

Political desensitisation means approaching international political issues with a nuanced, globalised mindset, rather than hastily drawing enemy lines based on simplistic or rash political value judgments. It is about refraining from treating politics as an all-or-nothing, life-or-death confrontation. In the international community, friction, conflict, and opposition between countries are inevitable, but interdependence, cooperation, and compromise are equally essential. Referring to international rules, engaging in marathon negotiations, nurturing cooperation opportunities, and striving for win-win outcomes are diplomatic principles that must be upheld.

In diplomatic activities, it is crucial to avoid, by all means, the mindset that resorts to disengagement at the first sign of conflict, presuming the inevitability of war or that only one side can prevail. The frequent use of the phrase “destined for war” in China’s public discourse, particularly concerning relations with countries in conflict with China, reflects impulsive rhetoric driven by political sensitisation. Such rhetoric is counterproductive to China’s efforts to maintain positive relations with other nations in the international community. China must avoid slogan diplomacy. Political desensitisation means precisely moving away from slogans—such empty rhetoric holds no practical value when handling foreign affairs.

Second, China needs to cultivate a consciousness of “others.” In the traditional framework of moral idealism, China has developed a way of thinking and acting based on its own moral stance, where the “others” are often regarded as secondary or insignificant. While a foreign policy that centres on “me” and treats the “others” as supplementary may reflect China’s proactive and enterprising approach to foreign affairs, it also makes it difficult to create an international environment for peaceful coexistence where differences are addressed rationally, and cooperation is pursued in a spirit of respect and equality among nations.

For China, the tendency has long been to approach international relations through the lens of political ideologies, state systems, historically established friend-or-foe dynamics, and its own moral judgments. As a result, even when China acknowledges the existence of “others”—especially powerful ones—it remains reluctant to engage with countries that differ ideologically, have different state systems, have historically been antagonistic, or do not align with China’s self-defined moral standards. Even when engagement is unavoidable, such nations are still viewed as hostile forces in terms of values and deeper relations. This can be illustrated by today's Sino-Russian friendship and Sino-American friction.

Learning to engage with diverse, heterogeneous “others” is a crucial step for China in becoming a mature modern nation and truly integrating into the international community.

Third, China needs to cultivate a win-win diplomatic mindset. Since reform and opening up, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation have been core principles guiding China’s foreign relations on paper. However, fully achieving this goal still requires some hard work. The reason is that China has long approached diplomatic relations with both strong and weak countries through a win-or-lose, zero-sum mentality. Win-win cooperation is also a code of international behaviour advocated by Yan Xuetong’s “moral realism,” though his focus tends to be more on the shift in international leadership between established powers and rising ones.

In the international arena, a country must, based on its realistic circumstances, weigh the gains and losses of its interests. However, at the same time, it must be willing to consider the interests of others if it expects the same consideration in return. Under the influence of moral idealism, a country may easily come to see itself as always providing benefits to others. A sense of pride in acting justly, even at the cost of its own resources, can lead to a moral superiority complex, particularly toward countries receiving aid. Ironically, this can result in a double whammy: on one hand, substantial resources are spent aiding the other country, while on the other, the sense of superiority may hurt the recipient’s feelings, preventing them from feeling gratitude and even causing dissatisfaction or resentment toward China.

Thus, only by recognising that every member of the modern international system is a truly equal participant and by treating others rationally and equally can China engage in more expansive, long-term, win-win cooperation with other nations.

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