Yan Xuetong on the era of regression in international politics
Leading international relations scholar explores transition from post-Cold War globalization to an era of deglobalization, uncertainty, and cyber threats.
It's not the most uplifting piece for New Year's Eve, but the theme feels appropriate for a time of endings and beginnings. Yan Xuetong (阎学通), Honorary Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University and a leading figure in China's international relations (IR) field argues in the following article that the current era has moved beyond the post-Cold War period, yet has not entered a new Cold War. Instead, he describes this phase as "An Era of Regression in International Politics," characterised by "deglobalisation, uncertainty, and cyber threats."
Yan also acknowledges the lack of consensus on the defining features of the current period, noting that clarity often comes only with hindsight. His reflections are imbued with a sense of uncertainty and concern for future trajectories, which reminds me of this line from Richard Wagner's Das Rheingold:
Gleams no more on you maidens the gold,
in the newborn godly splendour bask ye henceforth in bliss!
—Yuxuan Jia
The article was originally published in Issue 2, 2023 of 世界经济与政治 World Economics and Politics, a journal issued by the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Yan recently wrote Why China Isn’t Scared of Trump in Foreign Affairs.
Yan recently commissioned this translation but hasn't reviewed it before publication.
阎学通：国际政治倒退的时代
Yan Xuetong: An Era of Regression in International Politics
The concept of an "era" refers to the demarcation of a specific historical period based on distinctive political, cultural, economic, or technological characteristics. Depending on the defining characteristics used for this demarcation, different interpretations of the same period may arise. For example, if defined by political conditions, the current period may be called the "Deglobalisation Era"; if based on military factors, it could be referred to as the "Nuclear Era"; if defined by economic conditions, it might be termed the "Digital Economy Era"; and if viewed through technological lenses, it could be called the "Internet Era."
Every historical era consists of three phases: its beginning, continuation, and end. At the beginning of an era, people's understanding of its characteristics is often limited, and the judgments made at this stage are typically speculative, leading to considerable disagreements. However, once an era has concluded, people have a clearer understanding of its defining features. At this point, judgments about the era become more inductive, resulting in fewer disagreements and making it easier to reach a consensus.
From the perspective of international politics, there was the Cold War Era and the post-Cold War Era. These two eras have now ended, and as a result, there is much greater consensus than disagreement in academia regarding their defining characteristics. However, the current international political landscape is entering a new era. Judgments about the defining characteristics of this era are still speculative, leading to significant disagreements. While the current international political situation is objective, people perceive this reality from different perspectives and with varying levels of understanding. This affects the formation of a consensus on the defining features of the present era, creating a "blind men and an elephant" scenario. This means that all assessments of the present era are subject to historical scrutiny, and no judgment has yet reached absolute certainty.
I. The Direction of Regression in International Politics
The main disagreement on the defining characteristics of the current international political era centres on whether the world has entered a "new Cold War." Some argue that we are indeed in a "new Cold War," while others contend that it is not a "new Cold War" but rather an "uneasy peace." In my view, the current international political landscape has three main characteristics: deglobalisation, uncertainty, and cyber threats. These features sharply contrast with the globalisation, stable great power relations, and global governance that marked the post-Cold War period. Based on this, I define the present era as the "Era of Regression in International Politics."
The policies adopted by major economies against globalisation have led to a trend of deglobalisation. Actions against globalisation refer to policies aimed at reducing economic interdependence with other countries, to the end of ensuring national economic security. When major economies act against globalisation, the trend of deglobalisation inevitably emerges.
The 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK marked the initial phase of deglobalisation; the U.S.-China trade friction in 2018 signalled the rise of its main force; the widespread border closures during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 entrenched this trend; and in 2022, sweeping sanctions and decoupling measures against Russia following the Ukraine crisis represented a new peak of deglobalisation.
With the occurrence of these four events, the deglobalisation strategies of major economies have become increasingly clear: the United States with its "small yard, high fence" strategy, Europe focusing on strengthening internal EU supply chains, Japan and India actively engaging in the U.S.-led "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework," and Russia pivoting to an economic system detached from the U.S. and Europe.
The uncertainty in international politics is manifested in the escalating strategic confrontation and conflict among major powers, accompanied by growing fear toward one another and rising concerns over security. Since 2018, the "decoupling" events between China and the United States in the technological field have continued unabated. In 2022, the visit of the U.S. House Speaker to Taiwan triggered a significant escalation in tensions across the Taiwan Strait. In 2019, relations between the United States, France, and Germany deteriorated, with France criticizing the U.S. for failing to fulfil its leadership role in NATO, describing the alliance as experiencing "brain death." Military clashes occurred between China and India at the border in the Doklam region in 2017 and the Galwan Valley in 2020. Following the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition bill unrest, Sino-British relations soured, extending their ideological confrontation into other domains. In 2020, the UK announced a ban on Chinese 5G technology. In 2022, countries such as the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan provided military aid to Ukraine in response to Russia's actions. Subsequently, Germany and Japan decided to alter their defence policies and increased their defence spending to 2% of GDP.
The advancement of digital technology has expanded great power competition from the physical realm into cyberspace, elevating cybersecurity to a vital, and increasingly central element of national security. During the Ukraine crisis, Russia's weaker cyber capabilities compared to NATO underscored that military advantage in physical space alone was insufficient to achieve political objectives. Trump's victory in the 2016 election and his loss in the 2020 election are both directly related to the influence of online public opinion.
Digital technology has driven the rapid development of social media, allowing public opinion to reverse overnight, posing a serious threat to regime security. Simultaneously, the digital economy has deepened wealth and income disparities within major countries, exacerbating social and political divisions. China, Russia, the European Union, and Japan have all introduced cybersecurity strategies, viewing cybersecurity as an important component of their national security strategies. The European Union has even begun discussing whether it needs to establish its own "internet firewall".
II. The Extent of Regression in International Politics
The current "regression" in international politics is assessed in relation to the post-Cold War era of globalisation. If the historical frame of reference is expanded to the early 20th century, contemporary international politics would appear relatively straightforward and moderate compared to the complexity and rivalry of the two World Wars, and comparatively peaceful and stable in relation to the tensions of the Cold War.
Compared to globalisation, deglobalisation entails greater uncertainty, primarily because objective changes in international politics diverge from people's subjective expectations. Certainty arises when objective outcomes align with expectations, while uncertainty emerges when they do not. Globalisation, characterized by political democratisation and economic marketisation, aligns closely with people's expectations, fostering a stronger sense of certainty. Deglobalisation, however, is marked by power consolidation and market fragmentation, contradicting these expectations and generating uncertainty.
Nonetheless, nuclear deterrence remains unchanged, keeping the risk of direct war and nuclear conflict among major powers very low. For instance, the Ukraine crisis has not escalated into a direct conflict among major powers nor spread to neighbouring countries. As a result, the certainty of today's international politics, while lower than that of the post-Cold War era, remains higher than during the Cold War or the two World Wars.
Compared to the unipolar structure of the post-Cold War era, the current international landscape has become significantly more complex. Today's deglobalisation coincides with the transition from U.S. dominance to Sino-American competition. Under the post-Cold War unipolar structure, maintaining the international order was closely tied to preserving U.S. hegemony. Consequently, the United States demonstrated a strong willingness to uphold the international order, providing extensive public goods. Other major powers, faced with a substantial power gap, were unable to challenge U.S. leadership and instead benefited from the stability and resources the U.S. provided. As a result, international politics during that time was relatively straightforward.
However, with the ongoing shift in the international order, the U.S. views the globalisation-preserving world order as benefiting China the most, diminishing its willingness to uphold the system. The U.S. has not only relinquished its leadership role but has also actively undermined the order through trade protectionism, withdrawal from international organisations, and breaches of arms control agreements.
In the absence of global leadership, tensions and conflicts among major powers have escalated, rendering current international politics more complex than during the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, this complexity remains less pronounced than that of the Cold War's bipolar structure or the periods of the two World Wars.
The severity of cyber threats today has surpassed that of the post-Cold War era, yet the loss of life they cause remains far lower than that of wars. Strategic competition among major powers has extended into cyberspace, broadening the dimensions of rivalry. However, using casualty numbers as a measure of competition intensity, current major power competition ranks higher than in the post-Cold War period but lower than in the first 90 years of the 20th century.
In the digital age, the core of competition lies in digital technological advantages, which is less intense than the ideological supremacy struggles of the Cold War. Digital technology competition predominantly occurs in cyberspace, resulting in significantly fewer casualties compared to the geopolitical rivalries of physical space. This competition, however, can potentially be integrated into physical geopolitical conflicts, as evidenced by the Ukraine crisis.
Globally, the scale of casualties from wars in the digital age shows a declining trend, far lower than during the two World Wars or the Cold War. While the advancement of digital technology coincides with trends of deglobalisation and power consolidation, the precision of smart weapons has notably reduced unnecessary casualties in modern warfare.
The factors driving the current regression in international politics are multifaceted, with no consensus in academia on a definitive core cause.
From the perspective of political ideologies, the rise of populism has brought populist leaders to power in several major countries, prompting governments to pursue deglobalisation policies. From the perspective of power imbalances, the ongoing shift in the international order has increased the complexity of competition among major powers. From the perspective of digital technology, the emergence of social media has amplified the likelihood of abrupt shifts in public opinion, undermining regime security and introducing greater uncertainty into foreign policy and international relations. From the perspective of economic structures, the digital economy has intensified wealth polarisation both within and between nations, fueling growing social demands for reforms to address these inequities.
In summary, academic assessments of the characteristics of the current era remain largely predictive, offering relatively superficial insights and limited accuracy regarding its underlying causes. Governments around the world also hold varying perceptions of the present era. In the absence of a definitive conclusion, it is essential to consider diverse perspectives and avoid being constrained by a single viewpoint.
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