Zhang Weiying presents a timely and essential critique of our tendency to defer to self-proclaimed experts when making critical decisions about international affairs. His systematic documentation of forecasting failures should give us pause before accepting punditry as wisdom. While the Politburo draws on rigorous academic and institutional advisers whose commitment to national interest supersedes personal ambition, many governments and organizations remain vulnerable to influential voices whose credentials rest more on confidence than competence.
The danger intensifies when we consider a dimension Zhang's argument might further explore: the active manipulation of circumstances by actors who use emerging data not merely to forecast but to engineer outcomes. In today's deeply interconnected global system, sophisticated players routinely exploit this complexity to steer events in ways that defy traditional prediction. When self-appointed experts offer forecasts, they often fail to account for, or may even participate in, these strategic interventions that deliberately introduce volatility and redirect trajectories.
This renders conventional expert forecasting not merely unreliable but potentially misleading. These interventions frequently operate on short-term dominance logic that contradicts both rational analysis and historical patterns. Following expert consensus in such an environment means navigating by maps that no longer match the terrain.
Perhaps we need a fundamental shift in approach: rather than building forecasts on linear extrapolations of bounded events—the stock-in-trade of most international affairs experts—we might better understand our current reality through frameworks like chaos theory. This means identifying patterns within the deliberately engineered turbulence of contemporary geopolitics rather than pretending the world follows predictable paths. The question isn't whether experts can forecast accurately—Zhang demonstrates they cannot. The question is whether we'll continue granting them influence over consequential decisions despite this documented failure.
Zhang Weiying presents a timely and essential critique of our tendency to defer to self-proclaimed experts when making critical decisions about international affairs. His systematic documentation of forecasting failures should give us pause before accepting punditry as wisdom. While the Politburo draws on rigorous academic and institutional advisers whose commitment to national interest supersedes personal ambition, many governments and organizations remain vulnerable to influential voices whose credentials rest more on confidence than competence.
The danger intensifies when we consider a dimension Zhang's argument might further explore: the active manipulation of circumstances by actors who use emerging data not merely to forecast but to engineer outcomes. In today's deeply interconnected global system, sophisticated players routinely exploit this complexity to steer events in ways that defy traditional prediction. When self-appointed experts offer forecasts, they often fail to account for, or may even participate in, these strategic interventions that deliberately introduce volatility and redirect trajectories.
This renders conventional expert forecasting not merely unreliable but potentially misleading. These interventions frequently operate on short-term dominance logic that contradicts both rational analysis and historical patterns. Following expert consensus in such an environment means navigating by maps that no longer match the terrain.
Perhaps we need a fundamental shift in approach: rather than building forecasts on linear extrapolations of bounded events—the stock-in-trade of most international affairs experts—we might better understand our current reality through frameworks like chaos theory. This means identifying patterns within the deliberately engineered turbulence of contemporary geopolitics rather than pretending the world follows predictable paths. The question isn't whether experts can forecast accurately—Zhang demonstrates they cannot. The question is whether we'll continue granting them influence over consequential decisions despite this documented failure.
Yuxuan and Zhijian: another excellent piece. Thank you! Geremie