Thank you for this fine article. It is probably significant that the book was published in 1999, long before Xi Jinping became Party Secretary, during the last few years of General Secretary Jiang Zemin which seem to have been the most recent peak of Party openness.
I like to think of General Secretary Xi's view as Make China Great Again, the later MAGA -- Make America Great Again of President Trump sounds similar.
There were various empires that called themselves say Qing or Ming or Song or Tang that had core areas within the Chinese cultural region and then expanded to other territories, sometimes incorporating and assimilating them totally, others areas assimilating to a much lesser degree such as the Tibetan, Xinjiang and Mongolian areas.
There have been many states of Chinese culture existing in the region of what is China today. Some were founded by invaders such as the Yuan and the Qing but Chinese today are proud of them. I sometimes wonder if Japan had won World War II would the Chinese, two or three hundred years from now, be boasting about the glories of the Nippon Dynasty (although maybe it would have a different name)?
Some Tibetans and Uyghurs would like to see Tibet and Xinjiang as independent countries. These feelings seem to have been intensified by the way they have been treated by the Chinese central government. Even though Beijing has been spending vast amounts of money improving the infrastructure and living conditions of the people in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Like someone once said, you can do all kinds of things, but I will never forget the way you made me feel. Economically it would be better for Xinjiang and Tibet to be part of China. Why do many of the local inhabitants disagree? There are religious and cultural differences and more recent histories of repression.
The Dalai Lama has said that Tibet could be part of China if the Tibetans had true autonomy that would enable them to protect their culture, language and religion. Autonomy, despite the number of autonomous regions and districts China has, is something that Xi Jinping seems to be retreating from. That autonomous areas might have people thinking thoughts and even organizing themselves in ways the Party disagrees with is alarming to the Party which as one might say in dated American slang is a 'control freak'.
Many people in those areas have a desire for autonomy and religious freedom which the Communist Party, which has its own quasi-religious political philosophy and its own intense faith that only it can lead China to its great historical destiny, cannot accept. Article One of the PRC Constitution demands that the Party be in control and no criticism of China's system be permitted. Of course if Chinese people had genuine freedom of speech and of media, then there would be much more and stronger criticism of the Communist Party. That Party isn't wrong about that.
To make the division at 1840 is understandable from the specifically Chinese point of view, but it does seem to be a case that imperialism is OK when it is Han Chinese but not OK when it is western imperialism.
Then there is the argument that Chinese imperialism was benign while western imperialism was nasty. Both were true for both at various times, however there is the natural human tendency which at its extreme leads to racist thinking. That is while I make excuses for people on my own side and minimize their bad behavior, while for people on the other side I give everything the worst interpretation and make no allowances for them at all.
Of course the South China Sea has other names -- in the Republic of the Philippines it is the West Philippine Sea and in Vietnam it is the East Vietnam Sea!
As for the since ancient times argument, the famous nine-dotted line in the South China Sea dates back to 1947 from the last few years of the Republic of China.
History is complicated and where we stand is where we sit. It is difficult to escape even partially from the seas of assumptions and perspectives in which we are all immersed.
Given that different peoples will have different views on history, desires to self-govern and to self-determination, the answer is to follow the law and for the law to be applied consistently and predictably in all cases. For example, if you believe that a peoples have a right of self-determination if they feel that they are being oppressed, then I take it that you support the right of the peoples of the Donetsk and Luhansk to unilaterally declare independence from Ukraine? After all Ukraine had severely restricted Russian culture, Russian language and the Russian Orthodox religion across Ukraine - a situation far worse than what is happening in Tibet and Xinjiang now.
Forgive me for degrading the quality of this excellent article and comments by posting. I have to say how wonderful they are. I suppose I feel that way because they conform to my beliefs, but seeing others express them so incredibly is inspirational. Those of us at the lower tiers of intellect have to count on those above us, and it gives me hope that my optimism about the future isn't misplaced.
China’s problem is simple Sinocentrism. It’s a mentality. You can’t argue against it rationally. Eg, “Tibet belongs to China! Ever since the Qing. The British took part of Tibet. Give it back!” As you can see, arguments over lost territory never work the other way round — i.e., it’s still ours even though it’s gone. Also, China is taking the South China Sea even though there’s no historical justification for it. (The claim is based on an ROC historian’s take on it.) How do you argue against that?
In particular, this statement: “It’s what China can use for historical justification. Not just based on an RoC claim as you stated.”
The first actual claim was made by the ROC in the mid 20th century. That’s a fact. It used as part of its justification voyages made during the Ming dynasty. This was continued by the PRC. “Not based on an RoC claim” is a completely misplaced statement.
I would rather them claim and then argue, fight and then go back to normal programming. Be it China or an ASEAN country. Better than having a full fledged naval war on the basis of “Might makes right”.
Some of the ASEAN countries are also claiming against each other and China. Still what has it got to do with you? My country will suffer directly because our trade routes connect through the South China Sea. I rather they argue with water cannons than duke it out with firepower.
Read the title of the article again. It isn’t only about Taiwan. You mentioned South China Sea and gave a simplistic explanation: “simple sinocentrism”. It isn’t. That’s my point.
And I said the claim was made by the ROC, which you disputed. It turns out I was right. The justifications and post-rationalisations are easily found (Cheng Ho, etc.), but the claim does NOT go back to the Qing or even the Ming. You appear to be missing this point entirely, perhaps because you are completely in sympathy with the claim?
RoC is the one claiming. We know very well the governments of RoC and PRC have very different ideologies. That’s why it is not that simple to tag ‘simple sinocentrism’. I’d read somewhere that the PRC removed two dash lines from the Gulf of Tonkin but not RoC. Could be wrong but frankly I don’t care about the claim.
They can argue until the cows come home and the chickens roost. Indonesia is itself a maritime powerhouse, capable of defending its claims. Along with the rest of ASEAN. My stance is to let them sort it out amongst themselves.
Chinese dynasties and regime have a habit of basing their territorial claims on previous dynasties. The PRC essentially claims for China what the ROC claimed. —- One exception is Mongolia, which Chiang Kai-Shek relinquished but later went back on. Eventually it was Mao who relinquished (Outer) Mongolia. There are still rabid nationalists in China who maintain that Mongolia belongs to China.
The Qing did not claim the South China Sea as Chinese territory (天下). It was the ROC that first asserted the claim, in the 1930s, if I remember rightly. Of course it was based on Cheng Ho, etc., as well as other evidence (sailing instructions, assertions that the sea was sailed by Chinese traders, etc). The PRC is only continuing the ROC claim.
The Qing may not have included it because the rulers were Manchurians - their ethnicity deal with more of land conquests than naval. Not of the Han ethnicity. We can go on and on but you might want to delve deeper because the simple sinocentrism you talk about is not simple or really sinocentrism.
So you were actually wrong about the dating of the claim. How many other territorial claims have been made in retrospect? How much of China’s claims (eg, the claim to ancient origins for China’s ownership of Taiwan) is due to the peculiar mentality that caused the Chinese government to attempt to have the Nantes Museum special exhibit on the Mongol Empire to be retitled “China’s Steppe Empire”? (The Chinese were rejected and Mongolia stepped in to fill the breach). I called it “Sinocentrism”, the Japanese, who have their own peculiar axe to grind, call it 中華思想, but it’s a mentality, however you look at it. The article we are discussing attempts to respond to these peculiar claims by means of clear and rational considerations. My point is that you can’t counter a mentality with rational arguments.
South China Sea has an additional historical justification : Admiral Zheng He.
China didn’t teach me this.
Singapore and Malaysia taught me this.
Not an RoC claim.
Just a further stretch back into the Ming Dynasty which collected some tributary vassal states in Asia, and sunk a few Portuguese colony ships in their merry way.
On the bright side, China doesn’t colonise beyond their land borders. History dictates their preference for tributary states, not colonised ones.
On the not-so-bright side, territorial arguments with China end up messy.
Really thoughtful points. You show just how complicated and sensitive the whole topic of unity, autonomy, and historical memory can be, especially when different political systems and experiences are involved.
How could China move toward a kind of national unity that doesn’t fear regional autonomy, cultural differences, or diversity, but actually sees them as the foundation for long-term stability? And how can that kind of model stay credible in a world where “self-determination” is so often used as a political tool, by both Western and non-Western powers?
I agree that the argument that territory has historically been part of China since ancient times is useless legal statement to make in addressing the question of whether any territory should or should remain a part of China. But the fact that it is a useless statement is itself a useless point to make. It is a non sequitur that leads nowhere useful, and I question the bona fides of this publication in making a mountain of what is not even a molehill.
The questions are and have always been what under international law is recognised as part of a country's territory, what is currently recognised, and what would be required for a part of what is recognised as part of a country's territory to be recognised as no longer being part of that country's territory, and to what extent does international law recognise a right of self-determination by people who live on territory now recognised as belonging to a particular country to legally break away without giving the country a right to take back that territory.
You are right: simply saying that Alsace-Lorrain is part of French ancient territory means nothing legally. But dismissing that statement as legally meaningless does not then give the people of Alsace-Lorrain a right to declare independence unilaterally or declare a decision to join Germany without reference to the French government or the French people. Ditto for Corsia, Northern Ireland and Scotland. So making a big deal of dismissing this statement is a complete red herring. A far more useful discourse is to answer the questions I set out above. Where would Mr Li or this publication stand for example on the international recognition of Somaliland?
The question is of course of considerable complexity under international law, but there is no general right to self-determination except under currently accepted very narrow circumstances, none of which apply to existing territories currently recognised under international law as part of China. And if Mr Li or this publication would grab the bull by the horns to directly address how international law would treat this issue -- noting in particular that self-governance as a reason to breakaway is STILL not treated formally as a recognised exception to international law to the basic rule of territorial integrity nor is a vague FEELING of oppression -- I would be most interested to what you would positively argue rather than relying on pointless refutation of an issue that has no meaning under international law in any event.
Thank you for this fine article. It is probably significant that the book was published in 1999, long before Xi Jinping became Party Secretary, during the last few years of General Secretary Jiang Zemin which seem to have been the most recent peak of Party openness.
I like to think of General Secretary Xi's view as Make China Great Again, the later MAGA -- Make America Great Again of President Trump sounds similar.
There were various empires that called themselves say Qing or Ming or Song or Tang that had core areas within the Chinese cultural region and then expanded to other territories, sometimes incorporating and assimilating them totally, others areas assimilating to a much lesser degree such as the Tibetan, Xinjiang and Mongolian areas.
There have been many states of Chinese culture existing in the region of what is China today. Some were founded by invaders such as the Yuan and the Qing but Chinese today are proud of them. I sometimes wonder if Japan had won World War II would the Chinese, two or three hundred years from now, be boasting about the glories of the Nippon Dynasty (although maybe it would have a different name)?
Some Tibetans and Uyghurs would like to see Tibet and Xinjiang as independent countries. These feelings seem to have been intensified by the way they have been treated by the Chinese central government. Even though Beijing has been spending vast amounts of money improving the infrastructure and living conditions of the people in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Like someone once said, you can do all kinds of things, but I will never forget the way you made me feel. Economically it would be better for Xinjiang and Tibet to be part of China. Why do many of the local inhabitants disagree? There are religious and cultural differences and more recent histories of repression.
The Dalai Lama has said that Tibet could be part of China if the Tibetans had true autonomy that would enable them to protect their culture, language and religion. Autonomy, despite the number of autonomous regions and districts China has, is something that Xi Jinping seems to be retreating from. That autonomous areas might have people thinking thoughts and even organizing themselves in ways the Party disagrees with is alarming to the Party which as one might say in dated American slang is a 'control freak'.
Many people in those areas have a desire for autonomy and religious freedom which the Communist Party, which has its own quasi-religious political philosophy and its own intense faith that only it can lead China to its great historical destiny, cannot accept. Article One of the PRC Constitution demands that the Party be in control and no criticism of China's system be permitted. Of course if Chinese people had genuine freedom of speech and of media, then there would be much more and stronger criticism of the Communist Party. That Party isn't wrong about that.
To make the division at 1840 is understandable from the specifically Chinese point of view, but it does seem to be a case that imperialism is OK when it is Han Chinese but not OK when it is western imperialism.
Then there is the argument that Chinese imperialism was benign while western imperialism was nasty. Both were true for both at various times, however there is the natural human tendency which at its extreme leads to racist thinking. That is while I make excuses for people on my own side and minimize their bad behavior, while for people on the other side I give everything the worst interpretation and make no allowances for them at all.
Of course the South China Sea has other names -- in the Republic of the Philippines it is the West Philippine Sea and in Vietnam it is the East Vietnam Sea!
As for the since ancient times argument, the famous nine-dotted line in the South China Sea dates back to 1947 from the last few years of the Republic of China.
History is complicated and where we stand is where we sit. It is difficult to escape even partially from the seas of assumptions and perspectives in which we are all immersed.
David Cowhig
Given that different peoples will have different views on history, desires to self-govern and to self-determination, the answer is to follow the law and for the law to be applied consistently and predictably in all cases. For example, if you believe that a peoples have a right of self-determination if they feel that they are being oppressed, then I take it that you support the right of the peoples of the Donetsk and Luhansk to unilaterally declare independence from Ukraine? After all Ukraine had severely restricted Russian culture, Russian language and the Russian Orthodox religion across Ukraine - a situation far worse than what is happening in Tibet and Xinjiang now.
Forgive me for degrading the quality of this excellent article and comments by posting. I have to say how wonderful they are. I suppose I feel that way because they conform to my beliefs, but seeing others express them so incredibly is inspirational. Those of us at the lower tiers of intellect have to count on those above us, and it gives me hope that my optimism about the future isn't misplaced.
China’s problem is simple Sinocentrism. It’s a mentality. You can’t argue against it rationally. Eg, “Tibet belongs to China! Ever since the Qing. The British took part of Tibet. Give it back!” As you can see, arguments over lost territory never work the other way round — i.e., it’s still ours even though it’s gone. Also, China is taking the South China Sea even though there’s no historical justification for it. (The claim is based on an ROC historian’s take on it.) How do you argue against that?
In particular, this statement: “It’s what China can use for historical justification. Not just based on an RoC claim as you stated.”
The first actual claim was made by the ROC in the mid 20th century. That’s a fact. It used as part of its justification voyages made during the Ming dynasty. This was continued by the PRC. “Not based on an RoC claim” is a completely misplaced statement.
I would rather them claim and then argue, fight and then go back to normal programming. Be it China or an ASEAN country. Better than having a full fledged naval war on the basis of “Might makes right”.
I wish they would give up their aggressive and poorly based claim but I don’t see it happening.
Some of the ASEAN countries are also claiming against each other and China. Still what has it got to do with you? My country will suffer directly because our trade routes connect through the South China Sea. I rather they argue with water cannons than duke it out with firepower.
What has the article got to do with you, for that matter? It’s essentially talking about Taiwan.
Read the title of the article again. It isn’t only about Taiwan. You mentioned South China Sea and gave a simplistic explanation: “simple sinocentrism”. It isn’t. That’s my point.
Which part of the claim have I dated wrong? I didn’t date anything wrong. Just merely mentioned Zheng He as an additional justification on their part.
And I said the claim was made by the ROC, which you disputed. It turns out I was right. The justifications and post-rationalisations are easily found (Cheng Ho, etc.), but the claim does NOT go back to the Qing or even the Ming. You appear to be missing this point entirely, perhaps because you are completely in sympathy with the claim?
RoC is the one claiming. We know very well the governments of RoC and PRC have very different ideologies. That’s why it is not that simple to tag ‘simple sinocentrism’. I’d read somewhere that the PRC removed two dash lines from the Gulf of Tonkin but not RoC. Could be wrong but frankly I don’t care about the claim.
They can argue until the cows come home and the chickens roost. Indonesia is itself a maritime powerhouse, capable of defending its claims. Along with the rest of ASEAN. My stance is to let them sort it out amongst themselves.
Chinese dynasties and regime have a habit of basing their territorial claims on previous dynasties. The PRC essentially claims for China what the ROC claimed. —- One exception is Mongolia, which Chiang Kai-Shek relinquished but later went back on. Eventually it was Mao who relinquished (Outer) Mongolia. There are still rabid nationalists in China who maintain that Mongolia belongs to China.
No, historical textbooks in both countries only admit that Admiral Zheng He came and the Ming fleet was the superpower naval force back then.
It’s what China can use for historical justification. Not just based on an RoC claim as you stated.
The Qing did not claim the South China Sea as Chinese territory (天下). It was the ROC that first asserted the claim, in the 1930s, if I remember rightly. Of course it was based on Cheng Ho, etc., as well as other evidence (sailing instructions, assertions that the sea was sailed by Chinese traders, etc). The PRC is only continuing the ROC claim.
The Qing may not have included it because the rulers were Manchurians - their ethnicity deal with more of land conquests than naval. Not of the Han ethnicity. We can go on and on but you might want to delve deeper because the simple sinocentrism you talk about is not simple or really sinocentrism.
So you were actually wrong about the dating of the claim. How many other territorial claims have been made in retrospect? How much of China’s claims (eg, the claim to ancient origins for China’s ownership of Taiwan) is due to the peculiar mentality that caused the Chinese government to attempt to have the Nantes Museum special exhibit on the Mongol Empire to be retitled “China’s Steppe Empire”? (The Chinese were rejected and Mongolia stepped in to fill the breach). I called it “Sinocentrism”, the Japanese, who have their own peculiar axe to grind, call it 中華思想, but it’s a mentality, however you look at it. The article we are discussing attempts to respond to these peculiar claims by means of clear and rational considerations. My point is that you can’t counter a mentality with rational arguments.
South China Sea has an additional historical justification : Admiral Zheng He.
China didn’t teach me this.
Singapore and Malaysia taught me this.
Not an RoC claim.
Just a further stretch back into the Ming Dynasty which collected some tributary vassal states in Asia, and sunk a few Portuguese colony ships in their merry way.
On the bright side, China doesn’t colonise beyond their land borders. History dictates their preference for tributary states, not colonised ones.
On the not-so-bright side, territorial arguments with China end up messy.
Oh hey, victors write history.
So you are saying that Singapore and Malaysia teach that the South China Sea is Chinese territory? That is interesting.
Really thoughtful points. You show just how complicated and sensitive the whole topic of unity, autonomy, and historical memory can be, especially when different political systems and experiences are involved.
How could China move toward a kind of national unity that doesn’t fear regional autonomy, cultural differences, or diversity, but actually sees them as the foundation for long-term stability? And how can that kind of model stay credible in a world where “self-determination” is so often used as a political tool, by both Western and non-Western powers?
I agree that the argument that territory has historically been part of China since ancient times is useless legal statement to make in addressing the question of whether any territory should or should remain a part of China. But the fact that it is a useless statement is itself a useless point to make. It is a non sequitur that leads nowhere useful, and I question the bona fides of this publication in making a mountain of what is not even a molehill.
The questions are and have always been what under international law is recognised as part of a country's territory, what is currently recognised, and what would be required for a part of what is recognised as part of a country's territory to be recognised as no longer being part of that country's territory, and to what extent does international law recognise a right of self-determination by people who live on territory now recognised as belonging to a particular country to legally break away without giving the country a right to take back that territory.
You are right: simply saying that Alsace-Lorrain is part of French ancient territory means nothing legally. But dismissing that statement as legally meaningless does not then give the people of Alsace-Lorrain a right to declare independence unilaterally or declare a decision to join Germany without reference to the French government or the French people. Ditto for Corsia, Northern Ireland and Scotland. So making a big deal of dismissing this statement is a complete red herring. A far more useful discourse is to answer the questions I set out above. Where would Mr Li or this publication stand for example on the international recognition of Somaliland?
The question is of course of considerable complexity under international law, but there is no general right to self-determination except under currently accepted very narrow circumstances, none of which apply to existing territories currently recognised under international law as part of China. And if Mr Li or this publication would grab the bull by the horns to directly address how international law would treat this issue -- noting in particular that self-governance as a reason to breakaway is STILL not treated formally as a recognised exception to international law to the basic rule of territorial integrity nor is a vague FEELING of oppression -- I would be most interested to what you would positively argue rather than relying on pointless refutation of an issue that has no meaning under international law in any event.