Ge Jianxiong on "Chinese territory since ancient times"
A leading Chinese historian's nuanced discussion from 26 years ago remains relevant today and for the future.
“X has been Chinese territory since ancient times” is perhaps the most common Chinese expression one would encounter when it comes to territory disputes involving China.
Today, we are presenting a nuanced discussion of the statement from a quarter of a century ago by Ge Jianxiong, a professor at Fudan University and one of the most well-renowned Chinese historians alive.
The following text was originally part of 《分久必合，合久必分——统一分裂与中国历史余论》, a 30,000-word article Ge wrote for the 1999 book《学说中国》 by Jiangxi Education Publishing House.
The article is now available in 《统一与分裂—中国历史的启示》 Unity and division - Implications of Chinese history, a book that China’s Commercial Press began publishing in 2013.
怎样理解“自古以来就是中国的领土”?
How to Understand “Has Been China’s Territory Since Ancient Times”?
When discussing unification, we cannot separate it from territory, as any form of unification occurs within a defined spatial scope, and every unified regime necessarily possesses its territorial domain. When referring to specific regions—especially border areas—it is customary to assert that they have “been China’s territory since ancient times.” However, such claims often distort historical facts and fail to accurately account for the over two-thousand-year history of changes in China’s territorial boundaries and the patterns governing their evolution.
To properly address this issue, one must begin with a fundamental premise: every country in the world has undergone a process of formation, consolidation, and development. The concept of a state’s territory only arises after the establishment of the state itself. In the course of this development, territorial boundaries are generally subject to change—except in cases where natural barriers completely isolate a country. China is no exception.
If we acknowledge that the concept of “China” as a state has undergone a historical process—from nonexistence to existence, from small to large, from vague to clearly defined—then we must also accept that no specific piece of territory could have belonged to China from the very beginning, nor could all territories have become part of China simultaneously. Any claim that a certain area has “been China’s territory since ancient times” must be bounded by a clear historical timeframe; it cannot simply be traced back as far as possible. The concept of “China’s territory” could only emerge after the formation of the Chinese state. Before that point, not only was such a concept nonexistent—it was also meaningless.
For instance, if someone were to claim that Chinese people crossed the Bering Strait to reach the Americas ten thousand years ago, and therefore the Americas were first developed by the Chinese—even if it were true, there was no such country as “China” ten thousand years ago. Who, then, were these “Chinese people”? Does the term refer to individuals who lived in what is now Chinese territory at that time? And what is their relationship to the Chinese people of today? At most, they could be regarded as the ancestors of modern Chinese. To assert that a region belonged to China ten thousand years ago is therefore historically inaccurate, because China did not yet exist.
Regarding the territorial scope of “historical-period China,” the late Professor Tan Qixiang, in the editorial principles of the Historical Atlas of China (Volume I, SinoMaps Press, 1982), established the following guideline:
The territory of China between the 1750s—after the Qing Dynasty completed national unification—and the 1840s—prior to the imperialist invasions—represents the spatial extent shaped by several millennia of historical development. All ethnic groups active within this geographical scope during the historical period are considered part of Chinese history, and the regimes they established are regarded as integral components of China’s historical polity. In certain historical periods, some regimes exercised jurisdiction over territories that lay partly within and partly beyond the scope of China. In such cases, classification is determined based on the location of the regime’s political center (e.g. its capital). If the center fell within the scope, the regime is categorized as a Chinese regime; if it lay beyond, it is regarded as a neighboring (foreign) regime.
In his article “Historical China and the Territorial Extent of Successive Chinese Dynasties”
Professor Tan further elaborated on the rationale behind establishing this principle. He wrote:
We are modern Chinese; we cannot take the notion of ‘China’ as it existed in the minds of people in ancient times as the basis for defining China’s territorial extent…Nor can we use the current boundaries of China to delimit the extent of historical China. What we ought to adopt is the China that was naturally shaped over the course of several thousand years of historical development—throughout the entire historical period. We consider the territory of China from the mid-18th century to before 1840 as the China that was formed naturally through this long process of historical evolution. That is what we refer to as historical China. As for the present territorial extent of China, it is no longer the same as that historically formed scope. Rather, it reflects the consequences of more than a century of encroachment and partition by capitalist powers and imperialist aggression, which resulted in the loss of parts of our territory.
It is clear that what Professor Tan defined was the territorial scope relevant to contemporary scholars when researching Chinese history or compiling historical maps of China. For this reason, he specifically emphasized that we must not take the notion of “China” as conceived by people in ancient times to define the historical boundaries of China. In other words, the “China” in the minds of the ancients does not equate to the conceptual framework used by modern historians.
A close examination of the maps in the Historical Atlas of China makes this even more evident: in every specific historical period and under each particular regime, territorial boundaries were constantly changing—never fixed within a single, unchanging range. Therefore, the concept established by Professor Tan, which reflects the understanding of present-day scholars, should not be imposed retroactively on historical actors, nor should it be misapplied in discussions of unity and division during historical periods.
As for the second rationale proposed by Professor Tan, my understanding is that the territorial evolution of China should be divided into two distinct stages: one prior to 1840, and the other after 1840. The former was largely uninfluenced by external forces. During this period, the surrounding ethnic groups and regimes that had interacted with successive Central Plains dynasties were eventually incorporated into a unified state—the Qing Empire. The latter stage began with the incursion of Western powers into East Asia, after which changes in China’s territorial boundaries came to be directly or indirectly shaped by external influences. This marks the fundamental distinction between what is considered “natural” and what is not.
However, if we interpret “natural” to mean historically inevitable, then we must also acknowledge that the loss of certain Chinese territories after 1840 was likewise a historical inevitability. Why is it that, despite also suffering from imperialist aggression, some countries did not lose territory, while China lost over one million square kilometers? Why were some territories preserved, some lost and later recovered, and others irretrievably lost? These outcomes were not merely coincidental; they can all be traced to deep-seated internal causes within China itself.
Today’s China has inherited the territorial legacy of the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China. The Qing Empire reached its greatest territorial extent in the mid-18th century, which means that prior to that time, there were always certain regions that had not yet become part of China. How, then, should we determine whether a specific area belonged to China before the Qing? In practice, two standards exist: one based on the understanding of that historical time, and the other based on contemporary perspectives. According to the standard of the time, only those areas under the jurisdiction of the Central Plains dynasties could be considered part of China; all others were regarded as foreign lands inhabited by non-Chinese peoples. In contrast, from the standpoint of today’s standard, all ethnic groups and regimes that existed within the expansive boundaries of the Qing Empire are considered part of China—regardless of whether they had any historical relationship with the Central Plains dynasties.
The Central Plains dynasties were not equivalent to “China” as a whole, but they consistently constituted its principal body and core, serving as the foundation for political unification. These dynasties maintained a clear line of succession, and therefore the commonly accepted criterion for whether a region is considered “part of China” is its historical affiliation with one of those dynasties. For this reason, whether a particular region is regarded as “part of China” must be based on specific historical periods and concrete facts; any arbitrary retroactive claims or distortions of historical truth are unacceptable.
Before the Yuan Dynasty, none of the Central Plains dynasties had succeeded in incorporating the Tibetan Plateau into their territory. Tibet’s incorporation into China (i.e. under a Central Plains dynasty) can only be traced back to the Yuan Dynasty, when Tibet was placed under the jurisdiction of the Xuanzheng Yuan (the Ministry for the Spread of Governance, initially named the Zongzhi Yuan). Prior to this, during the Tang Dynasty, the Tang empire and the Tibetan Tubo kingdom were two entirely independent political entities. Even during periods of marriage alliance and relative harmony—such as when Princess Wencheng went to Tibet and married the Tibetan king Songtsen Gampo—the Tang court made no attempt to control or govern Tubo. Moreover, the “honeymoon” between Tang and Tubo was short-lived, while the years of confrontation and warfare were far longer.
Some have argued, based on one-sided records from the Tang side, that there existed a “tributary” relationship between Tubo and Tang, and therefore that Tubo was a vassal state of the Tang. Others claim that because of the so-called “uncle-nephew alliance” between Tang and Tubo, the relationship was inherently unequal. In fact, the reason the Tubo rulers referred to the Tang emperor as “uncle” and themselves as “nephew” was simply that kings such as Songtsen Gampo had married Tang princesses (Princess Wencheng and Princess Jincheng), making them sons-in-law of the Tang emperors. The Tang-Tibetan Treaty Inscription, which still stands in Lhasa today, clearly states:
“The two sovereigns, uncle and nephew, having come to agreement that their territories be united as one, have signed this alliance of great peace to last for eternity!” It also stipulates: “The border is set at the prefectures and garrisons administered by the two nations—east of this line belongs to the territory of Great Tang, west of the line belongs entirely to Great Tubo; neither side shall invade the other, nor shall they raise arms against each other.”
Similarly, the oath of the Tang-Tubo alliance sworn in the second year of Changqing (821 CE) proclaims: “The territories under Tang control shall be ruled by the Tang; the western region shall be ruled by Great Tubo.” These are the most objective pieces of evidence regarding Tang-Tubo relations.
According to the 《隋书·东夷传》Book of Sui, by the early 7th century CE the island of Taiwan already had local rulers (referred to as “kings”) governing its inhabitants. However, Taiwan and the Central Plains dynasties on the mainland never established a relationship of subordination, and prior to the Ming Dynasty there are virtually no historical records indicating any administrative link. During the Southern Song Dynasty, an Inspection Office for the Penghu Islands (the Pescadores) was set up under Tong’an County in Fujian. Some have speculated that this office also governed Taiwan, but there is no evidence for such a claim. The Song Dynasty’s local inspection offices were generally of low rank, and the jurisdiction of the one established in Tong’an would not have been very large. The distance between Penghu and Taiwan Island is significant, and the size of Penghu is vastly smaller than that of Taiwan. Even if that office did oversee the Penghu archipelago, it could not have extended across the strait to administer Taiwan Island’s affairs or defenses. The Yuan Dynasty likewise established a patrol inspectorate on Penghu, but similarly, no evidence shows that its jurisdiction included Taiwan Island.
Not only did the Southern Song have no administrative control over Taiwan, but neither the Yuan nor the Ming Dynasty ever incorporated Taiwan into their territory. In the late Ming period, the pirates Yan Siqi and Zheng Zhilong used the area around Beigang on Taiwan’s western coast as a base and formed an organized presence with quasi-regime characteristics. Ming government forces, when pursuing these pirates, did reach the waters around Taiwan, but the Ming court never established Taiwan as a regular administrative unit. Zheng Zhilong at one point surrendered to the Ming authorities, but he never turned over his base at Beigang to the Ming government. After Zheng Zhilong shifted his operations to the mainland, the Dutch occupied Beigang. In 1661, Zheng Zhilong’s son Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) “resumed his ancestor’s enterprise,” drove out the Dutch invaders and recovered Taiwan, establishing a local regime that professed loyalty to the Ming. However, by that time the mainland had fallen under Qing rule and the Southern Ming Yongli regime had been extinguished, so Zheng Chenggong’s government was an independent regional regime with no subordinate relationship to the mainland authority. It was only in the 22nd year of Emperor Kangxi’s reign (1683) that Zheng Chenggong’s grandson Zheng Keshuang surrendered, whereupon the Qing court established a prefecture in Taiwan under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province. From that point on, Taiwan’s affiliation to a mainland regime was formally established.
One could still say that Taiwan prior to 1683 was in some sense part of China, in that the peoples who had lived on Taiwan for many centuries had by 1683 become one of the ethnic groups of China—a member of the larger Chinese national family. Their history forms a part of Chinese history, and the autonomous regime they established on Taiwan was a regime in Chinese historical records. But this is not the same as being politically subject to a Central Plains dynasty or the central government. Therefore, one cannot interpret this to mean that Taiwan was, “since ancient times” (including the period before 1683), under the jurisdiction of a Central Plains dynasty or a mainland Chinese regime.
As for the oft-cited claims that Sun Quan’s dispatch of Wei Wen and Zhuge Zhi to Yizhou (Taiwan) during the Eastern Wu period, or Emperor Yang of Sui’s military expedition against Liuqiu (an old name referring to Taiwan), prove that “Taiwan has been Chinese territory since ancient times” — this is not merely laughable or ignorant, but entirely counterproductive. Both of those military ventures were essentially raids to capture people from Taiwan. If Taiwan were truly a part of the Sun Wu regime or a territory of the Sui Dynasty itself, would such predatory expeditions have been necessary?
Once a region came under the control of a Central Plains dynasty, this did not necessarily mean that it remained part of China permanently thereafter. There may have been one or more historical periods during which the region was separated from such central rule. Regardless of whether the area currently forms part of China, we must rigorously adhere to historical facts and conduct case-by-case analysis for each historical stage. It is inappropriate to assume that all periods following a region’s initial incorporation into a Central Plains dynasty automatically signify that the region remained “part of China.”
In the 1st century BCE, the Xiongnu people on the Mongolian Plateau experienced an internal split, during which the Southern Xiongnu Chanyu (the nomadic leader) surrendered to the Han Dynasty. With Han support, the Southern Xiongnu regained control over parts of the Mongolian Plateau. However, the Xiongnu were never incorporated into the Han Dynasty, nor did the Han court regard them as part of its own dominion. The two sides agreed to take the Great Wall as the boundary: “South of the Great Wall belongs to the Son of Heaven; north of the Great Wall belongs to the Chanyu.” Subsequent regimes established on the Mongolian Plateau generally maintained a similar relationship with the Central Plains dynasties, and thus cannot be considered to have been incorporated into the Chinese realm.
It was only after the Tang Dynasty defeated the Eastern Turkic Khaganate in the fourth year of the Zhenguan reign (630 CE) that the Mongolian Plateau temporarily became part of the Tang empire. This situation ended with the revival of the Turkic Khaganate, and it was not until the establishment of the Yuan Dynasty that the region was once again brought into a formal relationship of incorporation with the central Chinese state. The Ming Dynasty never brought the Mongolian Plateau under its jurisdiction, so from 1368 onward, the region once again became separated from central dynastic authority. It was only after the Qing Dynasty defeated Galdan during the reign of Emperor Kangxi that the region was reunified under China.
The Western Regions provide a similar example. In the second year of Shenjue of the Western Han (60 BCE), the establishment of the Protectorate of the Western Regions marked the incorporation of the Western Regions into the Western Han Empire’s territory. By the early first century CE, during Wang Mang’s Tianfeng era, the Western Regions Protectorate ceased to exist, interrupting the Western Regions’ affiliation with the Central Plains dynastic government. In the 17th year of Yongping of the Eastern Han (74 CE), the protectorate was reestablished, but it was abolished again just two years later in the first year of Jianchu (76 CE). Thereafter, the protectorate was restored two more times, so the Eastern Han’s control over the Western Regions was not continuous, and even then the areas under its jurisdiction were incomplete. In subsequent periods — including the Three Kingdoms period (Cao-Wei), the Western Jin, the Sixteen Kingdoms, the Northern Dynasties, and the Sui Dynasty — similar situations occurred, with on-and-off control of the Western Regions. It was not until the 14th year of Zhenguan of the Tang Dynasty (640 CE), when the Tang court established the Anxi Protectorate, that Tang authority over the Western Regions was fully restored. After the An-Shi Rebellion erupted in 755, the Tang Dynasty gradually lost its hold over the Western Regions. The Five Dynasties and Northern Song, and likewise the Liao and Jin dynasties, were never able to regain these far western territories.
Although the Yuan Empire possessed an expansive domain, parts of what is now Xinjiang were, at different times, claimed by the Ögedei Khanate and the Chagatai Khanate. In the early Ming period, the Ming government briefly controlled the eastern part of present-day Xinjiang, but later withdrew completely. Thus, the Western Regions did not become part of a unified Chinese realm again until the 24th year of Emperor Qianlong’s reign (1759), when the Qing Dynasty finally incorporated all of Xinjiang into its imperial territory.
The claim that a region “has been part of China since ancient times” reflects only historical circumstances and does not demonstrate the current status of that region. The northern part of the Korean Peninsula was once organized as commanderies and counties under Western Han, Eastern Han, Cao-Wei, Western Jin and other Central Plains regimes, making it an integral administrative region of those Chinese dynasties. Northern Vietnam, from the 2nd century BCE until the 10th century CE, was also part of various Chinese dynasties; in the early 15th century, the entirety of Vietnam was even established as a province of the Ming Dynasty. The Mongolian Plateau was on multiple occasions under the rule of Central Plains dynasties and was also within the territory of the Qing Empire. Yet all of these regions eventually broke away from China. Can we, on the basis of the fact that they “belonged to China since ancient times,” refuse to acknowledge the reality of their independence today?
For example, Tannu Uriankhai (present-day Tuva) and Outer Mongolia’s four Khalkha leagues were all under the Qing Dynasty’s Uliastai General during the Qing era. After Outer Mongolia declared “independence,” Tannu Uriankhai technically remained part of China; but in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet Union unilaterally “accepted” the Tannu Uriankhai region into the USSR, annexing that piece of Chinese territory without the signing of any international treaty. To this day, the vast majority of our citizens are entirely unaware of the historical fact that Tannu Uriankhai “was part of China since ancient times.”
Proving that a place “has been China’s territory since ancient times” may indeed provide moral strength to the Chinese people, but it does not necessarily offer any legal basis. Modern international law concerning territorial ownership mainly traces claims from the present back to a relatively recent period, not through an abstract notion of “since ancient times,” and it is not simply a case of “the earlier, the better.” Furthermore, territorial disputes between nations are, in most cases, resolved not according to international law but through struggles of power or negotiations based on practical interests.
During the Northern Song Dynasty, Shen Kuo—when negotiating a border dispute with the Liao Dynasty—used historical ownership as a basis to achieve a result favorable to the Song, a story that has become well-known. According to the 《宋史·沈括传》History of Song (biography of Shen Kuo) and the 《续资治通鉴长编》Extended Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government, when the Liao envoy Xiao Xi visited Song China, he demanded the territory of Huangwei in Hedong, vowing not to return home until he obtained that land. Entrusted with the negotiations, Shen Kuo first consulted the archives at the Shumi Yuan (Privy Council) and found records from earlier boundary talks. These records showed that the area was historically divided by the ancient Great Wall, and that the place Xiao Xi claimed lay thirty li (about ten miles) beyond that wall. Emperor Shenzong then ordered Shen Kuo to draft a map. Upon reviewing the map, Xiao Xi was compelled to abandon his original demand. The emperor dispatched Shen Kuo as an envoy to the Liao court to continue negotiations, where—armed with data from dozens of volumes of archival documents—he conducted six rounds of talks. Ultimately, the Liao abandoned its territorial claim to Huangwei and instead demanded the Tianchi (Heavenly Lake) region.
However, a closer analysis of the situation at that time reveals that both the Song and Liao dynasties were in a standoff and were reluctant to go to war over a local territorial dispute. Therefore, the “historical” evidence of “since ancient times” that Shen Kuo presented played a role to a certain extent. On the other hand, although the Liao gave up its claim to Huangwei, it raised new demands, and in subsequent border demarcations the Song Dynasty still ended up losing some territory. Thus, Shen Kuo’s “victory” should not be overstated, nor should this example be taken to imply that historical ownership can be the decisive factor in resolving territorial disputes.
I once asked an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
“How many of China’s territorial disputes with foreign countries have been resolved on the basis of historical claims? In diplomatic negotiations, how significant a role has historical documentation actually played?”
He did not give a definitive answer. I suspect that in reality there have been no successful cases, because statesmen consider present realities far more than history. We should stop indulging in the notion that “this has been China’s territory since ancient times,” and stop using vague concepts of grand unification to gratify certain people’s vanity. Instead, we must face the realities of the 21st century.
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Thank you for this fine article. It is probably significant that the book was published in 1999, long before Xi Jinping became Party Secretary, during the last few years of General Secretary Jiang Zemin which seem to have been the most recent peak of Party openness.
I like to think of General Secretary Xi's view as Make China Great Again, the later MAGA -- Make America Great Again of President Trump sounds similar.
There were various empires that called themselves say Qing or Ming or Song or Tang that had core areas within the Chinese cultural region and then expanded to other territories, sometimes incorporating and assimilating them totally, others areas assimilating to a much lesser degree such as the Tibetan, Xinjiang and Mongolian areas.
There have been many states of Chinese culture existing in the region of what is China today. Some were founded by invaders such as the Yuan and the Qing but Chinese today are proud of them. I sometimes wonder if Japan had won World War II would the Chinese, two or three hundred years from now, be boasting about the glories of the Nippon Dynasty (although maybe it would have a different name)?
Some Tibetans and Uyghurs would like to see Tibet and Xinjiang as independent countries. These feelings seem to have been intensified by the way they have been treated by the Chinese central government. Even though Beijing has been spending vast amounts of money improving the infrastructure and living conditions of the people in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Like someone once said, you can do all kinds of things, but I will never forget the way you made me feel. Economically it would be better for Xinjiang and Tibet to be part of China. Why do many of the local inhabitants disagree? There are religious and cultural differences and more recent histories of repression.
The Dalai Lama has said that Tibet could be part of China if the Tibetans had true autonomy that would enable them to protect their culture, language and religion. Autonomy, despite the number of autonomous regions and districts China has, is something that Xi Jinping seems to be retreating from. That autonomous areas might have people thinking thoughts and even organizing themselves in ways the Party disagrees with is alarming to the Party which as one might say in dated American slang is a 'control freak'.
Many people in those areas have a desire for autonomy and religious freedom which the Communist Party, which has its own quasi-religious political philosophy and its own intense faith that only it can lead China to its great historical destiny, cannot accept. Article One of the PRC Constitution demands that the Party be in control and no criticism of China's system be permitted. Of course if Chinese people had genuine freedom of speech and of media, then there would be much more and stronger criticism of the Communist Party. That Party isn't wrong about that.
To make the division at 1840 is understandable from the specifically Chinese point of view, but it does seem to be a case that imperialism is OK when it is Han Chinese but not OK when it is western imperialism.
Then there is the argument that Chinese imperialism was benign while western imperialism was nasty. Both were true for both at various times, however there is the natural human tendency which at its extreme leads to racist thinking. That is while I make excuses for people on my own side and minimize their bad behavior, while for people on the other side I give everything the worst interpretation and make no allowances for them at all.
Of course the South China Sea has other names -- in the Republic of the Philippines it is the West Philippine Sea and in Vietnam it is the East Vietnam Sea!
As for the since ancient times argument, the famous nine-dotted line in the South China Sea dates back to 1947 from the last few years of the Republic of China.
History is complicated and where we stand is where we sit. It is difficult to escape even partially from the seas of assumptions and perspectives in which we are all immersed.
David Cowhig
Forgive me for degrading the quality of this excellent article and comments by posting. I have to say how wonderful they are. I suppose I feel that way because they conform to my beliefs, but seeing others express them so incredibly is inspirational. Those of us at the lower tiers of intellect have to count on those above us, and it gives me hope that my optimism about the future isn't misplaced.