Feng Yujun on Russia's elite turnover & ideological reformation

The leading Chinese expert on Russian studies argues that Russia's future will be determined by the speed, breadth, and depth at which its national ideas and values reform and regenerate.

This article is the preface to 誰將接掌俄羅斯：普京之後的俄羅斯政治精英 Who Will Assume Control of Russia: Russia's Political Elites After Putin, by Feng Yujun and Zhou Churen (Kai Ming Book Store, Hong Kong, 1st ed., February 2024).

For the publication in The East is Read here, Feng Yujun has slightly revised the original text of the preface. He reviewed the translation before publication.

Feng Yujun is a leading expert on Russian studies in China and has been featured multiple times on The East is Read and Pekingnology. He is also the author of a well-read op-ed on the war in Ukraine in The Economist in April.

俄罗斯：需要精英更替还是思想更新？

Russia: Does It Need an Elite Turnover or a Ideological Reformation?

Feng Yujun

On December 31, 1999, on the eve of the new millennium, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, gravely ill, invited Vladimir Putin, a man still largely unknown to the public, to the Kremlin. In a surprising move, Yeltsin announced his decision to transfer the highest power in Russia to Putin, appointing him as acting president. "Take care of Russia," Yeltsin said profoundly to Putin.

On March 17, 2024, Russia held a new round of presidential elections, and as expected, Putin was re-elected as president. According to the 2020 constitutional amendments in Russia, all of Putin's previous presidential terms were effectively reset. This means that after his 2020-2024 term ends, he is eligible to run for two more presidential terms. With the presidential term now extended to six years following the constitutional changes, Putin theoretically could remain in power until 2036, assuming, of course, no unexpected events occur.

In summary, since taking office in 2000, Putin's tenure has been marked by three key actions:

1. Politically, he rebuilt a vertical power structure, significantly strengthening central authority. This has rendered many of the fundamental principles and political mechanisms established by the Russian Federation's Constitution of 1993—such as checks and balances, judicial independence, the multi-party system, and federalism—virtually ineffective.

2. Economically, he centralized resources and dismantled a group of powerful oligarchs who had grown influential and interfered in politics during the Yeltsin era. However, this also gave rise to a new class of oligarchs centred around Putin, intensifying oligarchic capitalism, which has come to define Russia's economic model.

3. Internationally, Putin used the banner of "Russian conservatism" to erode and overturn the post-Cold War international order. The Russo-Georgian War, the Crimean Crisis, and the Russia-Ukraine war have been efforts to restore territories and rebuild the empire.

Over the past 24 years, Russia under Putin has shown a development curve of initially high growth followed by a prolonged decline. In the first three years of his rule, some reforms were implemented, and high international oil prices contributed to relatively rapid economic growth from 2000 to 2007. However, after 2008, Russia has faced ongoing turbulence and setbacks. Several factors, including traditional culture, mindset, prevailing realities, power structures, and the international environment, have influenced the course of events. As a result, the institutional design and goal-setting at the outset of Russia's transformation have been significantly distorted. The liberal democratic system was replaced by an authoritarian regime, which was presented as a "sovereign democracy," and the social market economy was supplanted by oligarchic monopolies. Civic participation, which had intensified for a period, has since declined.

Firstly, Russia's economy has undergone a severe process of "de-industrialization." Factors such as outdated equipment, insufficient investment, brain drain, and the collapse of traditional economic ties have accelerated the decline of the industrial system established during the Soviet era. Moreover, the energy-dependent economic structure has become so deeply entrenched that it is difficult to change. Russia is struggling to keep pace with the "Fourth Industrial Revolution" and faces the dual challenges of responding to climate change and advancing energy transition.

German Gref, former Minister of Economic Development of Russia, stated that Russia has essentially lost the competition in the technological revolution and has found itself "in the ranks of countries that are losing, downshifter counties," unable to pursue material wealth and development. Other experts argued that because "Russian political institutions have ossified; their current state does not make it possible to create incentives for investment, raise foreign capital, protect property rights, sustain competition, or ensure equality before the law," Russia's "loss of economic competitive ability on a global scale" is accelerating. According to predictions from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Russia's Ministry of Economic Development, as well as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Russia's economic growth will be below the world average for a prolonged period in the future, which also means that its position in the global economic system will continue to decline.

Secondly, Russia's technological development has fallen behind, and there is a lack of future momentum. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Putin's rise to power, insufficient investment in research and development, institutional and structural constraints, significant talent loss, slow conversion of scientific achievements into practical applications, rigid strategic thinking, and deteriorating relations with the West have all severely hindered Russia's technological progress, placing it at a disadvantage in the intensifying global technological competition. In 2020, in terms of purchasing power parity, research and development spending by major technological countries was as follows: the United States $511.1 billion, China $451.9 billion, Japan $165.7 billion, Germany $118.8 billion, South Korea $77.7 billion, France $62.4 billion, and the UK $47.8 billion, while Russia spent only $37.3 billion. Despite some recent government efforts to reverse this trend, the results have been disappointing.

Thirdly, the effectiveness of political and social governance has been low, with social issues continuously emerging. Since 2003, the trend of power centralization in Russia has steadily intensified, but governance efficiency has not improved. Corruption within the power elite has increased, while the public's political participation and social vitality have continued to decline.

The country's demographic situation has worsened, with the population failing to reverse its downward trend, and the population structure continues to deteriorate. The country is also seeing a significant outflow of knowledge and wealth elites. A report by the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center highlights a decline in the quality of Russia's human capital, pointing to "a high degree of social apathy, a lack of readiness to try to improve one's social status, and acclimatisation to deteriorating conditions," which are becoming the "new normal" in Russian society and are expected to contribute to a systemic crisis in the country.

Fourthly, its international environment has generally worsened. Since 2008, Russia's assertive military actions, including the Russo-Georgian War, the Crimean Crisis, and its military intervention in Syria, have shocked the world and brought some tangible geopolitical gains. However, these actions have simultaneously led to a significant decline in Russia's international image, with relations with the U.S. and Western European countries deteriorating, and its influence in the post-Soviet space correspondingly waning.

As a result of these factors, an increasing number of people in Russia are comparing Putin's Russia to the "era of stagnation" in Brezhnev's later years. Although the Soviet Union seemed strong and prosperous at the time, standing as a superpower alongside the United States and competing in global geopolitics, Brezhnev's long tenure led to a worsening of social problems that ultimately triggered the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many now believe that, after 20 years of Putin's rule, the "stagnation in the broadest sense of the word—from economic depression to social apathy—is the only possible medium- and long-term scenario for Russia."

This societal mindset is highly detrimental to Putin's long-term rule. Therefore, stimulating domestic populist sentiment and boosting support for Putin's 2024 presidential campaign has become a top priority for him and his inner circle. They are acutely aware that, for the Russian people, restoring the "great power glory" of the past and reclaiming the "lost territories" resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union are undoubtedly the most effective morale boosters.

On July 12, 2021, Putin published a lengthy article titled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", emphasising that Russia and Ukraine have been "one people" for a thousand years and promoting the idea that "true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia". On February 22, 2022, Russia announced the recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as "independent republics." On February 24, Putin declared the beginning of a "special military operation" in Ukraine, marking the start of a regional war with significant historical consequences not only for Russia and Ukraine but for all of Europe and the world.

The Russia-Ukraine war has now been ongoing for nearly three years. Contrary to Russia's expectations, this war did not deliver a swift victory but instead turned into a brutal stalemate and war of attrition. Regardless of the outcome, Russia has suffered significant setbacks politically, economically, and diplomatically. For a long time to come, its influence in international politics and the global economic system will continue to decline.

In China's public discourse, Russia is often referred to as a "warrior nation." However, being a "warrior nation" does not equate to being a "winning nation." Historically, Russia has experienced multiple defeats in foreign wars that resulted in significant domestic political upheaval.

In the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856, the war had not yet ended when Nicholas I, in despair over the unfavourable course of the conflict, died. Later, Russia's defeat sparked "the era of the Great Reforms." The defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in the early 20th century not only forced Russia to sign the Treaty of Portsmouth, ceding significant interests in Northeast Asia to Japan but also triggered the Russian Revolution of 1905, transitioning Russia from an autocratic monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. The defeat in World War I precipitated the 1917 Russian Revolution, which overthrew the Romanov dynasty that had ruled for 304 years and briefly dissolved the Russian Empire. Likewise, the defeat in the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 to 1989 was a crucial factor contributing to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the current domestic political landscape of Russia, although Putin's approval rating remains high, several significant events suggest that beneath the surface, the situation is far from stable. Anti-war protests and demonstrations across various regions of Russia at the outset of the war, the Wagner Group mutiny in the summer of 2023, the targeted elimination of several extreme pro-war figures, and the continuous incursions into Russian territory by the "Russian Volunteer Corps" and the "Freedom of Russia Legion"—made up of thousands of Russian citizens and supported by Ukraine—reveal deep political undercurrents.

Therefore, when assessing Russia's current and future domestic situation, strategic observers should not settle for the overly simplistic conclusion that "Putin remains unshaken, firmly holding onto power." Instead, they must acknowledge the more complex realities and potential future developments.

Against the backdrop of rapidly changing internal and external environments, Russia's "elite turnover" has already become a prominent issue. In the near future, crucial questions arise: Who is likely to enter the core circle of power in Russia? Who will take over the ruling power? And what will Russia's development trajectory look like amidst this elite turnover? These are pivotal questions that everyone is closely watching, and they must be addressed.

With these considerations in mind, I have selected nearly 30 political elites who have risen to prominence over the course of Putin's two-decade rule, making their mark within Russia's power circles and potentially playing a significant role in Russian political life after 2024. This selection aims to provide readers with a rough roadmap for understanding Russia's future political landscape. Among these individuals are those already holding high-ranking positions in Russia's political hierarchy, the "second-generation elites" with strong networks and great ambition, as well as opposition figures who are dissatisfied with the status quo, resisting, but currently imprisoned.

The study of these figures can not only shed light on the career trajectories, networks, and political views of Russia's elites but also provide insight into the future development of Russia and its national trajectory. It is worth noting that, less than a year after this book's publication, two individuals featured in the text have already passed away: opposition politician Alexei Navalny and Ivan Sechin, who was only 35 years old. This, in itself, underscores the complexity and danger of Russia's political scene.

For any country, elite turnover is crucial. However, it is equally important to recognize that a country's development requires not only a healthy and orderly elite turnover but also a continuous updating of its ideas and values. For a country like Russia, with a deep imperial tradition and a tendency to look back rather than forward, the inertia of outdated ideas is particularly pronounced. The ongoing and far-reaching Russia-Ukraine war is, in fact, a product of Russia's accumulated insecurities, imperial mindset, messianic ideas, pan-Slavism, and a persistent drive to expand its sphere of influence. These notions and behaviours have long been brewing and have ultimately culminated in this war.

Therefore, Russia's future will not only depend on the frequency and intensity of elite turnover but also on the tension between its great power ambitions and its insufficient national strength. More importantly, Russia's future will be determined by the speed, breadth, and depth at which its national ideas and values reform and regenerate.

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