Cao Xin: China cannot sidestep on the North Korea issue

Thinktanker argues that as North Korea expands its nuclear ambition, China’s avoidance of responsibility risks its own security, estranges its neighbours, and cedes regional influence to Washington.

China’s lack of action on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions has compromised its own security, strained relations with Seoul, and undermined its authority in East Asian security matters, wrote Cao Xin, Secretary-General and Senior Researcher at the Centre for International Public Opinion Studies at the Charhar Institute, a non-governmental think tank in China.

Cao maintains that, whether due to concerns over or attempts to leverage the North Korean issue in the shifting dynamics of China–U.S. and China–Russia relations, Beijing has been avoiding a responsibility it can ill afford to delegate. The consequences are clear: Public opinion in South Korea is increasingly aligning with Washington, particularly on security matters, and the U.S. is quick to fill the power vacuum in the region left by China’s absence.

Cao argues that China must make clear its commitment to regional security, and that it must do so without letting the complexities of China-U.S. or China-Russia relations sway its position if it is to salvage its regional influence.

The article was originally published on FTChinese, the Financial Times’ Chinese-language website. It is also accessible on the Charhar Institute’s WeChat blog.

中国应独立看待并处理朝鲜问题

China Should Independently Assess and Address the North Korean Issue

Over the past week, the actions of South Korea’s new Lee Jae‑myung administration have become one of the international public opinion focal points, and all the more so for countries in the region.

First, South Korea suspended its propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts across to the North, and in return, North Korea also ceased its border loudspeakers toward South Korea—an intriguing interaction. In related news, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently confirmed that North Korea is constructing new nuclear facilities. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to support Russia’s operations in Ukraine. Additionally, recent South Korean polls have raised new expectations for Lee’s administration and revealed important insights for China.

All of this occurs against the deeper backdrop of the China‑U.S.‑Russia trilateral game. However, China, as a major country in the region, must independently assess and handle the North Korea issue—as a matter of security—because China cannot evade it.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is deeply influenced by great power competition

Last week, the situation on the Korean Peninsula showed two contrasting scenarios: one was that both North and South Korea halted propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts directed at each other along the border; but at the same time, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that North Korea is constructing a new nuclear facility in the Yongbyon area. These events unfolded against a backdrop of North Korea’s intensified nuclear activities, its continued military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the possibility of deepening ties between China and South Korea.

First, the Lee Jae-myung administration took the initiative to halt the South Korean military’s anti-North loudspeaker broadcasts along the border.

U.S. media reported that

“South Korea’s military shut down loudspeakers broadcasting anti-North Korea propaganda along the inter-Korean border on Wednesday, marking the new liberal government’s first concrete step toward easing tensions between the war-divided rivals.” “South Korea’s Defence Ministry said the move, ordered by President Lee Jae-myung, was part of efforts ‘to restore trust in inter-Korean relations and promote peace on the Korean Peninsula.’”

The following day, South Korea’s military confirmed that North Korea had also stopped its daily loudspeaker broadcasts to the South after Seoul suspended its own.

The exchange between the two sides appeared remarkably coordinated, and even somewhat amicable

U.S. media analysis suggests that North Korea

“is extremely sensitive to any outside criticism of its authoritarian leadership and its third-generation ruler, Kim Jong Un.”

“The South’s broadcast playlist was clearly designed to strike a nerve in Pyongyang, where Kim’s government has been intensifying a campaign to eliminate the influence of South Korean pop culture and language among the population in a bid to strengthen his family’s dynastic rule.”

Based on information from my own sources, South Korea’s decision to suspend propaganda broadcasts toward North Korea along the border was likely influenced by the United States. During his campaign, Lee Jae-myung acknowledged to the media that his policy flexibility on North Korea was limited. The United States, for its part, had reservations, believing that Lee did not place sufficient importance on the North Korea issue. Now that Lee has taken the initiative to halt the propaganda broadcasts, it likely reflects U.S. influence. This position from the United States is clearly linked to President Trump’s efforts to re-engage in Korean Peninsula affairs for political gain, as well as to Washington’s intent to preserve its hold over the Peninsula and discourage closer ties between China and South Korea.

Meanwhile, another concerning development for both South Korea and the broader region has come to light.

South Korean media reports that

“International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi informed the Board of Governors in Vienna on June 9 that the IAEA is ‘monitoring the construction of a new building at Yongbyon which has dimensions and features similar to the Kangson enrichment plant.’” “The IAEA has officially confirmed that North Korea is constructing new nuclear facilities, and that Pyongyang is working to enhance its nuclear capabilities by constructing a new nuclear facility in the Yongbyon area.”

The report also notes that

“Kangson is North Korea’s second-largest nuclear development site after Yongbyon. Beyond these two, the locations and specific features of North Korea’s other nuclear facilities have yet to be officially confirmed. If the new facility mentioned by Grossi becomes operational, it will become the third confirmed site. Previously, following the collapse of the U.S.–North Korea summit in Hanoi in February 2019, then-President Trump stated that North Korea possessed five nuclear facilities.”

The report emphasises,

“It is worth noting that Kangson houses a facility capable of producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear warheads. Analysts believe the newly identified ‘Kangson‑scale’ nuclear facility likewise has the capacity to mass‑produce HEU.”

The above situation indicates that North Korea has not paused its development of nuclear missile capabilities for even a single day. Pyongyang’s decision to halt its loudspeaker broadcasts in response to Seoul ceasing its own should first be understood within the context of the Russia–Ukraine war. North Korea is acutely aware that Russia faces heavy sanctions from Europe and that the Trump administration did not endorse Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory. North Korea needs to remain committed to supporting Russia in this geopolitical climate, and has thus sought to leverage Lee Jae-myung’s traditionally pro-North party to advance a strategy of easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, aimed at avoiding confrontation on multiple fronts.

A second factor is Pyongyang’s desire to prevent China from growing too close to South Korea’s new administration. South Korean media have noted that, against the backdrop of North Korea’s accelerating nuclear programme, the new government in Seoul will face considerable challenges in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

Regional security is China’s own obligation

In observing recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, one guiding principle must be upheld: as an immediate neighbour with deep ties to the Peninsula, China must address the North Korea issue independently. Under no circumstances should this issue be tied to the state of China-U.S. Relations or future China–Russia relations unless such linkage genuinely serves regional security. Safeguarding regional security is a responsibility China cannot shirk, as it constitutes a core national interest.

A public opinion poll in South Korea last week revealed several important insights.

According to South Korean media,

“Lee Jae-myung officially took office under a public warning from the U.S. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth on May 31 at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue, that ‘many countries are tempted by the idea of seeking both economic cooperation with China and defence cooperation with the United States.’ This was seen as a request for South Korea to abandon its long-standing strategy of ‘security with the U.S. and economy with China.’ Meanwhile, China, through President Xi’s reference to ‘jointly safeguarding free trade’ during his June 10 phone call with President Lee, appeared to caution Seoul against embracing a U.S.-preferred model of ‘security and economy with America.’”

“Caught in a diplomatic bind between the United States and China, the ‘pragmatic diplomacy à la Lee Jae-myung’ envisioned by public opinion diverges from both the traditional ‘security with the U.S. and economy with China’ approach and the U.S.-preferred model of aligning with Washington on both fronts. Instead, it seeks to strengthen security cooperation with the United States while pursuing balanced economic engagement with both powers, aiming to chart a viable course forward.”

However, I believe that, under Trump’s tariff policy of taxing the entire world, the expectations of the South Korean public are out of step with reality. Given South Korea’s status as a major East Asian exporter to the U.S., it is unlikely that Washington would grant it special exemptions. In this context, charting a course of economic cooperation with the United States presents considerable challenges for South Korea.

However, the South Korean public entrusts the country’s national security entirely to the United States, which aligns perfectly with the answer to the poll.

“When asked about ‘the most important diplomatic relationship,’ 90.7% of respondents chose South Korea–U.S. relations, ranking it first by a wide margin—nearly double that of the second-place South Korea–China relations (43.2%).”

The reason South Korean public opinion is overwhelmingly aligned on these two issues is that neither the public nor the government can be certain that China would come to South Korea’s defence in the event of an unprovoked North Korean attack. This presents a serious challenge for China, as it sharply contradicts the geopolitical reality that, as a regional power, China bears responsibility for maintaining regional stability.

At the same time,

“The proportion of South Koreans expressing a ‘negative impression of the United States’ rose from 12.7% last year to 17.1% this year. The most commonly cited reason—selected by 79.9% of those respondents—was ‘the U.S.’s tough stance on issues such as trade and tariffs,’ a sharp increase from 34.4% the previous year.”

This is an important new phenomenon in China–U.S.–South Korea relations, and it indicates the possibility for change.

The above data suggest that China’s failure—as a regional power—to safeguard regional security and stability is the main obstacle to advancing China–South Korea relations and the root cause for the United States’ strong influence in the region. Specifically, this stems from China’s lack of concrete and effective action on North Korea’s nuclear programme. North Korea’s unlawful possession of nuclear weapons directly undermines China’s own vital security interests in the region.

As a regional power, China must uphold a fundamental principle in addressing North Korea’s unlawful nuclear weapons programme: the issue must be dealt with independently and not entangled with the dynamics of China–U.S. relations or the state of China–Russia ties following the recent treaty between North Korea and Russia. Regional security is a core national interest for China, and safeguarding it is a responsibility China must assume directly. Regional security is a core national interest for China, and safeguarding it is a responsibility China must bear directly. Ignoring this principle—or worse, attempting to leverage the North Korea issue according to the shifting dynamics of China–U.S. or China–Russia relations—will only entangle China in strategic complications, undermining its ability to secure both its own safety and that of the broader region.

Another essential step is for China to make an unequivocal public declaration: any country in the region that initiates an unprovoked attack will be deemed an enemy of China, and Beijing will not remain a bystander. This stance must also apply to the use or threat of nuclear missile capabilities obtained in violation of international law.

Finally, China must clearly communicate to the international community that any transfer of weapons, equipment, or technology to North Korea prohibited by United Nations Security Council resolutions constitutes a direct threat to China’s national security.

Some of the issues mentioned above have existed for a long time and have already caused serious disruption and security risks for China itself. They must be resolved; otherwise, not only will China’s own security and regional stability remain at risk, but—given the deep political and social divisions within South Korean society—it will also be difficult for China to establish genuinely sound relations with the new South Korean government, or with any government, for that matter. These problems should never have happened in the first place, but now that they have, it is imperative to take immediate action to contain the damage.