Zheng Yongnian: Asia-Pacific, destined for world war?

The Chinese strategist, public intellectual, and opinion leader with extensive Western training and practice delivers a fatalistic warning of Asia being the powder keg of WWIII.

In an unusually pessimistic essay that’s a response to the 2024 NATO Summit and Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power at the same time, Zheng Yongnian delves into the precarious state of global geopolitics, positing that the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly becoming the focal point of potential large-scale conflicts.

At the heart of Zheng's argument is the assertion that Asia's rapid economic growth and subsequent military modernization have created a volatile mix of economic interdependence and unresolved historical grievances. He contends that the United States, perceiving significant economic and strategic interests in the region, is maneuvering to assert its dominance, thereby exacerbating tensions. The formation of various "mini-multilateral" alliances and the strategic pivot towards Asia by NATO are presented by the Peking University- and Princeton-trained international relations scholar as indicators of an impending shift towards conflict.

Zheng Yongnian is a Professor and founding dean of the School of Public Policy and Dean of the Institute of International Affairs (IIA), Qianhai, at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen). He was Director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore and before that founding Research Director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham.

The Chinese analyst with deep Western experience presents a notably pessimistic and dark outlook on the future of Asia and global peace. This perspective, though grounded in observable trends, may not fully account for the complexities and potential mitigating factors that could prevent the dire scenario he envisions. Moreover, some of the factual descriptions within the article warrant a closer examination.

His warnning that nationalism is surging across Asia and pushing decision makers toward impulsive and irrational choices certainly rings true, though.

Anyways, "World War III and the Powder Keg of Asia" is translated below, largely considering Zheng’s unique standing and influence in China’s elite and public opinion. The fin-de-siècle warning was published on 大湾区评论 Greater Bay Area Review, a WeChat blog that frequently features articles by Zheng and his team.

Zheng or his team hasn’t reviewed the translation.

第三次世界大战及其亚洲“火药桶”

World War III and the Powder Keg of Asia

I. The Shadow of World War Reemerges

With the breakdown of post-World War II international order with the United Nations at its core, geopolitics characterized by great power competition has become increasingly volatile. More and more people believe that a third World War is inevitable. For many, a new Cold War between major powers has even begun. The pressing question is: where will the primary battleground of World War III be?

The so-called world wars are fought between nations and waged by the countries involved. However, countries are not abstract entities; they are made up of individuals. Ultimately, wars between countries are battles between people. Nevertheless, the general populace, whether as participants or victims, do not decide to go to war. That decision is made by those in positions of power. For those in power, war is never without purpose. Historically, wars have been driven by the blatant pursuit of interests. It is this quest for interests that has prompted their decision to go to war.

The ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville in The Old Regime and the Revolution can be extended from internal revolutions to international conflicts. Tocqueville argued that poverty alone does not trigger revolution; rather, revolutions often occur during periods of transition from poverty to prosperity. In other words, revolutions arise from disputes over the distribution of interests. The same logic applies to international conflicts. Economic development in a region often leads to two forms of inequality: first, inequality within a country among different social classes, which Marx identified as class inequality; second, inequality between countries. Internal inequality fosters populism, while inequality between nations fuels nationalism. Both World War I and World War II were the results of Europe's rapid economic growth.

With this structural cause in mind, the "spark" needed to ignite war becomes easy to come by. Even if no natural "spark" arises, there will be someone one. While individuals vary in their level of belligerence, when political, diplomatic, or coercive measures fail to resolve conflicts of interest, war becomes the next recourse. Belligerent politicians are more inclined to resort to war than their less aggressive counterparts.

With the Russia-Ukrainian war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still lingering on, concerns are growing that these regional conflicts could escalate into larger multinational ones. However, most analysts do not believe these regions will become the primary battleground of a new world war. Instead, various signs suggest that major powers are shifting the potential battleground of World War III toward Asia, the "powder keg" for World War III in formation.

II. Asia as the "Powder Keg"

The Asia-Pacific region, in any view, appears destined to become the battleground for the next world war. The logic is straightforward: this region contains all the key elements for such a conflict—economic interests, the U.S., an "Asian NATO," military modernization, and nationalism. More specifically, the U.S. is positioning itself as a key architect of potential wars in Asia, driven largely by the significant economic gains it stands to gain from the region.

Given the U.S.'s deep-seated internal challenges, which are unlikely to be resolved through internal revolution, external war becomes a more viable option (Author's note: see my article “Revolution” and “Counter-Revolution” in the United States). Since at least modern times, internal revolutions and external wars have been the two most effective means of addressing major issues. There is no reason to underestimate the possibility of the United States resorting to war to solve its internal problems.

Why Asia? The importance of Asia, particularly to the U.S. and the West, has been highlighted extensively in American narratives. Two prominent U.S. experts in diplomacy, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, offer the clearest and most direct articulation of these themes in their recent book Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power. According to Blackwill and Fontaine, Asia's significance arises from both the "data" it represents and the rise of China. Asia is home to "60 percent of the world's population, three of the five largest national economies, over 40 percent of global GDP, an estimated two-thirds of the world's economic growth, 41 percent of international exports and 37 percent of global imports, half of the world's active military personnel, six of the ten biggest armies, four of the ten highest defense budgets, five of the nine nuclear-weapons states, and six of the ten major carbon emitters." Yet, what they argue is even more significant is the "China's abiding threats to international order."

These accomplishments are not easily achieved. Over the past few decades, Asia has emerged as the fastest-growing and most peaceful region in the world, representing a miracle in global economic history comparable to Europe's growth in the 30 years before World War I. At that time, Europe also experienced rapid development, and prosperity and peace became the main characteristics of the era. People believed that no one would resort to war to resolve international disputes, nor to violence (revolution) to address internal conflicts. Yet, no matter how much people hoped for peace, war broke out—not once, but twice—each time escalating into a world war involving multiple nations.

Now, it is Asia's turn. Much like Europe before World War I, Asia’s rapid economic development has fueled significant military modernization across the region. Despite economic interdependence—sometimes at very high levels—achieved by many Asian countries, peace in the region remains precarious due to unresolved historical grievances and ongoing tensions, much like pre-war Europe. Beneath the veneer of economic interdependence, Asian nations are locked in unprecedented competition, with current conflicts often surfacing during debates over historical issues.

These conflicts between Asian countries create a highly favorable structural condition for the United States to assert leadership in Asian affairs as an "extraneous" power. Although the U.S. claims to promote peace in Asia with its leadership, the reality is that Asia under Pax Americana is rapidly sliding toward war.

More importantly, the U.S. is not truly an "extraneous" power. While the term refers to its geographic location—the U.S. being on the eastern shore of the Pacific—in terms of interests, the U.S. is deeply embedded in Asia. Since modern times, especially after World War II, the U.S. has been heavily involved in Asian affairs, from Japan to the Korean Peninsula, and across East Asia to ASEAN. No other country is as deeply intertwined with Asia as the U.S. Since the 1980s, as Asia became a pillar of the global economy, the U.S. has increasingly framed itself, economically speaking, as an Asia-Pacific nation, rather than a traditional Atlantic one. In this way, America's desire to maintain its "empire" (hegemony) aligns organically with its economic interests in Asia, creating a powerful incentive to sustain its dominance while securing significant economic benefits from the region.

Obama's "Pivot to Asia" is widely seen as the moment when the U.S. began to significantly reallocate its attention, time, and resources to the region, to boost its chances of winning the pivotal competition of the era. This policy was specifically aimed at China, though its origins date back even further. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the half-century-long Cold War, and with the disappearance of its traditional adversary, the U.S. began redefining its "rival," identifying China as the new focus. When George W. Bush took office, the U.S. adopted a conservative foreign policy, which was also directed at China. However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted America's strategic priorities, temporarily delaying its Asian strategy.

Blackwill and Fontaine summarized the reasons for the failure of America's "Pivot to Asia" strategy in their book:

• First, the United States persistently underestimated the China challenge.

• Second, crises emerged in other places. Iraq, Afghanistan War, Syria, and ISIS, compounded by new conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Palestinian conflict, have continuously redirected the U.S. strategy.

• Third, officials across U.S. administrations have been unable to agree on identifiable ends, budgets, and specific policies of the Pivot.

• Fourth, U.S. foreign policy on Asia received little domestic attention, and thus no American president put sufficient weight behind the Pivot.

• Fifth, in the absence of a forcing event like Pearl Harbor or 9/11, Asia has not been able to capture the United States' sufficient attention.

Their obvious conclusion is that, after a "lost decade," the U.S. must once again pivot toward the Asia-Pacific. That is self-evident. As I have discussed many times, since the introduction of the "Indo-Pacific" concept, the U.S. has established at least seven "mini-multilateral" alliances in the region, all aimed at countering China. While U.S. statements often emphasize that these efforts are designed to "prevent" potential conflicts supposedly caused by China or even wars, experience suggests otherwise. These moves are, in fact, constructing a broader framework for war—one that spans globally and includes NATO, an Asian version of NATO, and Asian countries. Furthermore, these actions have prompted rapid strategic adjustments from Russia and North Korea, further shifting potential flashpoints toward the Asia-Pacific.

III. America in the Asia-Pacific

The shift of NATO's strategic focus to China is now a core priority in the U.S.'s China containment strategy. Historically, there has been no direct geopolitical conflict between China and European nations, and their relations have primarily centered around trade. However, the U.S. has increasingly tied China and Russia together, engaging in cognitive warfare to frame China as a "threat" to Europe. The initial expectation in the U.S. and Europe that Russia would be quickly crippled by the war in Ukraine has clearly not been met. As a result, the U.S. has shifted its strategic focus to China, viewing China's support for Russia as a "primary factor" enabling Russia to sustain its war efforts. Numerous U.S.-led European policy research institutes have collaborated and aided in this cognitive warfare, accelerating NATO's strategic shift toward China.

This year marks NATO's 75th anniversary, now comprising 32 member states, with the addition of Finland and Sweden after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. However, NATO has long shifted from a self-proclaimed "peacekeeper" to a total warmaker. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine can be traced directly to Russia's extreme insecurity due to NATO's expansion. Today, NATO is trying to expand toward Asia, and with a climate of war preparation. At the 2024 NATO Summit on July 9 in Washington, Members of Congress from both the Republican and Democratic parties of the U.S. advocated for stronger cooperation with European allies to counter the so-called China's "aggressive military operations in the Indo-Pacific region." U.S. Republican Congressman Michael McCaul, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in an interview with U.S. media that "NATO was formed to form an alliance of trans-Atlantic community against any foreign oppressors...our adversaries being Putin, Chairman Xi, the Ayatollah, and Kim Jong-un, all in this 'unholy alliance' together, and they are the biggest threat." He further claimed, "What worries me and keeps me up at night is World War III, and NATO can stop that."

From any perspective, it is clear that the 2024 NATO summit was specifically aimed at China. NATO centered its focus on five key agendas concerning China:

1. Why is NATO shifting its strategic focus to China?

2. What message does NATO intend to send to China?

3. How does NATO play a concrete role in countering the "China threat"?

4. Will NATO engage in direct confrontation with China?

5. Why has NATO once again invited Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand to the summit?

In the lead-up to the NATO summit, politicians and media in the U.S. and the West intensified their efforts to demonize China, as usual, by binding China with Russia. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg remarked in an interview with U.S. media, "The war in Ukraine demonstrates how closely aligned Russia and China and North Korea and Iran are. China is the main enabler of Russia's war aggression against Ukraine."

As anticipated by international affairs observers, the NATO summit issued a declaration that, for the first time, publicly condemns China for providing support to Russia's defense industrial base.

1. NATO's Shift toward the Asia-Pacific

To lead NATO to Asia, or to establish an Asian version of NATO, the U.S.-led NATO has actively sought cooperation with Asian-Pacific countries in recent years. This year's NATO summit in Washington once again invited the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—key U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2022, these so-called "Indo-Pacific 4" (IP4) have been always invited to NATO summits. In the words of the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the repeated invitations to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand reflect a growing recognition among partner countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific that their security challenges are increasingly interconnected. "This has also been a very deliberate part of our policy," he said, "a breaking down of the silos between European alliances, Asian alliances, and even more broadly as we work in countries—and not just countries—other partners from other parts of the world."

Japan plays a central role as the U.S.'s proxy in this process. Despite few domestic achievements, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been charging ahead on the mission to form an Asian NATO. At the Ukraine Peace Summit in June, Kishida appealed to NATO countries' primary security concerns in Europe, warning that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow." This is not the first time Kishida has made such a statement. In recent years, Japan has frequently promoted this viewpoint to the international community, particularly to other Asian nations.

Under Fumio Kishida's promotion, Japan is increasingly positioning itself as a bridge between Europe and Northeast Asia. In 2023, Japan and NATO signed an Individualized Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP), which covers various areas including maritime security, disinformation, and space. Japan and NATO aimed to improve the interoperability and adaptability of their military and security forces, increase the frequency of joint exercises, and enhance cooperation on intelligence and best practices. In addition, Japan has been negotiating new Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA) with individual NATO member states to strengthen defense training and capacity building, signing such an agreement with the UK in early 2023. In 2024, Japan and Italy issued the Japan-Italy Action Plan, extending through 2027. This plan covers seven areas, including diplomacy, defense, and security. Italy is also one of Japan's key partners in the development of its next-generation fighter jet.

On July 8, Japan signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with the Philippines, allowing the two countries' military forces to enter each other's territory for joint military training aimed at China. The RAA streamlines procedures for mutual military visits and the transport of weapons and ammunition, reducing logistical burdens for joint exercises and enhancing interoperability between the two nations' armed forces. This agreement is seen as a "quasi-alliance" defense cooperation.

2. The Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula

As Asia increasingly becomes the "powder keg" of World War III, the Korean Peninsula remains a critical factor that cannot be overlooked. Since World War II, the peninsula has consistently been both a real and potential flashpoint in the region. North Korea continues to be a central concern for China, Russia, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. From China's perspective, while it can adjust its strategies to manage rising tensions stoked by the United States in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait—where it is directly involved—the Korean Peninsula presents distinct challenges. As seen during the Korean War, even if China is not a direct participant and lacks effective crisis management mechanisms for North Korea, it will inevitably be drawn into conflicts on the peninsula. Since the emergence of the Korean nuclear issue, China has been consistently in a reactive, passive position.

Today, the situation on the Korean Peninsula seems calm, but it is actually edging toward a larger crisis. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, North Korea has emerged as a staunch ally of Russia. In June, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a state visit to North Korea, during which the two countries signed a mutual defense pact. Although North Korea's Ambassador to the United Nations, Kim Song, assured the UN Security Council that "there is no reason whatsoever to be concerned about development of their bilateral relations," as the treaty was merely an effort to "promote progress and well being of the people of the two countries," the West views it differently, interpreting the pact as a signal of alliance. The pact is viewed, for one, as addressing the security needs of both countries and for another, possibly, as Russia's attempt to ease pressure on the European front by shifting the conflict focus toward the Asia-Pacific. In any case, the pact has further consolidated the ties between Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

The actions of the U.S. warrant even greater attention. Both the Republican and Democratic parties have removed the term "denuclearization of North Korea" from their latest platforms, raising concerns in South Korea about whether the U.S. is recognizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. Furthermore, The New York Times reported that in March, U.S. President Joe Biden approved a highly classified U.S. nuclear strategic plan, marking the first strategic shift to address the so-called "China's rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal."

IV. Challenges Facing Asian Societies

Driven by a major shift in geopolitical focus, Asia faces an unprecedented risk of war. From any perspective—geopolitical, conventional warfare, or nuclear deterrence—the region's situation is rapidly deteriorating. Alarmingly, not only is there insufficient recognition of this risk within Asian societies, but more countries—whether willingly or not—are becoming entangled in this dangerous war game. Additionally, nationalism is surging across Asia, a force that historically has always been a potent catalyst for conflicts and wars between nations. Particularly, in the age of social media, nationalism exerts an even greater influence on decision-makers, pushing them toward impulsive and irrational choices.

China is undoubtedly in the eye of this geopolitical storm. In light of these dramatic geopolitical shifts, people will gain a deeper understanding of the "profound changes unseen in a century." How to respond to such a tectonic geopolitical transformation presents the most significant challenge for this generation.