Yan Xuetong's press briefing ahead of 13th World Peace Forum
The U.S. is constantly at war. Europe had 11 wars in the past 30 years. And they dare to lecture us that East Asia is the most dangerous place on earth?
On June 26, Tsinghua University held a press briefing for its 13th World Peace Forum, scheduled to take place from July 2 to 4. Below is an English translation of the Chinese transcript shared with journalists. All emphasis is ours.
Yang Bin, Professor and Secretary-General of the 13th World Peace Forum:
Good morning, dear media friends. Thank you very much for attending today’s media briefing for the 13th World Peace Forum, especially amidst your busy schedules. Many of you are long-time friends of Tsinghua University and of the World Peace Forum, and I know many of you are also old friends of Professor Yan Xuetong. I am honoured to be entrusted by the university and to have the trust of Professor Yan to contribute to the organisation of the World Peace Forum.
Today, we are particularly honoured to have Professor Yan Xuetong deliver a special lecture. After the lecture, Professor Yan will also engage with you in a discussion, which I believe will be very exciting.
The 13th World Peace Forum is scheduled to take place from July 2 to July 4, 2025, in Beijing. The theme of this year’s forum is “Advancing Global Peace and Prosperity: Shared Responsibility, Benefit, and Achievement.” This theme is rooted in a profound real-world context. Currently, the international situation is complex and severe, with local conflicts flaring up, and the smoke of war still lingering in many regions. Populism is rising, global economic growth is sluggish, and peace and development face unprecedented challenges. In this context, emphasising the concept of Shared Responsibility, Benefit, and Achievement becomes especially important. The forum aims to gather global wisdom and explore how to strengthen international cooperation, share the responsibilities of maintaining peace and promoting development, and share the opportunities brought by globalisation, ultimately achieving common prosperity and lasting peace for all nations.
This year’s forum is closely focused on the themes of our era: peace and development. We have meticulously designed a rich and diverse agenda to have a comprehensive and in-depth discussion of the core challenges and opportunities facing the international community today. The main activities are as follows:
First, we will have an opening ceremony on the morning of July 3, attended by a national-level leader, who will deliver an important speech.
There will be two lunch speeches, with Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Li Guoping, Chief Engineer of the China National Space Administration, attending.
There will be four major sessions, addressing macro-strategic topics: International Order and World Peace
Pan-Securitization and Global Security Predicament
The Role of Global South in World Peace and Prosperity
Major Power Coordination and Conflict Resolution.
Additionally, there will be 18 panel discussion\s on a wide range of topics, including
1. Asia-Pacific Cooperation and Security
2. Preserving World Economic Order
3. SCO and Regional Security Cooperation
4. Economic Cooperation in East Asia: Opportunities and Challenges
5. Transatlantic Relations in Transition
6. Artificial Intelligence: Risks and Global Regulation
7. China-U.S. Relations under Trump 2.0
8. The Role of the BRICS in Upholding an Orderly World
9. Challenges and Opportunities of the Use of AI in Armed Conflict
10. China-Europe Ties: Exploring New Avenues for Cooperation
11. Strengthening China-Africa Cooperation
12. South Asian Security and Order
13. The Future of European Security
14. Middle Powers in a Multipolar World
15. The Rise of Economic Security and Its Global Implications
16. Building Sustainable Peace in the Middle East
17. Arms Control in a Turbulent World
18. Evolving Major-Power Relations and World Order
During the forum, we will also host several press conferences with key guest speakers, where media representatives will have the opportunity to ask questions on issues of interest.
This forum has several outstanding features, mainly in terms of the level of guests, international influence, and media attention. We are very grateful to the entire organising team of the World Peace Forum for their tremendous efforts in achieving this. Professor Yan Xuetong, who previously served as the Secretary-General of the World Peace Forum, and the Institute for International Relations, Tsinghua University (TUIIR), have also contributed greatly to the continued improvement and success of the forum. As a result, this year’s international guest lineup is stronger than ever, with a wider range of representation, and the quantity and quality of foreign guests attending are at a new high.
Among the foreign speakers, we have 49 senior-level guests from 25 countries, including Egypt, Australia, Belgium, Pakistan, Germany, Russia, France, South Korea, Kazakhstan, Canada, the U.S., South Africa, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Iran, India, the UK, Jordan, and others. In addition, there will be ambassadors from 13 countries, including Brazil, Malaysia, Serbia, Spain, and Italy.
Over 60 foreign guest speakers will speak at the forum, with more than 17 of them at the ministerial level or higher. More than 50% of foreign guests are expected to come from the Global South, surpassing the number of guests from developed countries. This fully demonstrates the forum’s growing international appeal and representativeness.
The forum’s international influence has been steadily increasing. Numerous globally renowned strategic experts and leading research institutions have proactively contacted the forum’s secretariat, not only expressing strong intentions to attend but also actively engaging in the forum’s agenda setting and core issue discussions. This vividly reflects how the World Peace Forum has become an indispensable high-level platform for intellectual exchange and policy dialogue in the field of global strategic security, gaining significant attention from the international community.
In terms of media attention, the forum has garnered unprecedented interest and support from both domestic and international media. As of now, over 80 media organisations have registered to participate, and more than 200 journalists have registered, with 43 major domestic media outlets and 38 international ones involved. This broad media participation will greatly facilitate the global dissemination of the forum’s outcomes, further expanding its intellectual influence.
I have just shared some of the key features and overall improvements of this year’s forum. As the organiser, I would like to express our sincere thanks to the media for their long-standing support for the World Peace Forum. The forum will continue to provide media friends with participation opportunities, facilitating yout in-depth communication with top domestic and international experts and scholars. To ensure that our media friends can efficiently and conveniently carry out their work, we will focus on providing all necessary support, including establishing dedicated media workspaces and interview rooms, arranging interviews with domestic and foreign experts and scholars, and offering detailed conference materials and on-site transcripts to help journalists quickly understand the core topics and speakers’ viewpoints. We will also establish a media centre to provide a good working environment and network support. We hope that media friends both at home and abroad will actively report on this year’s World Peace Forum. Once again, on behalf of the secretariat, thank you all.
Yan Xuetong, Honorary President, Institute for International Relations, Tsinghua University (TUIIR)
I am very glad to discuss the current background of the World Peace Forum with everyone. As you may have noticed, international meetings focusing on peace and security issues have recently received more attention than those on economic development. I will first introduce the current situation and then share my views.
Let’s look at the recent events, particularly the uncertainty surrounding the war between Israel and Iran. On June 10, U.S. and Israeli officials communicated publicly that Trump had told Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu he opposed military action against Iran. In my view, this statement by Trump was not a false one. Many people now believe that Israel and the U.S. had planned a military strike together to take place on June 13, but that is not the case we witnessed. On June 10, Trump had already stated that he opposed military strikes against Iran. He believed that a nuclear agreement with Iran was still possible. At that time, the U.S. and Iran had already agreed to meet on June 15 to hold talks on nuclear issues.
In my interpretation, the reason why I believe Trump’s opposition to military action was genuine on June 10 is because of his domestic political base, namely MAGA—Make America Great Again. He made a great promise to MAGA to gain their support, pledging “America First.” This meant that all his foreign policies were meant to serve U.S. national interests. MAGA had always argued that Trump should not go to war on behalf of Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s personal interests were not the U.S.’s interests. The U.S. should not go to war for Netanyahu’s benefit, spending taxpayer money and putting U.S. soldiers at risk, potentially leading to a long-term war like those in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. These wars lasted over 10 years, and the longest lasted 20 years. MAGA supporters reminded Trump that he had promised not to get involved in such actions again, which is why they support him. that such wars should not happen again. Therefore, when Trump said he opposed military action against Iran, it was a reflection of his need to maintain strong support from his domestic base.
At this point on June 10, the U.S. still opposed military action, but another matter showed that neither the Democratic nor the Republican parties could escape Netanyahu’s influence over U.S. policy. There is a strange phenomenon here—MAGA told the U.S. what policy to adopt, but the U.S. government was very unwilling to follow it. For instance, during the Gaza war, when the U.S. tried to send aid to Gaza, it was blocked by the Israeli military. Biden publicly criticised Netanyahu—this was publicly reported—for blocking even a symbolic gesture despite the U.S. providing military support. Yet, Netanyahu even managed to re-introduce a law in Congress, the “Antisemitism Awareness Act.” It is not only about committing acts or making statements opposing Jews; even holding such thoughts is considered illegal. In other words, merely thinking such thoughts is a violation of the law. It is remarkable that Netanyahu had the power to influence the U.S. Congress to pass a law that contradicts the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech. This is an incredibly influence.
On June 12, Trump said that Israel might attack Iran, but that the threat wasn’t imminent. This indicates he had agreed to Netanyahu’s plan to strike Iran, though the exact timing was uncertain. On June 13, Israel did strike Iran. On that day, Trump also confirmed that he knew Israel was planning to wage war against Iran, syaing that the U.S. was aware of the situation. This implied his approval.
On June 19, Trump denied reports that he had approved strikes on Iran, calling them fake news and malicious lies. This statement indicated the U.S. had no intention to strike Iran. It also suggested that the U.S. would not follow Netanyahu’s lead. Netanyahu had been pushing Trump to take military action, but the U.S. domestic forces from MAGA pushed back. MAGA insisted that Netanyahu should not be the one to determine U.S. policy on Iran, and that the U.S. should not take military action under any circumstances. Many soldiers and veterans spoke out against it. At that time, Trump dismissed the reports as rumours, claiming there was no truth to them.
However, just three days later, on June 21, Trump made another statement, claiming that the U.S. had successfully attacked three Iranian nuclear facilities. Now, the U.S. Secretary of Defence states that the decision to strike was made at the last minute, with Trump giving the order. In the end, Trump still crafted his policy in line with Netanyahu’s wishes.
Next, on June 22, Netanyahu said that the U.S. military actions were carried out after “full coordination” with Israel. What does “full coordination” mean? It means Israel had persuaded the U.S. to strike Iran, and the U.S. agreed. The U.S. military’s actions were coordinated by Israel; without this coordination, the U.S. would not have struck. Essentially, the U.S. carried out the strikes according to Israel’s wishes.
On June 23, some senior members of the U.S. House of Representatives began discussing plans to prevent Trump from taking military intervention against Iran. This was after the strikes on the 22nd, with the aim of stopping any additional military actions. However, this initiative came only from the Democratic Party, not the Republican Party.
The latest news today indicates that Trump’s perspective on this matter is beginning to change. On June 23, Trump announced that Israel and Iran had reached a ceasefire agreement. However, just four hours after Trump’s announcement, the fighting resumed. Many thought the U.S. had the power to stop the fighting, but in reality, Israel had initiated the attack. Trump himself admitted that he couldn’t control Israel’s actions. He said, “I gotta get Israel to calm down now…Israel, as soon as we made the deal, they came out and they dropped a load of bombs, the likes of which I’ve never seen before, the biggest load that we’ve seen. We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the fuck they’re doing.”
This shows the limited influence of the U.S. over Israel. In international relations, there’s a saying that sometimes it’s not the dog wagging the tail, but the tail wagging the dog. Small countries can pull larger countries into conflicts, and the question is: why do the larger countries allow themselves to be pulled in?
Trump immediately called Netanyahu and demanded that Israel stop attacking Iran. Netanyahu responded by saying that Israel could not cancel the attack because Iran had violated the ceasefire agreement. If this report is true, it shows that Trump and Netanyahu had an argument. Later, Israel declared a ceasefire, but whether it was genuine remains unclear. On June 24, China’s representative to the UN expressed hope that the ceasefire would hold.
I don’t know what media friends think, but it seems that very few people believe this ceasefire will be lasting. Most believe that the ceasefire is likely to be very temporary, though how temporary it is, no one knows yet.
On the evening of June 23, Trump spoke at NATO and said of the Israel-Iran conflict: “Can it start again? I guess someday, it can. It could maybe start soon.” This indicates that the U.S. does not have control over the ceasefire, and even Trump himself feels that Netanyahu might not listen to him.
Let’s review the events from June 10 until now. We see that the U.S. does not have the kind of initiative in this war that many people imagine. We all feel that the international situation has become very uncertain. If the U.S. government and its top decision-makers believe that every decision they make is one they had no choice but to make, then where is the certainty? Where is the certainty? Even when it comes to taking large-scale military actions overseas, they are indecisive, only making decisions at the last minute rather than having a plan ready 3 or 5 months in advance, and carrying out the plan accordingly. The decisions are very reactive. From June 10 to 21, only 11 days passed, and within those 11 days, a decision was made on whether to strike or not. When the highest decision-makers of the U.S. military can make a 180-degree turn on a decision within just 11 days, do you think international security can have any certainty?
So, from this situation, we can understand why people feel that the instability of today’s international order is rising, and its uncertainty is intensifying. One important reason, if there is one, is that the U.S. itself no longer has the ability to execute its military actions according to its own plans in a structured manner. Instead, it is always reacting to changing situations, doing what it believes it has no choice but to do, even though it actually has the power to act otherwise. This is the first point.
The second point is that while people are focusing on the war between Iran and Israel, there have been other military conflicts during this period: the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has lasted for three years; the Gaza war, which has been going on for nearly two years since it began in 2023; and, just recently, the four-day air conflict between Pakistan and India. Now, military conflicts are increasing, and they are no longer of the symbolic kind, such as the brief four-day war between India and Pakistan. They are trending towards becoming prolonged. The Russia-Ukraine war, which some initially thought would last 48 hours, three days, three weeks, or three months, has now lasted more than three years and shows no sign of ending. The Gaza war, which many thought would be a quick operation for Israel against Hamas, is still ongoing. Starting on October 7, 2023, it has now been over two years, with no resolution yet. Just yesterday, it seemed like fighting in Gaza resumed.
Let’s look at this situation. On May 19, Trump said that Ukraine and Russia would continue negotiating a ceasefire, with the Vatican also expressing its willingness to mediate. Trump said that the terms of the ceasefire could only be determined by the Russia and Ukraine, as only they understood the details of the negotiations, and that the atmosphere and tone of the talks were very harmonious.
Now, consider that this statement came on May 19, 2025. Before this, Trump, when he was not yet in power, believed that he could end the war very quickly. He said he could finish it in 24 hours, and later, in two weeks. But after four to five months of engagement, Trump realised that the U.S. could not decide the outcome of this war. Trump himself admitted this, saying that the ceasefire conditions could only be determined by Russia and Ukraine, and the U.S. had no power to decide when or how the war would end. He said this is a matter that only Russia and Ukraine could settle, echoing the old Chinese saying: “When you’re not in charge, you don’t understand the cost.” He thought he could resolve the conflict, but it turns out that it is not his call.
In their phone conversation, Putin and Trump both said that broader conditions needed to be agreed upon before signing a more comprehensive peace agreement. Russia would propose and prepare to cooperate with Ukraine to draft a memorandum that includes a possible peace agreement and ceasefire. At this point, both sides understand that the war will not end quickly, and reaching a peace agreement will be very difficult. It’s not just the Russia-Ukraine conflict that is hard to resolve; even the Gaza conflict could take a while to settle. Israel and Hamas have reached numerous ceasefire agreements, yet the fighting continues. It’s similar to how men constantly say they’re dieting but soon find themselves gaining weight again. Some might say weight loss is a lifelong pursuit.
What I mean is, we are seeing the long-term nature of wars emerge now. A ceasefire does not mean peace will be achieved. A peace agreement may take numerous ceasefire agreements to reach, and no one knows how many more ceasefires are required before a final peace can be achieved. This is another aspect of the uncertainty we are witnessing.
Similarly, on May 16, Trump, while mediating, spoke with Zelensky, but the talks were unpleasant. Zelensky showed a lack of willingness to cooperate. At this point, the U.S. realised that just because it provides military aid, it doesn’t mean the recipient country will listen. I imagine Trump didn’t anticipate this difficulty in dealing with Israel. But now, he realises that military aid doesn’t guarantee control over the situation. Once aid is provided, it’s up to the recipient how they use it.
We can see that the issue of ending wars is not as simple as many people imagine. The U.S. is often seen as the world’s foremost military superpower, capable of achieving whatever it sets its mind to, but that is not the case. There are many things it cannot achieve. For instance, Trump once claimed he could quickly end the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This was back on February 12, shortly after taking office. He thought one phone call could solve everything, but he found out that his diplomatic strategy—phone call diplomacy—did not work as easily as he imagined. After making a call on February 12, he expressed satisfaction that the issue had been resolved with a single phone call, resulting in an agreement to negotiate despite earlier resistance. However, since February 18, when the United States first sent negotiators to mediate talks between Russia and Ukraine—talks that officially began that day in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia—more than four months have passed, and no resolution has been reached. Historically, Israel and Hamas had their first ceasefire talks lasting over a year before reaching an agreement, and similarly, the negotiations for World War I took over a year, the Korean War lasted two years, and the Vietnam War lasted over three years. It took over five years and five months between Israel and Egypt.
History tells us that when wars break out, it’s not like we imagine where a military superpower comes in and tells everyone to stop fighting, and that’s the end of it. Many wars involve superpowers, but their involvement doesn’t necessarily mean the war will end quickly. History shows that the involvement of superpowers in most cases escalates the war, making it larger and more intense, but it does not guarantee an immediate resolution.
The morning after the U.S. bombing of Iran on June 22, a Russian television interviewer asked whether U.S. involvement would immediately trigger a world war. I responded that it would not. While the entry of a superpower could escalate the conflict, the danger of a world war is not as imminent today. It’s limited by nuclear weapons, which act as a constraint on superpowers during conflicts. The conflict may escalate, but it won’t expand to a world war.
Now, to summarise briefly, we are discussing Trump’s presidency and changes in the international order. Trump’s current presidency has not started a new international order; instead, it has accelerated the de-globalisation he began in his previous term. This acceleration includes an increase in military conflicts and rising uncertainty in international affairs. In the case of the Israel-Iran military conflict, Trump intervened with a bombing and requested Israel to stop fighting.
But think about it: Is the greatest pressure he faces from Iran? From Israel? From international condemnation? No, the real pressure doesn’t come from these sources. Is it due to poor U.S. economic performance, fluctuating oil prices, or a weak stock market? Again, no. In my personal view, the reason he requested an immediate stop is the loss of support from MAGA. MAGA represents his largest domestic support base. If he continues and turns this conflict into a real war, with the U.S. being deeply involved and sending troops, it would lead to a major loss of support from MAGA. His domestic support would collapse, which directly threatens his political security—his hold on power.
His political survival was at stake, which is why Netanyahu could fully exploit this situation. Regardless of Netanyahu’s actions in Gaza—such as the massacre of women and children—both Democratic and Republican leaders had to support him. No matter how much they criticised or used harsh words, they still had to support him. So, the main driving force behind U.S. policy in the Middle East, in my personal view, is not external or international factors, but internal ones. That’s why you can see that even the policies concerning international students are now scrutinised for anti-Israel comments on social media. If a student criticises Israel, they are not allowed to study in the U.S. This shows just how much influence Netanyahu’s government has on U.S. domestic and foreign policy.
Regarding the two wars, the Israel-Iran war and the Russia-Ukraine war, we can observe the trend in international changes. I’ll now make a macro judgment.
Last year, the global order shifted from a globalisation-based system to one of de-globalisation. Now, the uncertainty in the de-globalisation order is more severe, both in military conflicts and in economic cooperation.
In terms of military conflicts, there is an upward trend—conflicts are increasing, not decreasing. The Russia-Ukraine war started in 2022, but it hasn’t spread to other countries’ territories. In contrast, the Gaza war has been spreading from the onset, with more countries involved in military actions. Israel has been involved in Syria’s Golan Heights, Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, and now Iran. This conflict has a tendency to expand. We don’t know how far it will spread, but it’s not out of the question that the war could extend further. Even yesterday, Trump acknowledged that there’s a possibility of further fighting with Iran.
Second, the danger of nuclear proliferation. The recent U.S. military strikes against Iran clearly violate the basic regulations of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nuclear states are responsible for providing security assurances for nuclear projects. However, what has happened in this case is that these nuclear projects have not been safeguarded and have instead been attacked by nuclear states. This creates a significant problem: when the U.S. strikes Iran’s nuclear programme, other countries will begin to question whether nuclear states can be trusted by non-nuclear states. The question of trust is not determined by the nuclear states themselves, such as China, the U.S., Russia, or France. Whether nuclear states’ assurances are trustworthy or not cannot be judged by them. It is up to non-nuclear states to decide if they trust nuclear states. This is a concept in moral realism—moral realism holds that a major power’s morality is not judged by itself, but by others, by “the other.” Morality is judged by others. For example, whether I am moral or not is not up to me to say, but for others to judge. The judgment of morality is based on the judgment of others.
Therefore, today’s U.S. actions will lead non-nuclear states to question whether nuclear states can be trusted. People will be sceptical of whether nuclear states can strike nuclear projects of non-nuclear countries. When more countries begin to doubt the reliability of nuclear states, the possibility of these countries pursuing nuclear weapons could increase. This is a very detrimental development for the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Interestingly, there is one non-nuclear country that supports the U.S. military strikes against Iran, and that is Germany, under Chancellor Merz. Why? I don’t know his true intentions, but if other European countries adopt this approach, what will happen? That is to say, these European countries that support strikes against non-nuclear countries, will they use this as an excuse to develop their own nuclear weapons? We don’t know his thoughts, but his actions have caused confusion in Europe, and many people criticise Merz and his purpose for making such statements. So, I believe we can see that the risk of nuclear proliferation is increasing, not decreasing.
Additionally, there have been serious violations of human rights, with Gaza being the most typical case. This time, we found that the attacks by Iran and Israel have both resulted in significant civilian casualties. In comparison to Gaza, the casualties might seem small, but over 50,000 civilians have died in Gaza, with some estimates now nearing 60,000. The attacks are specifically targeting schools and hospitals. This raises a very serious issue: today, people no longer care about whether they are following the laws of war. At least in the past, they would verbally claim to adhere to the laws of war, but now, they don’t even bother to say they will follow them. We can see that the uncertainty in the international order is not just a matter of degree; it may also involve a qualitative change. The shift from globalisation to de-globalisation is not just a change in the amount of international cooperation, but a change in direction. Today’s de-globalised order is a chaotic world we do not want to see.
The second aspect is economic. The first appearance of supply chain disruption came with the U.S.-China trade war, which led to disruptions in bilateral supply chains. Then, in 2022, the Ukraine war led to further breakdowns in supply chains due to sanctions against Russia. Now, the war between Iran and Israel has caused additional supply chain disruptions. The current trend shows that we cannot foresee a repair of the original supply chains. The trend seems to be that more supply chains will break down, rather than the already disrupted ones being restored. Hence, there is now a term called “reshaping the supply chain,” which differs from restoring it. Restoring the supply chain means repairing the chain to its original state after it’s been damaged. Reshaping it means creating an entirely new supply chain, which may be very different from the previous one. First, the new supply chains will be shorter and involve fewer countries. In the past, a product might involve production from over 100 countries, but now it might only involve three countries. This means supply chains will be shorter, and many of the longer existing supply chains are at risk of further breakdowns.
Secondly, the results of the de-globalisation trend are clear: the U.S. continues to impose sanctions, with Trump’s early sanctions extending into the Biden administration. Now, under the second Trump administration, sanctions have become the norm. The primary method for the U.S. to engage in international economic cooperation is not through collaboration, but through sanctions. The most common tool of sanctions is tariffs. The U.S. uses tariffs as a primary method of international economic cooperation, and when tariffs are imposed on other countries, they often retaliate with tariffs of their own. Sanctions and retaliatory sanctions have become a regular feature of the global economic environment. In the past, sanctions were only used for specific issues, but now they are the first tool, followed by cooperation. Cooperation is now seen in the context of reducing the damage caused by sanctions. The logic is different from the past. Previously, cooperation meant expanding absolute gains, whereas now it’s about minimising relative losses. This has become a new normalized phenomenon.
So, under Trump’s administration, we saw some new characteristics in both the security and economic fields—some of which had existed before but were strengthened during this period, while others were previously uncommon and have now become normalised.
In recent discussions, much attention has been given to the concept of a rules-based order, which was proposed by the United States after the Cold War and supported by many European countries. However, the U.S. government no longer uses this term, and neither does the Trump administration. You’ll notice that many countries that once embraced this concept, such as those in Europe and some of America’s allies, no longer mention the rules-based order. While China initially did not support this concept, the Chinese government has now started to discuss it, taking up the conversation themselves.
Now Trump hasn’t explicitly said what kind of order he wants to establish, but his phone call diplomacy has shown us that he only calls the highest leaders of countries. He won’t deal with lower-level officials. My understanding is that he doesn’t have a summarising term for it, so I would summarise it myself: What he wants to establish is an international order based on personal deals between leaders. This is a significant change. When the order is based on rules, we can discuss who violated the rules and who is right or wrong, and we should follow the right path, at least having a guiding principle on what should be done. But when everything is based on personal deals between decision-makers made over the phone, what kind of result do you expect?
First, no one knows what was agreed upon in the phone conversation between the two leaders. Second, even if they did reach an agreement, is their understanding the same or different? For example, if Trump called Netanyahu, saying, “You agreed to a ceasefire, but four hours later, there’s bombing, and the ceasefire didn’t happen. Didn’t we agree on that in the phone call?” Netanyahu could say, “That’s not what I meant, you misunderstood.” So, when decisions are based on personal phone deals between leaders, it is inherently uncertain. You don’t know what the standard is, what the content is, or if both leaders understood each other’s words correctly. What if they were speaking past each other? They both think the other understood the meaning, but one says, “That’s not what I meant.” How do you resolve that? We can see that an order based on personal deals between decision-makers is inherently uncertain, because the foundation itself is uncertain.
So, today I’ve shared this brief overview, discussing the two wars and then offering some general conclusions. I welcome your feedback and hope you will point out any mistakes.
Q&A
Question: Hello, I know that you are a representative scholar of the realist camp and have proposed the concept of moral realism. I would like to ask for your evaluation of the three leaders currently involved in wars or controversial actions—Trump, Putin, and Netanyahu. Do they have morality [as in the moral realism context], and do their governing logic align with realism?
Yan Xuetong: Recently, many people have asked me about Netanyahu and what type of leader he represents. Some have asked whether he fits the description of a “anemocratic” leader, as I have categorised leadership into four types: humane authority, hegemony, tyranny, and anemocracy. I don’t think he belongs to the “anemocratic” type. I believe Netanyahu is more of a “tyranny.” When making decisions, such as in the Gaza War or the Israel-Iran war, he places his personal interests first. Some have asked what basis I have for this judgment. Well, I’m not alone in this view—there are others in Israel and the U.S. who share it. For example, last week, Bill Clinton in the U.S. said that Netanyahu started this war to maintain his own personal power. By engaging in war, he avoids stepping down; without war, he would have to leave office.
Many people in Israel oppose him, saying that his current approach is not protecting the hostages. If the war were to end, Hamas could release the hostages, but as long as the war continues, Hamas won’t. While Netanyahu publicly claims they are working to bring the hostages back, his continued military actions are aimed at preventing Hamas from releasing all the hostages. The truth is, he knows this, but why does he keep doing it? In my understanding, as many in Israel have pointed out, he is doing it to stay in power. I don’t believe Netanyahu is fighting these wars to protect the national interests of Israel or its people. I think these two wars are primarily serving his personal political interests.
Question: My question is about how Netanyahu has specifically manipulated Trump’s domestic and foreign policies. I remember you had a conversation with John Mearsheimer at Tsinghua, and he mentioned that Israel has a very powerful lobby group in the U.S. Can you elaborate on this?
Yan Xuetong: Mearsheimer wrote a book claiming that Israel’s lobby group controls the U.S., leading the U.S. to adopt policies in the Middle East that serve Israel’s interests, not America’s. And now he faces many blackmails in the U.S.
From an academic perspective, I don’t fully agree with Mearsheimer’s view that Israel can control the U.S. simply through its lobby. This is somewhat hard to imagine—even if they have influenced American lawmakers, it’s unlikely that the entire American society could be bought off. Why does such a phenomenon occur? Even though Biden is unwilling to support military actions in Gaza, he still provides weapons. This is directly related to his political survival. I believe there is another factor greater than the influence of the lobby groups: Netanyahu has created a culture in the U.S. related to WWII and the suffering of Jewish people. Because of their past victimisation, the Israeli government must be supported in whatever it does, whether it’s good or bad. I don’t fully understand why this culture has developed.
From my understanding, this has developed into a cultural factor in U.S. society. It has even become so severe that if you protest Netanyahu, schools in the U.S. will have police arrest you. The current regulations state that foreign students who speak ill of Netanyahu will be expelled, and domestic students will face punishment. This influence seems to have surpassed the so-called lobby groups.
In this sense, I can’t precisely explain the mechanism of how it works, because I’m not a specialist in American culture. But this is certainly something worth studying—how Netanyahu has gained such power to manipulate the U.S. Middle East policy.
Question: I would like to ask your opinion on the future developments regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Do you think Iran will pursue nuclear weapons, or will it seek to reach another nuclear agreement?
Yan Xuetong: At this point, I can’t predict what the Iranian government will ultimately decide. Officially, Iran’s policy is that it is not preparing to pursue nuclear weapons, but it continues to pursue peaceful nuclear energy projects. In my view, the risk of nuclear proliferation is rising in the Middle East, not decreasing, and it’s not just Iran that poses a risk.
Question: Earlier, you mentioned uncertainty. I would like to ask if you believe there is uncertainty in the Taiwan Strait. Also, the Chinese mainland has consistently emphasised its strategic resolve. If there is uncertainty in the Taiwan Strait, how should this strategic resolve counter the uncertainty? Additionally, you mentioned Trump’s transactional nature. Some public opinion suggests that Trump may use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in his dealings with China. What is your view on this?
Yan Xuetong: First of all, I think the statements from the Taiwan Affairs Office and the recent meetings about the integration of cross-strait regional development have made it very clear. First, the Chinese government has the ability to maintain order in this region. This is well within China’s military capabilities. We now have the capability to maintain order, and it will not be decided by any external great power whether there will be war in this region. I believe China’s military capabilities are now strong enough for this. Second, China’s policy toward Taiwan is very clear: we still aim to promote the integration and development of both sides.
So, I think there is something particularly worth studying: why has East Asia, often regarded as unstable—whether it’s the South China Sea, the Diaoyu Islands, Taiwan, or the Korean Peninsula—been at peace for decades since the end of the Cambodian War in 1991? Why has this region not experienced war? For decades, this region has remained peaceful. Based on the inertia of historical development, this peace could continue.
While I cannot predict how long this peace will last, I am confident that there will be no war in the next five years. Those who claim that East Asia is not safe and use various terms to describe it as dangerous are often from countries that are already involved in wars—for example, European countries. Few Africans believe in the possibility of war in East Asia, and few people in Latin America perceive potential conflicts in the region. The concerns about various dangers, including the Taiwan Strait crisis, and the uncertainty surrounding such issues, are mostly held by countries currently involved in wars, such as the U.S. and Europe. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, Europe has been involved in numerous wars—Armenia and Azerbaijan, Greece and Turkey, the Kosovo War, Chechen wars, and the Ukraine war. There have been 11 wars in the past 30 years. In contrast, East Asia has established a long-standing peace mechanism, which ensures not only the peace of the Taiwan Strait but also the safety of the entire region, making it one of the more peaceful areas in the world. In contrast, the most unstable regions today are the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. So, if we want to focus on global peace, we should first pay attention to regions where wars are ongoing. If those regions stop fighting, the world would likely be much more peaceful, while the possibility of conflict in regions that have not yet fought remains low.
wondering where i can find the original video/transcript in chinese? thank you!