Yan Xuetong says policy makers should be placed at the center of theoretical analysis in international relations
China’s leading IR scholar says traditional system-level theories have failed to explain the current shift of global trend
The following article was a revised version of the one published in the Chinese-language Quarterly Journal of International Politics, Issue 3, 2025. The author, Yan Xuetong, is Honorary President of the Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University, and serves as an Academic Advisor to the Quarterly Journal of International Politics.
In this very academic discussion, Yan revisits the long-standing structure-agent debate in international studies, arguing that structuralist theories have failed to explain current global trend, such as the Trump administration’s foreign policies contrary to the tradition of American diplomacy and the reorientation of European security thinking. He suggests placing policy makers, rather than structural variables, at the center of theoretical analysis.
Yan personally revised the following English-language version.
阎学通:演员VS剧场 : 国际关系理论的范式
Yan Xuetong: Actors VS. Theaters — IR Theoretical Paradigms
Just half a year into President Trump’s second term, his administration has not only strongly disrupted the global order but has also challenged many established theories of international relations (IR). IR theories which focused on systemic level variables have proven inadequate at explaining the ongoing changes in the global order. Systemic explanations—such as power structure, institutions, norms, geopolitics, culture, and interaction—all failed to offer a convincing explanation as to why the Trump administration abandoned strategic U.S. allies, the reliance on which is the cornerstone of American foreign policy since the end of World War II. These systemic theories also fail to explain why attitudes of European countries have changed from being wary of Germany’s military strength to actively encouraging the enhancement of German military capability. It is obvious that theories focused on systemic explanations cannot account for why globalization has reversed toward counter-globalization nor why uncertainty became the main characteristic of the current global order. Faced with these drawbacks, IR scholars are increasingly turning to behavioral analysis through the framework of policy makers’ influence on international systems. Here, I aim to explore the debate of the IR theoretical paradigms.
Which Factor Plays the Decisive Role: The System or the Man?
The inadequacies of systemic theories have revived the long-standing agent-structure debate in IR theoretical studies. The debate has persisted for decades without consensus. I propose the cause for the lack of consensus is partially the fuzzy definition of “agent,” whether it refers to policy-makers (the persons) or institutional entities (such as governments, states, organizations, and companies).
Objects do not have relationships with each other. Therefore, international relations are the relations between people. International relations are decided by the people who lead the states or other social entities. The problem with current IR theoretical paradigms is that the political or economic entities are treated as the agent. Under this interpretation, there is no explanation for why Trump’s Administration adopts policies that are in opposition of Biden’s Administration when they are both government entities of the United States. Therefore, I would argue “agent” should be conceptualized as the persons who lead social entities, as it is the leaders within those entities (and not the entities themselves) who are responding to the environment. If we contextualize “agent” as the person, then the current international events and trends can be explained. In this framework, the differences between the Trump Administration and Biden’s can be attributed to the fact that Donald Trump provides a different leadership from Joe Biden.
To develop a theory that can explain interstate relations in both modern and historical context, I propose to define “agent” as reference to the leader of the state. Historically, the state was considered the private property of the individual ruler or a ruling family. As such, it is taken for granted that the ancient state’s foreign policy primarily serves the private interests of the ruler or the ruling family of the state. Whereas, in modern understandings, the state is the citizen’s property. Ergo, many would assume the leader’s personal interest does no longer have influence on foreign policy making.
According to historical record, the premodern rulers practiced intermarriage between ruling families as a form of diplomacy. This demonstrates how interstate relations is the relationship between rulers but not states. The “state’s action” was merely the expression of the rulers’ use of the state apparatus when achieving their goals. However, in modern times, this phenomenon still persists. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continuously wages war against his neighbors, which is widely viewed as an effort to maintain his rule in Israel. The former U.S. President Bill Clinton agrees that Netanyahu attacked Iran for the sake of “staying in office forever and ever.” This view has been widely echoed within the international community.
Defining the “agent” as the leader of an entity clarifies the relationship between structure and agent. Where the “agent” is referring to the policy maker, “structure” refers to the international and domestic environment. Here, the international environment are elements including the global power structure, strategic relationships, geopolitical context, international norms and so on. Meanwhile, the domestic environment refers to governmental institutions, social structures, party politics, national culture, etc.
If the domestic and international environments are comparable to the front and backstage in a theatre, while the policy maker is the actor on the stage. While the lighting, audio, props, orchestra, stagehand, etc. all influence the performance, the most decisive factor is the actor’s quality. Similarly, both domestic and international environmental factors influence the policy maker, but some policy makers are constrained by these factors while others are not. A theoretical paradigm with the policy maker as the independent variable can explain the commonly observed phenomenon where the same structural factors result in variable effects on different policy makers. For example, changes in state leadership can lead to an immediate change in a state’s foreign relations, such as turning enemies into allies or vice versa, despite structural variables remaining the same.
Are Levels of Analysis: Fluid or Exclusive?
Breaking away from the constraints of levels of analysis is necessary for developing new IR theories. Kenneth Waltz’s innovation with the levels of analysis—systemic, state, and individual—has served as a valuable conceptual tool for categorizing variables. However, his assertion that individual-level variables are only useful for analyzing foreign policy and applicable to construction of IR theories remains a matter of debate. While the levels of analysis reflect scholars’ thinking, we should not suggest every factor exclusively impactful on a single level. Some factors may simultaneously operate across two analytical levels.
For instance, global leadership expresses its impact on both systemic and individual levels. When analyzing the formation of the Yalta system, the role that Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill play is a global leadership which functions as a variable at the systemic level. When we analyze the policy they pushed for, they function as leaders of state and are variables at the individual level. Recognizing that agents can be variables at both the system and individual levels of analysis could facilitate the development of a novel theoretical paradigm with potentially greater explanatory power.
To improve the objectiveness of their theories, some IR scholars have focused predominantly on non-human factors at the systemic level while ignoring the role of agents. The school of geopolitical theories is a popular paradigm that explains international relations through framework of the international environment. For instance, in this framework, geopolitical scholars often argue that a state’s resource scarcity is the cause of its military aggression. However, this framework cannot explain the phenomenon that all states are faced with the challenge of limited natural resources, yet some resort to war while others do not. Furthermore, for any given state faced with the same resources challenges, it will oscillate between warring and peaceful stages in history. The strain of natural resource scarcity remains constant through these oscillations, therefore it cannot explain why the state alternates between these two stages. What can account for such outcomes is variable that is the policy maker’s preference for warfare (or not) as a means of obtaining resources from other states.
I do not reject theoretical paradigms with systemic-level factors as independent variables. However, I do argue that we should clarify the relationship between the structure and the agent when constructing IR theories. While the two variables do feedback into each other, it is nonetheless necessary to avoid concluding the theoretical exploration at this point, because this fails to explain the mechanism of the interaction. For example, the structural variables remained constant when Trump imposed a 50% tariff on India. In response, Narendra Modi’s government shifted its China policy from confrontation to cooperation. This clearly illustrates a case of alternations made to US-Indian strategic relations as well as India-China relations without structural causes.
To develop an IR theory that crosses levels of analysis, the theory must serve to clarify the mechanism of interaction between the structure and the agent in a sequential manner. I need to emphasize the importance of explaining the mechanistic sequence of impact and not the chronological sequences of existence. Chronology is description, not explanation. Because the agent can choose how to act within their social constraints, therefore I would argue that IR theories should address more agent impacts on the social structures and not the other way around. When structural paradigms treat the social environment as a constraint on the agent, they do not clarify the mechanistic relationship between the environment and the agent. They cannot define the dimensions, scope, or degree of environmental impacts. For example, one can define a bipolar competition as a zero-sum game according to the power structure, but it cannot explain why superpowers’ strategies differ according to their leaders’ preferences rather than the same power structure.
I propose to treat the environment as a constant and the agent as the independent variable in a new theoretical paradigm. The factors of international system constitute the international environment, while social elements of the state form the domestic one. The agent weighs domestic considerations more heavily than international ones when formulating foreign policies.
How to Study Agents?
The limitations of structural theories encourage some IR theorists to shift the focus of their studies from non-human to human factors. This is a highly reasonable approach. Ultimately, international relations are relations among human beings: it is human beings who define national interests, decide how to pursue them, and implement the policies they make. It is human who engage in mutual destruction during wars, participate in trade and cooperation, and act as international leaders or followers.
In this pursuit, we need to decide which group of people should be the subject of IR studies: Is it the general public, governmental bureaucrats, or policy makers? From an analytical perspective, both the bureaucrats and policy makers exist in the government. However, foreign policies are decided by a very small group of individuals at the apex of the governmental hierarchy. Therefore, I suggest that IR theoretical studies focus on the policy makers, while treating the general public and bureaucrats as domestic environmental factors.
Theoretical paradigms in which policy makers are the independent variables face with a debate: is the policy maker(s) one individual or a small group of individuals? IR psychologists consider the supreme leader as the single policy maker. However, in practice the foreign strategies are formulated through discussions between a group of individuals rather than decided by one person without consultation with others. Even the traditional “great man theory” is a result of collective policy-making. I believe it is more reasonable to conceptualize the policy maker as a small group of individuals centered around the supreme leader. While this approach may increase the complexity of studying policy makers, it has the advantage of being able to explain policy uncertainty. Because a group of policy makers necessitates the existence of differing views in that group, it explains why policy uncertainty is a universal phenomenon in international relations.
An extension of the debate is how to categorize the types of policy makers. For IR studies, classification is a necessary step toward greater scientific objectivity. Numerous typologies have been suggested with respect to policy makers, particularly in IR psychology focusing on micro-level studies. Those typologies have refined categories of policy makers to the point of inapplicability at larger historical scale. To advance the studies of international leadership types, it is necessary to formulate macro categorizations that are applicable longitudinally on a historical scale.
This theoretical paradigm must incorporate the continuous changes in the international history as well as be able to explain the current international happenings. If the newly developed theory fails to explain the current events, it is unreliable and may be even useless.
Such a theory must address several fundamental questions: How do policy makers influence the international order? What kind of policy makers can change environmental constrains? Through what mechanisms do political views shape policy makers’ strategic preferences? How do international leaders and followers interact with each other? What type of policy makers are able to formulate international leadership?
Because policy makers’ power is legitimized by social groups, such as political parties, social classes, ethnic communities, governments, states, or coalitions of states, this theoretical paradigm must clarify the political identity of the policy maker. Based on their political identities, IR theorists can study the behavioral patterns of policy makers from different perspectives, such as interests, capability, preferences, ideas, and social circle.
The development of a reliable theoretical paradigm focused on the policy maker requires a large body of scholars as it involves a wide range of research questions. With increasing scholarly engagement, we can deepen our understanding about the role of policy makers and achieve paradigm breakthroughs. I hope that the obvious drawbacks of structural paradigms will spur academic interest in advancing the development of novel IR theories focused on policy makers. I hope this essay provides some proto-concepts for novel theoretical paradigms via the platform of the Quarterly Journal of International Politics.






Def agree 100 percent.
The debate between structural constraints and individual agency in international relations may find unexpected illumination in the leadership dynamics of social animals and insects. Among chimpanzees and bonobos, our closest evolutionary relatives, leadership emerges from complex interactions between individual personalities and social structures remarkably similar to Yan Xuetong's framework. Research by primatologists like Frans de Waal demonstrates that alpha males in chimpanzee communities range from aggressive dominators to shrewd coalition-builders, with each leadership style producing dramatically different group behaviors, from warfare with neighboring troops to peaceful coexistence, despite identical environmental pressures. Similarly, bonobo societies, facing comparable ecological constraints to chimpanzees, have evolved fundamentally different conflict resolution patterns largely mediated through individual female coalitions that constrain male aggression. These primate examples suggest that Yan's conceptualization of leaders as "actors" responding variably to the same "theater" may reflect deep evolutionary patterns where individual temperament and strategic choice genuinely shape collective outcomes even within rigid social hierarchies.
Social insects offer an even more provocative parallel that challenges assumptions about collective versus individual decision-making. Honeybee swarms selecting new nest sites engage in a sophisticated democratic process where scout bees effectively "debate" options through waggle dances, with the colony's final decision emerging from the intensity and persistence of individual advocates rather than predetermined structural rules. Research by Thomas Seeley reveals that even genetically identical colonies with the same resource constraints make systematically different choices based on which scouts prove most persuasive and persistent, a striking analog to how Trump and Biden's administrations pursued opposing policies from identical structural positions. Similarly, ant colonies of the same species demonstrate varying degrees of risk-taking in foraging and warfare based on subtle differences in the composition of their decision-making cohort, with some colonies aggressively expanding territory while genetic neighbors remain conservative despite facing identical geopolitical pressures.
These biological models suggest that the structure-versus-agent debate may be resolvable by recognizing that evolution has designed social systems to function through both channels simultaneously, with the balance calibrated differently across species and contexts. Just as naked mole rat colonies operate with rigid caste systems where individual agency is severely constrained, while wolf packs invest tremendous authority in alpha personalities whose risk preferences shape pack survival, human international relations may occupy a middle position where structural factors create boundaries but individual leaders possess genuine discretion within those bounds. The Trump administration's disruption of alliance structures, like a particularly aggressive chimpanzee alpha overthrowing established coalitions, demonstrates that human social architecture, unlike the deterministic programming of social insects, has evolved to permit individual variation to cascade into systemic change, suggesting Yan's emphasis on policy-maker agency reflects an authentic feature of human evolutionary design rather than merely analytical preference.