Transcript: Hu Bo on South China Sea
The Director of South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) discusses his background, U.S. military activities in SCS, China-Philippines standoff, etc.
The South China Sea is again in the headlines, and I’m posting the transcript of my Peking Playbook podcast interview with Hu Bo, Research Professor and Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies of Peking University and Director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI).
The most well-known Chinese think tank on the South China Sea shares the background and data sources of SCSPI, its recent Incomplete Report on US Military Activities in South China Sea in 2024, as well as China’s policy stance on the South China Sea and the standoff with the Philippines. For example, do you know that the much-touted “Nine-Dash Line” does not represent China’s territorial claim?
Hu Bo reviewed the following transcript before publication and made a few slight edits.
Welcome to the Peking Playbook Podcast, coming to you from the Pekingnology Newsletter on substack. My name is Zichen Wang.
Zichen Wang
Okay. Good morning, good afternoon, good evening. Welcome to Peking Playbook. This is Zichen Wang of the Pekingnology Newsletter. I'm very happy to give a try to my new idea of podcasting. So, today, I think, is the first of my podcasting series, and I'm talking to Mr. Hu Bo, Research Professor and Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies of Peking University. He is also the Director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), a Chinese organization focused on studying the situation in the South China Sea. We are recording this on Thursday evening, April. And I'm currently in Princeton, New Jersey, the United States.
So Professor Hu, very nice talking to you.
Hu Bo
Hi, Zichen. Good to see you, and good evening.
Zichen Wang
Thank you for getting on the podcast. As I just said, This is my first episode, so I hope it goes very well. Can you give us a self-introduction? I've very briefly introduced you. You are working full time at Peking University, and you are also leading the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative. Maybe tell us a little bit more about yourself? What is your job? How long have you been doing this?
Hu Bo
Hi. My name is Hu Bo. I come from the School of International Relations Studies at the Peking University, and my research focuses on maritime strategy, international security, and China's diplomacy. As to the specific areas, I study the South China Sea issue, of course. I am also leading, just as Zichen said, the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative. But it is a part-time job, actually. I'm full-time at Peking University, but part-time at the SCSPI.
Zichen Wang
I see. I'm sure quite some of my listeners have heard of South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative. I think this is—correct me if I'm wrong—the only Chinese institution that has consistently put out well-researched reports, including revealing very detailed data and observations, as well as sharing opinion pieces and studies on South China Sea.
You said that's your part time job. When did the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative start? What was the idea behind the initiative, and how many people are working for you, because you are the leader, the director, and what are the main projects that you guys have been operating?
Hu Bo
This initiative was started in April 2019. It is just a research network. Actually, we have people from different universities and different institutions in China and also abroad, and we have almost 40 or so members in our network. I think it's a new type of think tank in China, and also in the world.
Actually, We don't have full-time researchers, so we just have five administrative staff. Even me—I think I have told you before—I'm part-time. Our other vice directors are also (part-time), for instance, Yan Yan from the National Institute for the South China Sea Studies based in Haikou, and Professor Lei Xiaolu from Wuhan University based in Wuhan.
The reason I made this proposal for this initiative is that, as to the South China Sea issue, there are all kinds of fake news every day. We all know that maritime domain awareness—the threshold is a little high for normal scholars and for the public. So we wanted to make an initiative to clarify what happens every day in the South China Sea, and follow the policy and activities of related parties, to push for a more desirable situation in the South China Sea, with a view to maintain and promote the peace, stability, and prosperity of the South China Sea. So we launched the SCSPI in April of 2019.
Zichen Wang
I see. One of the reasons that SCSPI has caught my eye, and I guess many abroad, is because you guys have been publishing a lot of very detailed reports, contrasting with many other pieces out of Chinese institutions and the researchers and the self-styled think tanks. You have a lot of data, and you just mentioned that you have five full-time administrative workers at the institution, and there is a broad research network of scholars who are doing all the part-time work there. I think, like, against that background, it is very impressive output.
And this also connects to my next question, which is related to your recently published An Incomplete Report on U.S. Military Activities in the South China Sea in 2024. Let's just take that report as an example. Where does the data come from? And what kind of support do you get from, I don't know, maybe various other partners, in gathering this data? Or you just keep track of public reports, of news reports? How do you conduct your research, and are there any other parties that have been helping you?
Hu Bo
All the data come from open sources and merchants and business companies. So I think the job we have done is to gather this kind of data and information, and dig in the reasonable and effective data to clarify the situation of the South China Sea. So we have all kinds of data from China, also from over the world, from open sources as well as business data.
Just ahead, you mentioned that our methodology is a little different from other think tanks. We use IT with the data, we use big data, and we have different backgrounds of scholars—for instance, military strategy, international relations (IR), international law, and also marine economic development. So, we have different backgrounds of scholars from different institutions, and we also have IT team support for data analyzing. So we are cross-discipline research.
Zichen Wang
I see. So you mentioned, like, commercial data and open source from the merchants. My understanding is that—of course, I'm not an expert in this at all—there are, like, many shipping companies, and because there is so mamy maritime activities in the world, so there are, like, commercially available databases, and that's how you tap your data. And you also go through, like, the news reports, maybe research from other think tanks. Am I summarizing that correctly?
Hu Bo
I think the truth is that there are a lot of data from open source and business companies, for instance, AIS and ADS-B. Every vessel should broadcast their AIS information, so we can get information and know what's the location of them. I think the challenge for most think tanks and institutions is that they don't have the technology background. First of all, they don't know how to get the data, and then they couldn't analyze it based on this kind of first-source data. The first-source data is divided, and like pieces of the data. So I think normal institutions, they don't have IT technology background, they couldn't analyze it based on this data.
Zichen Wang
Okay, thank you. So let's move on to An Incomplete Report on U.S. Military Activities in the South China Sea in 2024. This is not your first report of this kind, right? So, how long have you been doing this, like, how many people take part in the production of the report?
Hu Bo
I think we release this kind of report every year since 2019. It means that we have published a report annually from 2018. Usually, we publish the report on the last year. So, this year, we published a report 2024. From 2018, we have six reports on U.S. military activities in the South China Sea annually. Just like we have mentioned, this report definitely is a joint contribution, where we have, I think, almost 20 people have contributed on this report. They have different backgrounds—computer science, military strategies, IR, as well as, international law.
Zichen Wang
Sure. So that sounds like a massive effort for me. So, the next question is, why do you focus on U.S. military activities in South China Sea? Why not some other subjects?
Hu Bo
The reason is very easy, because the U.S. military is a superstar in the South China Sea. There are also other military activities from extra-regional powers such as Australia and Japan, but their military activities couldn't match the scale and frequency of the United States. I think even China, for a long time, China's military activities couldn't match the United States in the South China Sea. So the reason is very easy, because the U.S. military is the superstar, we should follow this superstar.
Zichen Wang
That sounds very reasonable. So you have a number of highlights in the report. And just by the way, I've published basically a summary of the report in Pekingnology newsletter on March 25th. So if you are interested, you can go to www.pekingnology.com, to check it out. But I'd like to hear from the director, from the author of the report.
So you mentioned a few things in the report among your key findings. I think the first thing is, there is continuously strengthened strategic platforms activities. Can you talk to us about what are the strategic platforms, and what do you mean by that? And for example, carrier groups or submarines? And what have you observed when you come to continuously strengthened strategic platforms?
Hu Bo
Yes, in our assessment and in our concept on the strategic platforms, which includes the carrier strike groups and submarines, bombers, and also the amphibious ready groups. So, includes all categories of these strategic platforms. Why we call this kind of strategic platforms, I think, is because these platforms, they have strategic meanings. So, they are different from normal warships, from normal aircrafts, and usually, they have strategic consequences and strategic signal meanings.
Zichen Wang
So these are not just very big weapons. They carry strategic...
Hu Bo
They are just a platform, with a lot of weapons on board, of course.
Zichen Wang
I see. So you mentioned that the U.S. military has continuously strengthened these platforms activities in the South China Sea. So, like more of them on South China Sea in the year 2024.
Hu Bo
Yeah, this depends on which categories. So, this year is very interesting that, for instance, the frequency of carrier strike groups increased, while the intensity decreased. And also, the U.S. has planned to deploy amphibious ready groups, and we call them ARGs. But in 2024, they finally couldn't deploy ARGs in the South China Sea because of the logistic issues and (problems with the) ship factories. So, according to the latest GAO (Government Audit Office) report, it means that quality problems are faced by ARGs. A lot of problems, for instance, long maintenance circuits, shortage of spare parts, and equipment design defects. On the one hand, we think that the U.S. is trying to strengthen its strategic platforms in the South China Sea. But on the other hand, we also think that this kind of increasing deployment has been approaching a peak or some limits.
Zichen Wang
I see. So, I think you not just document like the number of the presence of them in the South China Sea, but you also combine it with other sources of factual information. For example, you just mentioned there are some defects with some of the platforms, you also make educated explanations or your understanding of why they have continuously strengthened some of the strategic platforms activities, and some of them didn't show up in the South China Sea, huh? And you also...
Hu Bo
Yes. We usually just introduce the truth, facts and data, but sometimes we comment on why—what is the reason in the background.
Zichen Wang
That's actually... no, no problem. That's actually what I really appreciate. Because, to be very frank, I read a lot of self-styled research reports, but they are more like just opinion pieces without really very deep base in facts and the sort of numbers you gather. So, apart from these, you also mentioned there is an uneven increase in marine and area reconnaissance activities in the South China Sea. China has been very much against this sort of recon activity in the South China Sea. Can you explain what is the uneven increase?
Hu Bo
Every year, the U.S. military sends the land-based aircraft to conduct the close-in reconnaissance against China. Every year, maybe 1000 sorties of this kind of close-in reconnaissance missions. Actually, besides that, U.S. also has ship-based and vessel-based aircraft, for instance, from the aircraft carriers, to conduct this kind of mission. So, just to take the land-based aircraft close-in reconnaissance for example, I think the number is very huge. Actually, China doesn't object to U.S. close-in reconnaissance. But I think China's objection is that sometimes, these missions are too close and too aggressive. For instance, sometimes these aircrafts, when they conduct close-in reconnaissance missions, they are approaching China's territorial airspace, even in the mainland airspace. So, it is very aggressive. In this kind of situation, the PLA must respond, but for the most of their activities outside China's territorial airspace, for instance, in the EEZ, I think the PLA just follows and monitors this kind of activities.
So, according to our observation and analysis, I think it's different from the normal news and media reports in China that politically, China doesn't like this kind of close-in reconnaissance. Militarily and technically, I think that in most of the situations, China just follows and monitors. Only in several situations I think will the PLA respond very harshly based on international practice. So, it is not just a legal issue; it is a political and national security issue. I think China and the U.S. have different understandings of this.
This is what we call aerial close-in reconnaissance. There are also maritime survey reconnaissance.This year, I think the aerial close-in reconnaissance is very stable compared with last year and last several years, for instance, 2022 and 2023. But the maritime reconnaissance activities have been improved maybe two times compared to last year. Totally, there are 706 ship days in activities, bypassing the duration in 2023 significantly. The simple thing is that, every day, there are two surveillance vessels conducting reconnaissance activities in the South China Sea in the last year.
Zichen Wang
I see. So every day, there are two surveillance vessels from the U.S. military in the South China Sea conducting maritime...
Hu Bo
I think there are three or four military aircraft in the air.
Zichen Wang
I think most of them are not in the news. And also, what you just mentioned very pointedly, and I think it's somthing that I'm very grateful you corrected my question at the very beginning, is that—I'm not an expert in this—my impression was that China is basically flatly against all sorts of U.S. military recon missions in this area. But as you just pointed out, the response from the People's Liberation Army bascially depends on different situations. For most of the time, it's just monitoring, and only when it approaches China's territorial airspace would the Chinese Air Force respond, like with airplanes. And that's what makes news—to intercept U.S. military planes. I think even that specific point would be worth another podcast because it’s something always in the news, it’s something that's prone to create real crises and conflicts, and people do not understand those technical details very much. But yeah, we're reviewing this incomplete report so let's move on to the...
Hu Bo
Yes. I want to add some information that, actually I think, just as you mentioned, the detailed information is very important to judge who is right and who is wrong based on truth and facts. The problem is that most of the public and even the scholars, they don't know what the real situation is. So I respond to our U.S. colleagues, that South China Sea is too large. You are complaining that your vessels, your aircraft, have been intercepted by PLA. Besides the complaint, you should also tell us where this kind of incidents happen. If you are just around the Hainan Island or Guangdong coastline, then you have a reason to be intercepted.
Zichen Wang
I see, the devil is always in the details. What you just mentioned reminds me of discussions between Chinese interlocutors and, for example, international media. The Chinese would say the U.S. media is very unfair when it comes to China reporting, and U.S. journalists and international media journalists would say, "Well, you should tell me which exact piece and where exactly am I unfair to you." Yeah, it’s always these sorts of details that people really in the business need to figure out exactly.
Well, not to dwell on this for too long. Let’s move on to the next part of your report, which is you observed low-frequency declaratory operations. Many of us have heard of the term "Freedom of Navigation Operations" and transits across the very sensitive Taiwan Strait. Basically, your report observes that the frequency of such operations by the U.S. military has declined. Is that correct? Or what have you been observing?
Hu Bo
Yes, you are right. In our report, we talk about this issue very specifically because the U.S. military has conducted FONOPs, what we call Freedom of Navigation Operations, for several (years). There are many categories of FONOPs. It means there are different categories of FONOPs. The media and the public, I think, focus on just one category of FONOPs, which our report specifically mentioned: island- or feature-intrusive Freedom of Navigation Operations. This type of operation means that the U.S. military enters the 12 nautical miles or territorial sea of features occupied by China.
Actually, you have seen this kind of news that many people are counting the number of FONOPs. Actually, it is difficult to count because the U.S. doesn't release the numbers and frequencies of most categories of FONOPs. Only on island- and feature-intrusive Freedom of Navigation Operations you can count. If you count in this way, actually the number decreased in 2024. But it doesn't mean U.S. FONOPs, generally, have decreased—just this kind of category decreased.
And Taiwan Strait transits, you know the U.S. has a specific term on Taiwan Strait transits. Taiwan Strait transits are not a category of FONOPs. I think many people have misunderstandings on this issue. Taiwan Strait transit is another (operation) we call "declaratory operations." Why we call these two operations "declaratory operations" is that I think the U.S. military uses these kinds of operations to declare something. For instance, the U.S. uses FONOPs to challenge what the U.S. calls "excessive maritime claims" of other countries. So, this is the meaning of declaratory operations.
Zichen Wang
I see. Let me put it in simple English, ordinary English, this sort of Freedom of Navigation Operations is political in nature. And of course, the U.S., their public explanation is, "we will sail wherever international law allows." So they want to make a statement, they want to register a mark, they want to go there, and also, very importantly, publicly say, "we have been there." That's what you mean by the declaratory operations, right?
Hu Bo
Yes. Therefore, they are just for political and diplomatic meanings.
Zichen Wang
And of course, the U.S. enjoys a vast network of allies in the Asia-Pacific region, although the latest tariff moves out of the White House may actually jeopardize their ties with quite some of these allies. But you observed there are continuously boosted number and intensity of joint operations with the militaries of the U.S. allies in the South China Sea. Can you shed a little more light on that?
Hu Bo
Yes. I think ally is very important for the United States to check China's rise in the South China Sea as well as the West Pacific. The U.S. has the advantage of many allies. Since the Obama administration, I think the U.S. has increased bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with its allies to build a military alliance network against China. For instance, the AUKUS, and the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Philippines cooperation. In the last several years of the Biden administration, it used the Philippines as a fulcrum in the South China Sea disputes and continued to strengthen bilateral and multilateral military cooperation.
So, we see a lot of joint military exercises. For instance, the scale and number of joint military exercises have been rising a lot compared to last year. Besides the Philippines, joint operations with Japan and Australia have also increased in frequency, intensity, and scale. Also, the U.S. has used the alliance network to strengthen regional maritime domain awareness.
In sum, I think joint activities and joint operations with allies in this area would be highlighted even in the future. The U.S.' own capabilities in this area, just as I mentioned before, have been outstretched. The U.S. has already deployed 60-70% of its overseas conventional air and maritime forces to the South China Sea and surrounding areas. But because the manufacturing industry in the U.S. has decreased a lot, the U.S.'s main platforms, for instance, the warships and aircraft, they couldn't increase their numbers quickly in the foreseeable future.
Zichen Wang
That's why you believe like they are trying to rally their allies.
Hu Bo
Yes, yeah. That's true.
Zichen Wang
Sure, we will get to the Philippines in a moment. But the last question specifically related to An Incomplete Report on US Military Activities in the South China Sea in 2024 is, you also observed there are exercises and drills for enhancing combat readiness. I'm not a military person, "combat readiness," that seems very real-life, real battle scenarios.
Hu Bo
It is not news that the U.S. is preparing for the worst scenarios, in case of war with the PLA. We are preparing for these kinds of scenarios, too. So it is not news. I think, especially in recent years, their exercises have focused on the readiness of military combat.
Zichen Wang
You mentioned, for example, there is an unprecedented scale of some exercises in the Western Pacific region. And it's related to the last point we're talking about. It's not just the U.S. military's presence and combat capabilities in the region, but also their joint operational capabilities with their allies. Because even though these two militaries enjoy a very robust relationship, they still need to exercise together. So, this is among the observations you have, right?
Hu Bo
Yes.
Zichen Wang
And there are also increasingly targeted exercise subjects and expanding multilateral exercise alliances. So, who are the major allies when it comes to these sort of military drills and exercises for combat readiness in the region?
Hu Bo
Japan and Australia. I think the Japan and Australia have played a very important role in this area, as in the U.S. deployment and the U.S. plans against China.
Zichen Wang
I see. Okay, I think we have basically gone through the main findings of the report. Again. If you are interested, you can check out Pekingnology on March 25 An Incomplete Report on U.S. Military Activities in the South China Sea in 2024. And also, of course, SCSPI has its own website and its own Twitter account, and you can find all the information over there.
But there is one thing I would really want to ask for your insight. And this is something you have just mentioned, and this is also something that's in the news—the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Hegseth recently just visited the Philippines. And when it comes to the South China Sea dispute, I guess in the past two or three years, what has been making the headlines is always that China is bullying the Philippines. Can you maybe like a...let's not spend an hour on this, but what are the main reasons for this outbreak of China-Philippines standoff in the South China Sea? It seems like in the past months, the situation has stabilized a little bit. So why? And what is the latest development?
Hu Bo
China and the Philippines, as well as other ASEAN member states, we have some disputes in the Spratly islands, and we also have disputes on the maritime demarcations. That's the history. So, China's claims have never been changed, ever since the founding of the People's Republic of China. So, our claims, China's claims, are very consistent in the South China Sea.
I want to emphasize that on July 12, 2016, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) made a statement repeating China’s claims in the South China Sea, which includes four categories. The first category is "Four-Sha" sovereignty, "Four-Sha" including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and other island groups. So, first of all, it's the sovereignty of the "Four-Sha." The second meaning is internal waters and territorial seas of the four island groups. Third category includes the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves generated from these four island groups. Finally, it is historic rights.
So, actually, you know, foreign friends and international media always talk about the "Nine-Dash Line," that China uses the "Nine-Dash Line" to claim the waters and islands in the South China Sea. This is not true. Actually, the nine-dash line is not China’s legal basis for claiming the South China Sea waters. The nine-dash line, I think, merely depicts the scope of China’s claims inside. But the Nine-Dash Line itself is not the legal basis. Nine-Dash Line is not China's claim. We should clarify that. I have talked too much on this issue, but my point is that China’s claims on the South China Sea have never been changed, and also China’s policy towards the South China Sea disputes has never been changed. Even now, we are following Deng Xiaoping's doctrine of "sharing disputes."
But regarding the Spratly Islands disputes, China recognizes the occupation in history by other parties, for instance, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia. Also, China recognizes that some other claimants over oil and gas development in disputed areas. We recognize the history and we don’t want to use force to change the status quo. But we couldn't bear the new losses, for instances, new features or new occupations by the Phillipines.
So, China’s policy has never been changed. The only change, I think, is China’s capabilities and China's resolve to defend its maritime rights and sovereignty in the South China Sea, which is totally different compared with 20 or 30 years ago.
So, China’s policy as well as China’s claims have never been changed. The only reason the Philippines complicated the case is that the Philippines' policy changed after Bongbong Marcos came into office.
I think Bongbong Marcos has two kinds of miscconclusions on the situation. First of all, Bongbong Marcos thinks that China has a lot of trouble domestically and internationally, so China will not respond to the Philippines' challenges in the South China Sea. Also, the Bongbong Marcos administration has unrealistic expectations of U.S. Support. They thought the U.S. will support them 100% to challenge China. But the real situation is definitely not. (Because of) these kinds of misconclusions on the situation, plus the Bongbong Marcos administration's ambitions in the South China Sea, they have tried to change the status quo everywhere in disputed areas between China and the Philippines, for instance, the Second Thomas Shoal, the Sabina Shoal, and even the Scarborough Shoal.
So, as I have mentioned before, China recognizes occupation in the history but China couldn't accept new losses in the South China Sea, in the Spratly Islands. When China faces challenges from the Philippines, it must respond; we have no room to back off. We are just keeping the status quo. China has made it very clear that China doesn't want to occupy the Second Thomas Shoal and the Sabina Shoal; China is just worried that the Philippines will occupy these features. So, China must keep alert and respond when changes happen.
Zichen Wang
I see. That's a very long answer, and actually, I have so many questions to many of the issues you've just raised, but we don't have enough time. And I guess I'll invite you to the podcast again sometime in the future.
And can I just ask one more thing? Like, you mentioned the current Philippino President, and he seems to pursue a different approach from his predecessor, whose name is President Duterte. There was some sort of, I don't know, gentleman's agreement, right? It's like a handshake agreement between China and the Philippines, and the Chinese claim is that he tore up—or actually didn't agree, didn't acknowledge—the very existence of that handshake agreement, the gentleman's agreement, which had kept the peace in the region. Can you give us, like, a few more details on that?
Hu Bo
Actually, the situation nowadays, I think, is much calmer than 2024 and 2023. The reason is that after two years of challenges against China, I think the Philippines has exhausted its meanings, its tools, its energies on China. I have written a piece for SCSPI on the situation of South China Sea. We have shared details that I think the Philippines will continue to challenge China in the South China Sea, but I think the Philippines couldn't do something big without U.S.' direct support.
So after two years of interaction with China, I think the Philippines has finally realized that China is very serious to respond to Philippines' challenges. And there is no space and no room for the Philippines to advance. So to some degree, I think—to a certain degree—the Philippines has finally realized the situation.
For instance, you have mentioned that China and the Philippines had used the diplomatic channels to calm down the situation of the Second Thomas Shoal and the Sabina Shoal. Especially for the Second Thomas Shoal, I think the situation had gone back to normal of 2022—before 2023. It means that China can accept the Philippines transporting some daily use materials and food to the grounded warships, but China couldn't accept the Philippines transporting building materials to this grounded vessel.
So that means the gentleman's agreement—after Bongbong Marcos came into office—Bongbong Marcos had said like this way, "there was no this kind of agreement. Even it is, the Philippines can tear it up." So you will see. But now, after two years of interactions with China, the Philippines finally realized that they couldn't do something more on the Second Thomas Shoal. We are back to normal.
So you will see diplomatic channels, even in China and the Philippines—diplomatic channels have played a lot of roles. The problem, I think, is, as you mentioned, that inside the Philippines there are different, divided approaches to deal with China. So usually, the MFA of the Philippines, I think the Foreign Ministry of the Philippines, they like to use the diplomatic channel to deal with China and to manage the disputes. But the armed forces or Philippines Coast Guards, they have different approaches, and they have different intentions to deal with China and to deal with the disputes. This makes the situation much more complicated.
Zichen Wang
I see. Just talk about my personal preferences. I would always prefer the diplomats to do the job, not involving the much more threatening Coast Guard or the militaries. And something you just mentioned is basically, for example, take the grounded ships, for example. So I guess what you were saying is that, you know, although China totally doesn't accept, like, the claims based on the grounded ships, but since it is already grounded there, and there are Philippino armed forces stationed there, so if you want to ship the food, the drinks, and all these necessary materials to your troops based on the grounded ships, then fine. Basically, if you just do that, China will not object to that. And that's the Chinese version of keeping the status quo. And you mentioned that's basically the Chinese principle, non-existing, consistent principle, in handling all these disputes in the region. And although the status quo may not fully align with the Chinese claims, but China isn't actually trying to, let's say, just remove the grounded ships. That's not what the Chinese want to do.
And based on that, I also have another question. The China-Philippine dispute has been making the headlines. But of course, there are other South China Sea claimants in the region, including Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. There are press reports which say, basically, for example, some countries building artificial islands actually at a very quick pace, and the scale of the construction is actually unprecedented. And there are other oil and gas exploration projects in the region which also actually fall into China's claimed regions. But these projects from other claimants seem to be, let's just say, going under the radar, and Beijing isn't exactly using coercive means such as China's Coast Guard or its military to stop these activities.
Why, in these issues, it seems that China has more tolerance or flexibility, and China is not as aggressive as widely painted in Western media? What makes the difference between the China-Philippino dispute and the disputes which are handled much more diplomatically and peacefully between China and other South China Sea claimants?
Hu Bo
Before I answer this question, I want to add some information on the Second Thomas Shoal. China doesn't recognize the occupation of Second Thomas Shoal by the Philippines. So, the situation on Second Thomas Shoal is totally different from other occupied features by the Philippines, by Vietnam, by Malaysia. So that's why, when the Philippines had shown the intention to occupy and consolidate this outpost at the Second Thomas Shoal, China's response was so serious and harsh. Because at the beginning, China didn't recognize the occupation of Second Thomas Shoal by using the grounded warships. Because at the beginning, in the 1990s, when the Philippines grounded this warship, the Philippines told Chinese counterparts that "we are just temporarily grounded, we don't want to occupy this feature forever, and we will leave." The results are totally different, especially nowadays after Bongbong Marcos came into office. So that's different.
Which touches upon your question about does China have different approaches to the Philippines, Vietnam, or Malaysia? I don't think so. I think China's approach is consistent and stable, no matter which country and which claimants. The difference is, I think, not from China, I think is from the Philippines. Usually, Vietnam and Malaysia prefer to use diplomatic channels to manage the disputes, which is totally different from the Philippines' approach. So the difference does not come from China, but comes from other different claimants.
Of course, China and Malaysia, I think, have much more frequency of diplomatic exchanges, and the general relationship, I think, is much more stable. The other reason, I think, is that the Philippines has shown intentions to interfere in the Taiwan issue, and the Philippines has sided with the U.S. against China, which makes the situation much more complicated than the maritime disputes.
So, China and the Philippines have a much more complicated background compared with China's relationships with Vietnam and Malaysia. As for China's disputes with Malaysia and Vietnam, I think China has used diplomatic channels and other law enforcement activities to challenge Malaysia's advancements in the disputed areas. But generally, I think, thanks to the generally good relationship and overall stable diplomatic channels, China and other claimants have kept the situation much better than China and the Philippines.
I think (regarding) the general situation in the South China Sea, China is very serious and very frank that China wants the South China Sea to be stable and peaceful, because China benefits from this atmosphere and benefits from the peace and stability of the South China Sea very much. China has kept restraint when facing challenges from the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and other claimants. I think if without China's self-restraint, there would be no peace and no stability in the South China Sea. Because if just counting on the hard power, I think China can do more things than China wants to do, but China didn't do that. The reason is that China wants to have a harmonious relationship with our neighbors. And for this reason, China can keep the restraint, shelve the disputes, manage the disputes, and keep the South China Sea a peaceful and harmonious area.
Zichen Wang
Okay, I think in an hour, we've covered a lot of ground. On that note, can I ask do you have any other highlights and the sort of common misconceptions you want to address in addition to what we have talked about today?
Hu Bo
I don't have anything else to add. As you can see, we have covered lot of issues. Maybe we should find other opportunities do more podcast. I only think I want to say that I welcome the notice and the following of our audience abroad, because most of SCSPI members come from China. So, I think, based on the truth, facts, and the data, we Chinese experts are in a better position to explain the China's policy. We can also share China's perspective to help you understand the situation of South China Sea and kill the fake news. It's our mission to kill the fake news. Thanks.
Zichen Wang
Okay. So thank you, Mr. Hu Bo. Thank you for coming to the podcast and becoming like the first guest of my podcast series.
Hu Bo
I appreciate that.
Zichen Wang
Okay, thank you. That was Research Professor at Peking University's Center for Maritime Strategy Studies, where he is the Director. He is also the Director of South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI). You are welcome to go to www.scspi.org and check out their Twitter feeds or X feeds, whatever it is called now. So, on that note, thank you, and thank you for listening.
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