Mainland Scholars on South Korea's Taiwan policy under Yoon Suk-yeol
Ling Shengli & Jiang Xue from China Foreign Affairs University examine Seoul’s shifting Taiwan policy: its drivers, impacts, and limitations.
As South Korea votes for a new president, we would like to feature an article published last October in Issue 5, 2024 of 台湾研究 Taiwan Studies, a journal run by the Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Note that it was published before the South Korean martial law crisis in December 2024.
The authors of the following article are 凌胜利 Ling Shengli, Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University, and 姜雪 Jiang Xue, a PhD student at the Institute.
The original Chinese article included loads of citations, most of which have been hyperlinked in the translation. For the remaining sources, please refer to the Chinese attachment above.
韩国涉台政策的调整、动因与走向
The Adjustment, Motivations and Trends of the ROK’s Taiwan-related Policy
Ling Shengli & Jiang Xue
Abstract:
With the Taiwan question becoming a core issue of the strategic rivalry between the United States and China, the U.S. tends to mobilize its allies to intervene the Taiwan question. As an ally of the U.S., the ROK's Taiwan-related policy has shifted to a certain degree in recent years, which is reflected in the increase of Taiwan-related remarks, the visits by high-level officials to Taiwan region, the frequency of Taiwan-related military activities, and the deepening of substantive cooperation with Chinese Taiwan. The adjustment of ROK’s Taiwan-related policy is fundamentally influenced by the strategic pull of the U.S., and is also closely related to factors such as its foreign policy adjustments, interest demands, and increased concerns about the Taiwan Strait. The ROK follows the U.S. in its Taiwan-related policy, which has affected the healthy development of Sino-ROK relations and increased the risk of external intervention in the issues of the Taiwan Strait. However, due to the differences in U.S.-ROK interests, the stable development of Sino-ROK relations, and domestic political changes, the ROK’s Taiwan-related policy will not blindly follow the U.S. in the future, and will still develop its ties with Chinese Taiwan in a flexible or implicit way without breaking through the one-China principle.
Key Words: Yoon Suk-yeol Administration; Taiwan Question; U.S.-ROK Alliance; Sino-ROK Relations
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the ROK, Seoul has maintained a relatively cautious stance on the Taiwan question, rarely commenting on the situation in the Taiwan Strait and avoiding political and military contact with the Taiwan authorities as much as possible. However, in recent years, especially under the administration of President Yoon Suk-yeol, the ROK’s official rhetoric on Taiwan has significantly increased, political and military interactions with Taiwan have become more frequent, and substantive cooperation in areas such as economics and technology has been strengthened. To a certain extent, the ROK‘s Taiwan policy has undergone certain adjustments and realignment.
Amid escalating US-China rivalry, Seoul’s Taiwan policy has increasingly approached China’s “red lines,” posing new challenges for the resolution of the Taiwan question and adding new risks to China-ROK relations. These developments make it particularly important and timely to study the driving forces behind the ROK's Taiwan policy shift and assess its future trajectory.
I. Adjustments to the ROK’s Taiwan Policy
Against the backdrop of intensified China–U.S. strategic competition, the United States has stepped up efforts to rally its allies, seeking broader support in its competition with China. As a result, the ROK’s Taiwan policy has shown a clear trend of alignment with Washington, particularly in the form of increased official rhetoric on Taiwan and new developments in Seoul’s interactions with Taipei across political, military, and economic dimensions.
1. Increased Official Rhetoric on Taiwan
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the ROK, Seoul has adhered to the one-China principle, signed the "New Relations Framework Agreement" with the Taiwan authorities and enacted several regulations that detail government-level exchanges. On the basis of the one-China principle, Seoul has primarily sought to strengthen economic cooperation with Taiwan-related matters. Outside of the economic sphere, it had long avoided making official statements on Taiwan-related issues, but this situation has been changing in recent years.
After the U.S.-ROK Summit in May 2021, the joint statement issued by both countries emphasised the "importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait," marking the first official mention of Taiwan in a ROK document since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the ROK. Notably, under President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration, Seoul’s official rhetoric on Taiwan has grown markedly.
First, senior government officials of the ROK, including President Yoon, have repeatedly made inappropriate remarks about Taiwan. In May and September 2022, President Yoon referred to the Taiwan question in interviews as a “global issue” and stressed that “universal principles based on international law contribute to regional peace and prosperity,” attempting to internationalise the Taiwan question, which China regards as a domestic matter. In April 2023, President Yoon further linked the Taiwan question with the North Korean question, stating that the ROK “strongly opposes any attempt to change the status quo by force.”
In addition to the President, the ROK Foreign Minister, Speaker of the National Assembly, and other high-ranking officials have frequently made remarks regarding Taiwan. In February 2023, Foreign Minister Park Jin stated that the ROK opposes “unilateral change of status quo by force” and that, in a Taiwan contingency, the ROK would need to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula due to its direct impact on the country. In April 2024, during a visit to the U.S., Speaker of the National Assembly Kim Jin-pyo mentioned the Taiwan issue, saying, “Ensuring the freedom of navigation and overflight in the Taiwan Strait directly concerns the interests of the ROK and other Indo-Pacific countries.”
Seoul’s official rhetoric on Taiwan seeks to “internationalise” the question, which seriously violates the spirit of the China-ROK Joint Communiqué and undermines the one-China principle.
Second, Taiwan-related matters have become a focus in the ROK’s foreign policy joint statements at bilateral and multilateral meetings. Since the Yoon administration, Taiwan has been mentioned in multiple joint statements issued by the ROK government. In May 2022, the U.S.-ROK joint statement emphasised the “importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” noting that it is a crucial factor for security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. In April and May 2023, after President Yoon’s summits with U.S. and European leaders, joint statements were issued that also mentioned Taiwan and stressed the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait.
As trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and the ROK strengthened, their joint statements on Taiwan have increased significantly. After the U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David in August 2023, “the spirit of Camp David” reaffirmed “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” and added “a call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.” In January 2024, the U.S., Japan, and the ROK held their first Indo-Pacific dialogue in Washington, reiterating their strong opposition to “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion anywhere in the waters of the Indo-Pacific,” while emphasising “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” as “indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community.”
In addition, in December 2022, President Yoon's administration released the "Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region" (also considered the ROK's version of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy"), which included a statement reaffirming "the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and for the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific." This marks a clear change in the ROK’s Taiwan policy, contrasting sharply with its previous cautious approach to the Taiwan question.
2. The Rising Rank of Officials Visiting Taiwan
After the ROK severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan authorities, political exchanges between the two sides significantly decreased, with only a limited level of communication maintained by National Assembly members, local officials, or city representatives. In 1994, the ROK government introduced the “Principles for Allowing Contacts with Taiwan” and “Basic Guidelines for Exchange and Cooperation with Taiwan,” which set strict limitations on official interaction, stipulating that high-ranking ROK officials should not meet with employees or politicians of Taiwan authorities, and that the Speaker of the National Assembly and ruling party representatives should generally refrain from visiting Taiwan.
However, in recent years, there have been instances of high-ranking ROK government officials visiting Taiwan, which seriously violates the one-China principle.
At the end of December 2022, ROK Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly Chung Woo-taik, along with Cho Kyoung-tae, the president of the Korea-Taiwan parliamentary friendship group, led a delegation of ROK MPs to visit Taiwan, where they held high-profile meetings with Taiwan authorities, including Tsai Ing-wen and You Si-kun. Compared to previous visits, this event was notable for three reasons:
First, the timing was politically sensitive, followed shortly after the U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, and was thus a provocative move despite China’s strong opposition; second, the delegation was larger and of higher rank than in the visit in December 2019, with the number of ROK National Assembly members increasing from two to four, including the Vice Speaker of the National Assembly, marking a significant elevation in the delegation’s rank; and third, the delegation had stronger connections with the ROK administration, as opposed to the December 2019 visit by opposition party parliamentarians, with this delegation consisting of ruling party parliamentarians.
Since then, ROK officials have frequently interacted with Taiwanese authorities, engaging in the so-called "parliamentary diplomacy," even voicing opinions on Taiwan's elections and attending Taiwan's "inauguration ceremonies." Overall, under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, interactions between ROK officials and the Taiwanese authorities have grown more frequent, and the level of official contact has noticeably risen.
3. Increased Military Activities Related to Taiwan
In recent years, the ROK has resumed military exchanges with Taiwan and has participated more frequently in military activities related to Taiwan. In 2018, Lee Chang-hyung, senior advisor to the former Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited the National Defence University in Taiwan under the guise of academic exchange, marking the first military exchange since the severance of diplomatic ties. In May 2023, former ROK Air Force Commander Park In-ho led a delegation to Taiwan, meeting with Taiwan’s defence officials. In August 2023, former ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Admiral Choi Yoon-hee, along with former U.S. Secretary of Defence Mark Esper, who led a delegation from the Atlantic Council, visited Taiwan, engaging in talks with senior Taiwanese military officials.
ROK has also become increasingly active in military operations near the Taiwan Strait. In June 2022, two ROK Air Force C-130J tactical transport aircraft came within 12 nautical miles of Taiwan, and in August, a C-130 transport aircraft crossed the eastern waters of Taiwan. In February 2023, nine T-50 trainer jets from the ROK Black Hawk aerobatic team, along with a C-130 transport aircraft, landed at Kaohsiung International Airport, supposedly for refuelling. Following that, ROK military aircraft continued to land in Taiwan for “refuelling.” Despite warnings from China, ROK military aircraft have frequently crossed or landed in Taiwan, marking a clear departure from previous practices.
4. Substantive Engagement with Taiwan under U.S.-Led Minilateralism
In recent years, driven by great power competition, the United States has formed alliances on issues such as supply chains, technology, and shared values. This has prompted increased substantive cooperation between the ROK and Taiwan in areas like high technology and economic security.
Using U.S.-led minilateral mechanisms as a platform, the ROK and Taiwan have strengthened cooperation in high technology and economic security. In the high-tech sector, the ROK and Taiwan have a complementary relationship in semiconductors, with the ROK being a strong player in memory semiconductors and Taiwan playing a key role in non-memory (system) semiconductors. Semiconductors are the ROK's largest import from Taiwan, and both the ROK and Taiwan have joined U.S.-led semiconductor alliances such as the Semiconductors in America Coalition (SIAC) and the "Chip 4" alliance, facilitating closer and more convenient cooperation between the two sides.
In economic security, the ROK and Taiwan are already significant trading partners and have broad potential for further cooperation. The ROK seeks to deepen its economic engagement with Taiwan through regional economic frameworks. In February 2023, Lee Eun-ho, former President of the Korean Security Agency of Trade and Industry (KOSTI), was appointed as the ROK's representative to Taiwan, marking the first time a former official from the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy has assumed this role. This move by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration is aimed at deepening economic and trade ties with Taiwan and enhancing the ROK's economic security.
In the ideological realm, the ROK and Taiwan have also strengthened cooperation. In March 2024, the ROK hosted the third "Summit for Democracy," with the Minister of Digital Affairs of Taiwan, Audrey Tang, invited to participate, which prompted opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the ROK government explained that the “Summit for Democracy” was not targeted at any specific country, the summit essentially politicises, instrumentalises, and weaponises the concept of “American-style democracy,” framing countries like China and Russia as “threats to democracy.” Taiwan has been placed at the forefront of this constructed narrative of democracy versus authoritarianism. By hosting the “Summit for Democracy” and inviting Taiwanese representatives, the ROK is essentially acting as a “pawn” for the U.S., taking a stance in the ideological competition.
II. The Drivers for the Adjustment of the ROK's Taiwan Policy
Against the backdrop of heightened U.S.-China strategic competition, the adjustment of the ROK's Taiwan policy has largely been driven by the U.S.'s adjustment of its strategy toward China, as well as the ROK's own national interests and increasing domestic concern over Taiwan-related matters.
1. The U.S. is Wooing the ROK to Join Forces in Containing China
The Biden administration places great importance on leveraging its alliance system in the strategic competition with China, and the ROK’s adjustment in its Taiwan policy is fundamentally driven by this strategic pull.. The Biden administration, relying on the alliance system, actively incites its allies to become more deeply involved in Taiwan Strait affairs, thereby forming a “unified front” to pressure China on the Taiwan question.
The Biden administration has increased its efforts to woo the ROK, recognising the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the U.S.-China strategic competition. First, the U.S. has focused on repairing the U.S.-ROK alliance to use the ROK as a counterbalance to China. After Yoon Suk-yeol took office, Biden chose the ROK as the first stop on his Asian tour, breaking from tradition by visiting the ROK before Japan, signalling his strong desire to engage the ROK. The U.S. and the ROK quickly reached an agreement on defence cost-sharing and terminated the old ballistic missile guidelines, bridging previous gaps in the alliance. In return, the U.S. wanted ROK leaders to take a tough line on China in a joint statement issued during the summit, as part of its strategy to work with allies to counter China.
Second, the U.S. has worked to attract the ROK into its Asia-Pacific minilateral mechanism. The Biden administration’s "Indo-Pacific Strategy" aims to expand its coalition, with the ROK being a priority for expansion. By bringing the ROK into the fold, the U.S. hopes to garner greater support for its Indo-Pacific strategy. At the same time, the U.S. has pushed for stronger U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, positioning it as a key element of its "Indo-Pacific Strategy."
Third, the U.S. has sought to establish a "global comprehensive strategic partnership" with the ROK, expanding the scope of the U.S.-ROK alliance. In May 2022, the U.S.-ROK summit elevated the alliance to a "global comprehensive strategic partnership," which means the geographic scope of the alliance extends beyond the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia to the broader Asian-Pacific region and even the global stage. The alliance’s functions have also expanded from military security to jointly addressing global issues, economic security, and Indo-Pacific concerns. Through the enhancement of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the Biden administration aims to strengthen ROK's cooperation with the U.S. in Indo-Pacific and global affairs, collectively addressing so-called "regional threats" and upholding a "rules-based" international order.
Fourth, the United States seeks to strengthen the combat readiness and out-of-area operational capabilities of the U.S.–ROK alliance, pushing Seoul to assume a greater military role. Washington has consistently promoted the concept of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) in U.S.–ROK out-of-area military cooperation, prompting renewed discussions on the “strategic flexibility” of U.S. Forces Korea.
Under the pretext of maintaining stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. has also urged the ROK to make military contributions. In May 2021, U.S. Forces Korea Commander General Paul Joseph LaCamera testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, stating, “Given...the international reach of the South Korean military, opportunities are emerging for alliance cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula. United States Forces Korea forces are uniquely positioned to provide the Commander of [US Indo-Pacific Command] a range of capabilities that create options for supporting out-of-area contingencies and responses to regional threats.” This indicates that the U.S., in its pursuit of maintaining regional hegemony, is pressuring the ROK to take on a larger military role.
Under U.S. pressure, the ROK may become more involved in the Taiwan Strait question and participate in various military activities in the region surrounding China, led by the U.S. and its allies.
2. The Yoon Suk-yeol Administration Has Strengthened Its Strategic Alignment with the U.S.
The Yoon Suk-yeol administration's enhanced strategic alignment with the U.S. is a direct cause behind the adjustment of ROK’s Taiwan policy. Maintaining the conservative, pro-U.S. political orientation, the Yoon administration places the U.S.-ROK alliance at the focal point of its foreign policy. Given its domestic ruling status and the pressures of party competition, the Yoon administration has grown increasing strategic dependency on the U.S., leaving it no choice but to further strengthen its strategic alignment with the U.S.
First, the Yoon administration actively engages in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy, upholding the U.S. dominance in regional and international orders. Unlike previous administrations that approached the Indo-Pacific Strategy with caution, the Yoon administration has taken a more proactive stance by joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) as a founding member. Although the ROK government repeatedly emphasises the inclusiveness of IPEF and asserts that it does not exclude China, IPEF is widely regarded as being strongly targeted at China.
In December 2022, the Yoon administration introduced a Korean version of its Indo-Pacific Strategy to align with the U.S. approach. The report on the ROK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasises opposition to unilateral change of status quo by force—a position that largely mirrors U.S. rhetoric on the Taiwan question and reveals ROK’s willingness to follow U.S. strategy even at the risk of harming China–ROK relations.
Second, the Yoon administration cooperates with the United States to upgrade the “global comprehensive strategic partnership,” playing a bigger role in regional and international affairs. The diplomatic and security goal of the Yoon administration is to become “a Global Pivotal State that contributes to freedom, peace, and prosperity,” thereby enhancing the ROK’s international status on both regional and global levels. To achieve this, the Yoon government has actively expanded the scope and areas of cooperation within the U.S.-ROK alliance, pushing for its evolution into a comprehensive global strategic partnership designed to jointly confront emerging challenges. This development has further drawn the ROK into the U.S. strategy toward China.
Third, the Yoon administration is working to improve ROK-Japan relations and strengthen U.S.-Japan-ROK security cooperation. Improving relations with Japan has become a key diplomatic priority for the Yoon administration, driven by the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan’s rising prominence within the U.S. Indo-Pacific framework, which has intensified concerns among ROK conservatives about being “abandoned.” To mitigate anxieties over the perceived decline of the U.S.-ROK alliance’s status within the U.S. Indo-Pacific system, the Yoon administration has actively sought to improve relations with Japan and bolster trilateral security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and the ROK. These efforts enhance coordination and joint messaging with the U.S. and Japan on China-related matters, including issues in the Taiwan Strait.
3. The ROK Leverages the Taiwan Policy as a Tool for Advancing Its Strategic Interests.
The ROK’s involvement in the Taiwan question is closely linked to its strategic needs vis-à-vis both China and the U.S., which is a key factor behind its shift in Taiwan policy. Currently, the ROK’s strategic outlook on China and the U.S. has changed—the ROK now perceives the competitive aspects of its relationship with China as increasingly outweighing the complementary ones, and it has grown more optimistic about and supportive of the U.S. in the U.S.-China strategic competition. In an increasingly conservative political climate, the ROK is attempting to leverage the Taiwan question to pursue divergent interests with China and the U.S.
First, the ROK uses Taiwan policy to strengthen the U.S.–ROK alliance in exchange for greater security assurances and economic benefits. As U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies, the U.S. is bound to amplify the Taiwan question and treat it as a strategic tool to constrain China. In playing the “Taiwan card,” the ROK’s closer ties with Taiwan serve U.S. interests and help to further solidify the U.S.–ROK alliance, thereby securing greater security guarantees from Washington.
For the ROK, the North Korean nuclear issue remains a critical existential threat, and its alignment with the U.S. on the Taiwan-related matters is largely aimed at securing American support on North Korea-related challenges. During Yoon’s April 2023 visit to the U.S., the top priority was to reinforce the U.S. nuclear umbrella over the ROK—ensuring the effectiveness of the so-called “extended deterrence” strategy. Moreover, the Yoon administration has enhanced policy coordination and military deterrence on North Korea through U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, thereby increasing the likelihood and effectiveness of U.S. and Japanese support for the ROK in contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.
Economic security has also emerged as a critical focus of the ROK. By joining the exclusive supply chain and technology alliances led by the U.S., the Yoon administration has strengthened high-tech and economic security cooperation with Taiwan, enhancing the competitiveness of the ROK’s technology sectors (such as semiconductors) and safeguarding its economic security.
Second, the ROK is projecting a “dignified” diplomatic posture toward China to seize the strategic initiative. Since coming to power, the Yoon administration has recalibrated ROK–China relations by emphasising a policy based on mutual respect and dignified engagement. This shift indicates that the Yoon administration no longer prioritises maintaining stability in the bilateral relations as its foremost concern, reflecting a broader change in the ROK’s strategic perception of China.
Economically, the ROK believes it must reduce its dependency on China to reduce the impact of China’s “economic coercion.” Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, the ROK has lowered its expectations of China’s role in resolving it, contending that, in the context of heightened U.S.-China strategic competition, the prospects for major-power cooperation have diminished, thus limiting China’s current influence over the North Korean nuclear challenge.
In light of these factors, the Yoon administration has increasingly relied on the United States to achieve its deterrence against North Korea and its economic security objectives, while seeking to take the strategic initiative in its relations with China.
Third, the ROK views Taiwan-related matters as a platform to enhance its regional engagement and thereby achieve its ambition of becoming a “global pivotal state.” The ROK sees Taiwan-related matters as an opportunity to boost its international stature by constructing a cooperative framework for maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait and expanding its role in regional security affairs, thereby becoming a “global pivotal state.” On one hand, maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait aligns with the ROK’s expectations for regional and international order, and its vocal stance on the Taiwan question has increased its participation in Indo-Pacific affairs. On the other hand, if a security crisis were to erupt in the Taiwan Strait, the ROK believes it is better positioned than other U.S. allies to serve as an intermediary, mediating conflicts and thereby enhancing its international standing.
4. The Ukraine Crisis and the Korean Peninsula have Catalysed the ROK’s Heightened Attention to Taiwan.
In recent years, the spillover effects of the Ukraine crisis and the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula have heightened the ROK’s security anxieties, drawing greater attention to Taiwan-related matters and elevating its strategic significance in Seoul’s foreign policy.
Shaped by U.S. policy and domestic public opinion, the ROK has closely followed the Ukraine crisis, extending its concerns to security developments in the Taiwan Strait. Influenced by American policies, much of the South Korean media has portrayed the Ukraine war as a clash between “authoritarianism and democracy.” Cooperation among so-called “democratic countries” is seen by some ROK political elites as politically correct.
On this basis, the Yoon administration has pursued a “values-based diplomacy,” aligning itself not only with U.S. and Western positions on Ukraine but also increasingly mirroring their rhetoric on Taiwan-related matters. Seoul views Taiwan as a “democracy” that shares the ROK’s values—liberty, a market economy, and free trade. In its political interactions with Taiwan, the ROK consistently highlights “democratic values,” underscoring the Yoon administration’s commitment to “values-based diplomacy.”
The security situation on the Korean Peninsula remains the ROK’s foremost national concern. However, as tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait, Seoul’s sensitivity to cross-Strait developments has also increased. ROK political circles are particularly concerned about the potential outbreak of “hybrid warfare” in the Taiwan Strait and its possible impacts on the ROK in three key areas.
First, the tensions in the Taiwan Strait are closely linked to those on the Korean Peninsula, posing a direct threat to the ROK’s military security. The ROK’s strategic community believe that, due to the interconnected nature of the Taiwan question and the North Korean nuclear issue, a conflict in the Taiwan Strait could potentially escalate into a broader conflict on the Korean Peninsula. More importantly, a conflict escalation in the Taiwan Strait could provide North Korea with opportunities to conduct nuclear or long-range missile tests, thereby exacerbating the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. President Yoon Suk-yeol has warned that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities present an imminent threat to the ROK and that an escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait could prompt North Korea to launch aggression.
Second, the Taiwan Strait is a vital corridor for the ROK’s maritime trade. A military conflict in the Strait would have a significant economic impact. The ROK is highly dependent on external trade, 99% of which relies on maritime routes. The Taiwan Strait and adjacent waters account for 33.27% of the ROK’s maritime transport volume. Thus, Seoul is concerned that a major conflict disrupting shipping routes would trigger massive economic losses through supply chain instability. Bloomberg has projected that in the event of war in the Taiwan Strait, the ROK’s GDP could contract by as much as 23% within a year, second only to the losses expected for Taiwan.
Third, public concern in the ROK regarding the Taiwan question has increased, along with growing support for assisting Taiwan in “a Taiwan contingency.” As U.S. and Western media hype the notion of “Today's Ukraine, tomorrow’s Taiwan,” domestic attention to Taiwan-related matters has surged, and support for U.S.-ROK intervention in Taiwan-related matters has grown. According to a survey conducted in August 2022 by the Chosun Ilbo and the East Asia Institute, 64.5% of South Korean respondents agreed that South Korea should provide direct or indirect support for U.S. military operations in a Taiwan contingency. This reflects a notable shift in domestic public opinion in the ROK regarding Taiwan-related matters.
III. The Impact, Trends, and Limitations of the Adjustment in the ROK’s Taiwan Policy
The adjustment in the ROK’s Taiwan policy reflects a tendency to follow the lead of the United States and to adopt a more assertive stance. However, the scope of the ROK’s future involvement in Taiwan-related matters will be shaped by multiple constraints, underscoring the need to evaluate both the implications and trajectory of its evolving Taiwan policy.
1. The Impact of the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration’s Taiwan Policy
The Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s Taiwan policy has not only strained Sino–ROK relations and added complexity to the Taiwan Strait situation, but has also undermined regional security in East Asia as a whole.
First, the Taiwan Strait question has triggered diplomatic friction between China and the ROK, dealing a setback to bilateral relations. Controversial statements by the Yoon administration regarding Taiwan-related matters have heightened tensions with Beijing and significantly cooled diplomatic ties.
The Taiwan question lies at the core of China’s national interests. The Yoon administration’s public declaration that Taiwan is a “global issue,” along with its stated opposition to “attempts to change the status quo by force,” directly challenged China’s core interests and crossed a red line. These remarks are a violation of the one-China principle and provoked strong protests from Beijing. In the ROK, China’s reaction has, in turn, sparked debate over whether Beijing respects the ROK’s sovereignty.
The Yoon administration’s alignment with the United States on the Taiwan question has led the ROK to reference the Taiwan question or Taiwan Strait security 12 times in under two years—seven of those statements made directly by President Yoon. In response, China has repeatedly voiced strong dissatisfaction and issued stern diplomatic protests. As a result, Taiwan-related matters have emerged as a new flashpoint in Sino–ROK relations. This shift has led to setbacks in high-level exchanges, economic cooperation, and cultural engagement between the two countries, while concerns within the ROK over the deterioration of bilateral ties have continued to mount.
Second, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s Taiwan policy has aligned with the U.S. strategy of “using Taiwan to contain China,” thereby increasing the risk of external interference in the Taiwan issue. The Yoon administration’s approach is clearly designed to strengthen the U.S.–ROK alliance by supporting Washington’s strategic objectives. This alignment advances U.S. efforts to embed the Taiwan Strait issue within its so-called “alliance network” under the Indo-Pacific Strategy. By framing Taiwan as a “global issue” and incorporating cross-Strait security into the ROK’s own Indo-Pacific Strategy—thus helping to internationalise what China considers a domestic matter—Seoul positions itself as an active partner in Washington’s broader containment agenda.
Additionally, this posture risks sending misleading signals to Taipei, thereby undermining prospects for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In May 2023, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan President You Si-kun publicly thanked President Yoon for his remarks on Taiwan, noting that democratic allies were showing increased attention to the island. Such responses indicate that the Yoon administration’s statements may have conveyed a wrong message to Taiwan authorities and "Taiwan independent" separatists, creating the impression that U.S. allies support “Taiwan independence”—a perception that runs counter to cross-Strait peace and stability.
Third, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s Taiwan policy has accelerated East Asia’s slide into bloc politics and heightened security risks on the Korean Peninsula. By taking a clear position with the Western “democratic camp” on the Taiwan question, the Yoon administration has placed the ROK at the forefront of the U.S.-led “new Cold War” bloc confrontation. This has disrupted the strategic balance in East Asia and fueled regional tensions. As the situation in the Taiwan Strait grows more volatile, the United States, Japan, and the ROK have stepped up joint deterrence measures against North Korea, prompting Pyongyang to adopt increasingly aggressive countermeasures and further straining inter-Korean relations. The likelihood of bloc formation in Northeast Asia has risen, marked by deepening U.S.–Japan–ROK trilateral cooperation and closer ties between North Korea and Russia. At the same time, coordination among major powers—and between North and South Korea—has significantly declined, compounding security risks on the Korean Peninsula.
2. The Future Trajectory of the ROK’s Taiwan Policy
Looking ahead, the ROK’s Taiwan policy will largely be influenced by the U.S.’s Taiwan policy and its efforts to “internationalise” the Taiwan question. However, given that Taiwan-related matters are not a priority in the ROK’s foreign policy and that deeper involvement in the Taiwan question risks entangling Seoul in regional crises, it is unlikely that the ROK will follow Washington’s strategy unconditionally. Rather, Seoul is expected to maintain a certain degree of autonomy and flexibility without explicitly breaching the one-China principle.
Politically, the U.S. is expected to continue rallying its allies to issue joint statements on Taiwan-related matters under the guise of “maintaining regional stability,” and to intensify coordinated pressure on China. As the U.S.-ROK “global comprehensive strategic alliance” deepens and Seoul becomes more integrated into Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, bilateral coordination on Taiwan-related matters will likely increase. It is expected that the ROK will continue to align with U.S. rhetoric on statements such as “maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” and engage in political contact with Taiwan authorities through political declarations, parliamentary exchanges, and “Track 1.5 Dialogues.” However, whether political statements will translate into “substantive” political cooperation remains to be seen. Thus far, the ROK government has not shown any efforts to establish deeper “informal” relations with the Taiwan authorities or support Taiwan’s pursuit of expanding its so-called “international space.”
Militarily, Washington is likely to increasingly link the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula under its “integrated deterrence” strategy and push for the ROK’s full involvement in the Taiwan question. Washington is placing greater emphasis on leveraging its alliance network to serve as a military guarantor for Taiwan.
First, it is actively hyping the prospect of a “Taiwan contingency” and the threat of a potential Chinese military takeover of Taiwan in order to tie the Taiwan issue to the security of U.S. allies and partners. In doing so, it underscores the importance of jointly preserving “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” While historically Taiwan has not been considered a core ROK security concern—past editions of its biennial Defence White Papers have never mentioned Taiwan—the growing importance of the Taiwan question within the alliance may lead the Yoon administration to follow Japan’s example in linking Taiwan Strait security to its own national security.
Second, the United States aims to frame defence against a Taiwan contingency as a core priority of its Indo-Pacific Strategy and to enhance U.S.–ROK military cooperation in this context. Washington is seeking a greater role for the ROK in the event of a cross-Strait conflict and has linked developments in the Taiwan Strait with security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula, raising the issue of “strategic flexibility” for U.S. Forces Korea. This suggests that, in the event of a crisis, Seoul could be pressured to contribute.
However, from the ROK’s perspective, the Korean Peninsula has consistently remained its central strategic concern, and both the U.S.–ROK alliance and U.S. Forces Korea exist primarily to counter the North Korean threat. Seoul’s main concern regarding the Taiwan question is that, in the event of a cross-Strait conflict, a U.S. military focus on Taiwan could create an opportunity for North Korea to escalate militarily.
In a July 2024 interview with Yomiuri Shimbun, ROK Defence Minister Shin Won-sik made this position clear, stating that ROK forces and U.S. Forces Korea would not deploy to a Taiwan conflict, but would focus on maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This reflects Seoul’s intention to strengthen trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan while remaining cautious about becoming directly entangled in a Taiwan Strait military crisis.
In the economic, technological, and ideological domains, the U.S., through its leadership in minilateral mechanisms, provides a platform for substantive cooperation between the ROK and Taiwan. Economic and technological cooperation between the ROK and Taiwan is expected to increase. The U.S. seeks to deepen interactions between its allies and Taiwan in areas such as "collective resilience" of supply chains, technology cooperation, and responding to “influence operations,” thus helping maintain and expand Taiwan authorities’ so-called “international space.”
Meanwhile, the ROK government also values economic and technological cooperation with Taiwan, seeing it as aligned with the ROK’s interests. During a recent visit to Taiwan, a South Korean professor has stated that the ROK seeks to “strengthen economic and trade cooperation and people-to-people exchanges with Taiwan,” and believes that “a close relationship with Taiwan can provide leverage (negotiating power) with the U.S. and China, and can create an opportunity to enhance competitiveness in key industrial sectors such as semiconductors.”
In the ideological realm, the U.S. employs the narrative of “democracy versus authoritarianism” to construct a binary opposition between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, using initiatives such as the Summit for Democracy to forge a “values-based alliance” aimed at countering China. In this context, Taiwan-related matters have become a key litmus test for the cohesion of U.S.-led alliances. Driven by ideological alignment and the imperative to strengthen the U.S.–ROK alliance, the Yoon administration is likely to continue expanding “parliamentary diplomacy” and public diplomacy with Taiwan under the banner of “shared values of freedom and democracy.”
Overall, it is likely that the Yoon administration will continue to include “maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” in its security interests and advance political contacts with Taiwan while expanding substantive cooperation in economic, technological, and other fields. However, due to various constraints, the ROK will not significantly breach the one-China principle to enhance its political and military relations with Taiwan.
3. Limitations of the ROK's Taiwan Policy
Despite the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s notable shift in its Taiwan policy, future developments will face a range of constraints, making it unlikely that the ROK will fully align with the U.S. position on Taiwan.
First, deep involvement in Taiwan-related matters neither serves the ROK’s national interests nor enhances its security. To begin with, the security situations in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula are interlinked to a certain extent. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would likely heighten tensions on the Peninsula and pose a direct threat to the ROK’s national security. Moreover, potential U.S. military intervention in a cross-Strait conflict could lead to the redeployment of U.S. Forces Korea or the use of U.S. bases in South Korea as operational hubs, leaving Seoul to confront the North Korean threat on its own while increasing the risk of entanglement in a Taiwan-related crisis. Finally, maritime trade routes near the Taiwan Strait could be severely disrupted in wartime, significantly affecting the ROK’s foreign trade and causing major economic losses. For these reasons, the ROK does not seek a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait and has no intention of becoming involved.
Second, the ROK’s involvement in Taiwan-related matters would damage Sino–ROK relations, with adverse effects on bilateral economic ties and regional stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Taiwan question touches on China’s core interests, and any intervention by the ROK would inevitably undermine the healthy development of bilateral relations. From an economic perspective, China remains one of the ROK’s most important trading partners and plays a critical role in its supply chains. Economic cooperation between the two countries is essential to the ROK’s continued growth. Consequently, any action or statement by Seoul that provokes Beijing over Taiwan-related matters risks harming economic relations and runs counter to the ROK’s national interests.
Over the long term, the ROK still needs China to play a constructive role in inter-Korean relations to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. If the ROK were to intervene in Taiwan-related matters, the inevitable deterioration of China–ROK ties would make bilateral cooperation on Korean Peninsula security increasingly difficult. As a matter of fact, against the backdrop of strained relations, the Yoon administration has already recognised the need to recalibrate its China policy and has taken steps to revive high-level trilateral dialogue with China and Japan. In May 2024, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul visited China, signalling Seoul’s willingness to improve ties. Later that month, during the ninth China–Japan–ROK trilateral summit, President Yoon held talks with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, reaffirming the ROK’s commitment to the one-China principle and pledging continued support for stable and constructive bilateral relations.
Third, the divergence in interests between the United States and the ROK ensures that Seoul will not blindly follow Washington’s Taiwan policy. On one hand, the U.S. and the ROK have different goals regarding Taiwan. The U.S.’s Taiwan policy aims to strategically counterbalance China, while the ROK is concerned about being drawn into a China-U.S. conflict. If Washington were to request military assistance from Seoul or seek to redeploy U.S. Forces Korea for operations in a Taiwan contingency, the ROK would face deeply challenging strategic decisions.
On the other hand, the U.S. and the ROK differ in their threat perceptions and strategic priorities. For the ROK, the North Korean threat remains an existential concern central to its national security, whereas it does not rank as a top priority in U.S. foreign policy. In the event of an escalation in the Taiwan Strait, there is a risk that the United States could shift its focus and military resources there, neglecting the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK favours maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and has voiced apprehension over the expanding U.S. military presence in the region. These dynamics underscore the strategic differences and divergent national interests between the U.S. and the ROK.
Finally, domestic political change in the ROK will significantly influence the future trajectory of its Taiwan policy. Political polarisation has deepened within the ROK, with sharp divisions between progressive and conservative factions on matters of foreign policy. In the 2024 National Assembly elections, the opposition parties won a decisive majority, leaving the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in a lame-duck position for the remainder of its term. As a result, the administration is likely to face strong resistance from the opposition on both domestic and foreign policy fronts.
The largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Korea, has openly criticised the government’s stance on Taiwan-related matters, stating that “The president's thoughtless and irresponsible remarks must be corrected so that they do not become a more serious self-destructive security threat,” and urging the administration to “prioritise national interests in foreign affairs.” As the Yoon administration’s “pro-U.S., anti-China” foreign policy is increasingly seen as diverging from broader national interests, it is likely to encounter growing pushback not only from the political opposition but also from the public.
In addition, due to partisan divisions in the United States over alliance policy, changes in U.S. domestic politics may also affect the ROK’s approach to the Taiwan issue. The uncertainty surrounding U.S. politics and the potential shifts in its foreign and alliance policies may lead Seoul to maintain a degree of ambiguity in its Taiwan policy, in an effort to preserve greater strategic autonomy.
Conclusion
In recent years, the United States has increasingly relied on its alliance network as part of its strategy to “use Taiwan to constrain China,” drawing allies into the Taiwan-related matters as part of its broader effort to counter China through a coordinated alliance-based approach.
Owing to its deep strategic dependence on the U.S., the ROK has shown a clear tendency to follow Washington’s lead on Taiwan. This trend is evident in official rhetoric, visits to Taiwan, military activities near the Taiwan Strait, and even the strengthening of engagement with Taiwan in the multilateral sphere—actively contributing to the “internationalisation” of the Taiwan issue.
This policy shift is closely tied to the U.S.’s strategic recalibration in its competition with China and has become a key factor shaping the ROK’s evolving approach to Taiwan.
In addition, the ROK’s Taiwan policy is influenced by domestic political changes, national interests, and growing concern over cross-Strait developments. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s approach to Taiwan has disrupted the healthy development of Sino–ROK relations, hindered progress on resolving the Taiwan issue, and intensified bloc dynamics in East Asia.
Looking ahead, the Yoon administration is expected to continue aligning with the U.S. on Taiwan-related matters, flexibly and implicitly deepening cooperation with Taiwan in various realms. However, given that the Taiwan question is a core Chinese interest, Seoul is likely to proceed with caution, carefully avoiding any breach of the one-China policy red line and remaining particularly restrained in political and military engagement with Taiwan.
China must closely monitor shifts in the ROK’s Taiwan policy and develop appropriate countermeasures. First, it should respond firmly and issue clear warnings to any ROK actions or statements that touch upon the one-China principle. Second, China should strengthen substantive economic cooperation with the ROK to reinforce the “ballast” of China-ROK economic ties. Third, China should promote the establishment of a regional security mechanism in East Asia, with an emphasis on conflict prevention and crisis management, in order to limit external interference in Taiwan Strait security.
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