India in China's discourse: A Thaw and Its Online Discontents
Chinese diplomats rebuilding ties with India are navigating — and pushing back against — an online backlash over renewed travel and visas.
Beijing has been working to stabilize and improve relations with New Delhi after several difficult years. Xu Feihong, China’s ambassador to India, has emerged as one of the key diplomats translating that broad political direction into the patient, practical work of rebuilding ties. A seasoned diplomat at the vice-minister rank, Xu has pursued that task with a combination of pragmatism and strategic clarity: restoring channels of contact, expanding exchanges, and helping create the conditions in which a deeply strained relationship can gradually become more manageable.
A major part of that effort has involved restoring exchanges between the two countries. Direct flights have gradually resumed, while business, tourism and other forms of people-to-people contact are recovering. Under Xu’s leadership, the Chinese Embassy and consulates in India have also been processing increasing numbers of visas for Indian citizens traveling to China. These are not merely administrative steps. They are part of a broader attempt to rebuild the connective tissue of the relationship, restore a degree of normalcy after years of estrangement, and open China more widely to the outside world.
Yet the increase in travel became a target of a group of self-styled “patriotic” influencers. False or misleading claims began circulating that Indians were “flooding” into China and that Chinese diplomatic missions in India were recklessly handing out visas. The attacks eventually turned on Xu himself. A veteran diplomat carefully advancing his government’s policy — and seeking to rebuild a difficult relationship without ignoring its underlying complexities — was accused of betraying the country whose interests he was working to serve.
The recent hostility has an immediate context. China-India relations deteriorated sharply after the deadly border clash in 2020, and the years of tension that followed contributed to a rise in hostile sentiment in parts of each country against the other. But negative views of India predate that episode and have deeper, more complex roots, including perceptions of India as a poorer, less developed country — a form of prejudice that is by no means unique to China but can be found in societies around the world.
What makes this episode particularly revealing is not simply the existence of such attitudes, but what happens when longstanding sentiments are hijacked by racists and then collide with a diplomatic thaw. Nationalist influencers can turn grievance, prejudice and fabrication into traffic. Diplomats, by contrast, must deal with the world as it is: balancing national interests, political realities and the longer-term need to prevent rivalry from hardening into permanent hostility. That is the more difficult and less theatrical task Xu and his colleagues have been undertaking.
The Chinese internet is subject to extensive controls, but that does not mean every strand of public opinion is manufactured from above, or that the authorities exercise complete command over the sentiments circulating online. In this case, some of the people most loudly claiming the mantle of patriotism ended up attacking diplomats for carrying out Beijing’s policy. It is a small reminder that even a state with enormous influence over the public sphere may still have to contend with nationalist pressures that have histories and dynamics of their own — and that responsible statecraft sometimes requires navigating and pushing back against bigotry, rather than staying silent.
—— Zichen Wang
It was against this backdrop that, on July 2, 澎湃新闻 The Paper, a major Chinese digital news outlet, published the commentary translated below. The Chinese Embassy in India later republished it in full on its website, signaling unmistakable support for its argument.
如何看待近期关于印度的一些讨论？
How Should We Think About the Recent Discussion on India?
Recently, Chinese social media has seen a number of posts claiming that Indian visitors are “flooding” into the country and that some have behaved poorly while in China. Some of these discussions have gone further, questioning whether China’s visa policy toward India is too generous, or alleging that Indians are “taking up Chinese resources.” In some corners of the internet, public anger has been stirred up. How should we understand this? A few points are worth making.
The immediate trigger for this round of debate is the claim that some Indian tourists have behaved improperly in China. If foreign visitors break rules or behave inappropriately, people are, of course, entitled to point this out. China has a long tradition of treating guests with courtesy, but guests are also expected to respect Chinese laws, regulations, and social norms. If anyone crosses the line, whatever their nationality, the matter should be handled in accordance with the law. There is nothing controversial about that.
The real problem begins when the behaviour of a few individuals is used to condemn an entire country, or when isolated incidents become an excuse for xenophobia. We should not close the door on India because of a handful of cases. Nor should we pin every negative story on Indians simply because the topic is trending and attracts online traffic.
When thinking about how China should engage with India, we need to look at the bigger picture. Historically, China and India are both ancient civilisations, with more than two thousand years of cultural exchange between them. From Xuanzang’s journey westward and his return with 657 volumes of Sanskrit Buddhist scriptures, to Rabindranath Tagore’s visit to China and his friendship with figures such as Xu Zhimo, to Dr Dwarkanath Kotnis, who gave his life while supporting the Chinese people’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression — these stories of people-to-people exchange are the true foundation of China-India relations.
In practical terms, China and India are neighbours that cannot be moved away. Together, they account for more than one-third of the world’s population, and both are pursuing modernisation. Peaceful coexistence is therefore a necessity. Win-win cooperation, too, is in shared interests.
Of course, differences between China and India do exist. But both countries have the wisdom to manage them. In recent months, the border situation has eased noticeably, which is a welcome development. Both sides also understand that the boundary question is not the whole of China-India relations, that it should be kept in its proper place, so that the broader relationship is not held hostage by a single issue.
In recent years, the leaders of China and India have met in Kazan and Tianjin. Since then, bilateral relations have continued to improve, and practical cooperation has strengthened. According to Indian official statistics, bilateral goods trade reached US$151.1 billion in the 2025–2026 fiscal year, making China India’s largest trading partner. This alone shows how deeply the two economies are connected. Behind the smooth flow of goods worth hundreds of billions of dollars, there must also be channels for people to travel, meet, and do business.
Since 2025, direct flights between China and India have gradually resumed. With more direct flights, it is only natural that people-to-people exchanges have increased compared with the pandemic years. It is also worth noting that more than 80 per cent of the visas China issues to Indian nationals are business visas. In other words, business travel makes up the overwhelming majority. Those coming purely for tourism are only a small share.
Seen from a wider international perspective, China-India relations are no longer just a bilateral issue. The Global South is gaining weight, and the global governance system is being reshaped. Whether in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in climate talks or WTO reform, the Global South will find it hard to make its voice heard without coordination between China and India. India is chairing BRICS this year, and China has said it supports India in fulfilling its responsibilities as the BRICS Chair and working together to promote the growth of the BRICS mechanism. All this suggests that what may appear to be a simple easing of travel is, in fact, the renewed connection of two major engines of the Global South.
Back to the visa issue. In recent years, China has introduced a range of visa facilitation measures. These are not aimed at one particular country, but at the world as a whole. So far, China has concluded mutual visa-free agreements with 160 countries and has granted unilateral visa-free access to nationals of 50 countries. These measures are a proactive move in China’s deepening opening up. They bring not only more international tourism revenue, but also more trade opportunities, a better business environment, and a stronger reputation for openness. These are real national dividends, and in the end they also benefit ordinary Chinese people.
China’s decision to open its doors wider reflects the confidence and breadth of vision of a major country. The goal is not short-term “reciprocity” in every narrow sense, but long-term mutual benefit.
That is why discussions about “unequal visa treatment” between China and India should also be approached rationally. It is true that in recent years India tightened visa issuance for Chinese citizens. Although it has now resumed issuing business and tourist visas, there remains a clear gap and delay compared with China’s approach. China should expect India to show sincerity and take concrete steps. At the same time, we should recognise that India’s policy is also in a process of dynamic adjustment. If the visa issue is endlessly escalated and turned into an outlet for anger, the result will only be counterproductive, narrowing the space for the relationship to improve and develop.
After the noise dies down, we still need to return to reason. Over the past few years, the disruption of exchanges between China and India has widened not only an information deficit, but also a trust deficit. Some people like to post sensational clips and stories about India and other South Asian countries, or to amplify alleged misconduct by Indians in China. This has left many Chinese people with a view of India that is increasingly fragmented, label-driven, and stereotyped. Such content may appear to be “patriotic,” but it is little more than clickbait that fuels confrontation and exclusion. In essence, it exploits patriotic feeling and national sentiment for traffic. It pollutes the online environment and does not reflect the open and confident mindset a major country should have.
Chinese civilisation has always valued openness and inclusiveness. As the saying goes, the sea is vast because it accepts all rivers. As citizens of a major country, we should have that same sense of proportion, confidence, and generosity.
India's remarkable Digital Public Infrastructure is making rounds internationally, Chinese India watcher documents
Below is a translation of 毛克疾：印度数字基建，莫迪政府的“新王牌”？Mao Keji: India’s digital infrastructure - the Modi Government’s new trump card? published in 世界知识 World Affairs, a publication under China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Agree. Anti-India sentiment on the Chinese internet is not entirely baseless. But turning genuine interstate tensions, isolated cases of misconduct, and legitimate concerns over technological security into blanket hostility toward all Indians is neither factually justified nor consistent with China’s long-term national interests.
Recent debates on Chinese online forums over Indian tourists, students, and businesspeople do have some basis in reality. Some Indian tourists have been reported violating public rules at Chinese tourist sites, on public transportation, and in public waters. It is not difficult to understand why such incidents have caused public dissatisfaction. China welcomes foreign visitors, but openness does not require lowering standards of public order. Foreign nationals who violate Chinese regulations should be subject to the same rules as Chinese citizens. Those responsible for serious or repeated violations may also be legally restricted from re-entering the country.
Public concern over technology leakage likewise should not be dismissed simply as “racism.” In cross-border commercial cooperation, there have indeed been cases involving the unauthorized copying of software code, imitation of product designs, acquisition of manufacturing know-how, and infringement of intellectual property rights. Some companies use factory visits, technical training, and supply-chain cooperation to learn from China’s manufacturing experience, which may also create risks involving the protection of commercial secrets. Chinese companies therefore need stronger controls over factory access, better data segregation, more rigorous intellectual-property agreements, and tighter protection of core technologies.
However, there is currently no reliable evidence supporting online claims that “large numbers of Indian students are stealing Chinese military and defense technologies.” China’s key laboratories, defense programs, and sensitive academic disciplines already maintain strict access controls for foreign nationals. There are clear boundaries between normal education, commercial visits, technological exchange, and the illegal acquisition of trade secrets. Treating all Indian students and businesspeople as presumed technology thieves merely turns a legitimate industrial-security concern into collective suspicion of ordinary people.
The decline in Chinese public trust toward India in recent years also has deeper geopolitical roots. The 2017 Doklam standoff and the 2020 Galwan Valley clash seriously damaged mutual trust between the two countries. Since then, India’s participation in the Quad, AUKUS, and Pax Silica has been widely viewed in China as part of a broader effort to work with the United States to contain China. Although India continues to emphasize strategic autonomy, some of its security and technology policies clearly reflect a strong tendency to guard against China.
After 2020, India also significantly tightened security reviews of Chinese investment, restricted Chinese companies’ access to parts of the Indian market, and banned hundreds of Chinese apps. Although India began to selectively ease some restrictions on manufacturing investment in 2026, the policies of the preceding years created a strong impression in China: India wants access to Chinese capital, components, and manufacturing technology while continuing to restrict Chinese companies from entering the Indian market.
Social media’s amplification mechanisms have further intensified these sentiments. A video showing one tourist behaving badly can receive millions of views, while ten thousand ordinary tourists who follow the rules will never become news. Some online influencers repeatedly amplify the most extreme cases, portray commercial competition as systematic technology theft, and describe normal cross-border travel as “an influx of Indians into China.” Threat, prejudice, and anger become tools for generating traffic. Individual incidents are eventually converted into group stereotypes, while the complexity of relations between major countries is compressed into a simple friend-versus-enemy narrative.
Yet online sentiment does not represent the strategic position of the Chinese government.
Foreign policy must simultaneously consider border security, industrial interests, regional stability, and long-term development. China has never placed India in the position of its principal strategic adversary. Chinese leaders have repeatedly emphasized that China and India should be “partners rather than rivals” and should view each other’s development as an opportunity rather than a threat. During the 2025 meeting between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, Xi again stated that the boundary issue should not define the overall relationship. In 2026, Wang Yi continued to describe development as the greatest shared interest of both countries.
China possesses the world’s most comprehensive manufacturing system. India possesses an enormous population and market. China’s industrial capabilities can reduce the cost of India’s industrial upgrading, while India’s development can create new markets for Chinese companies.
A mature major power will neither abandon necessary safeguards simply because diplomatic relations are improving, nor allow online anger to substitute for national strategy. Maintaining a clear-eyed view of India, insisting on reciprocity, protecting China’s core interests, and expanding areas of cooperation that benefit both countries constitute the long-term policy most consistent with China’s national interests.