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Nicholas Ke's avatar

The distinction the PBOC draws between the real effective exchange rate and the nominal rate is the part of this article that most commentary glosses over. Citing the IMF's External Balance Assessment as evidence on the nominal RMB misses what the EBA actually measures. Nov 18 offered a live test of the framework: the dollar spiked sharply after the October 27-28 FOMC minutes showed almost all officials backing further rate increases, gold fell more than 3%, and yet the RMB has strengthened about 9% against the dollar since 2025. That sits oddly with the claim that non-dollar currencies were under broad depreciation pressure from surging Treasury yields. One question ahead of the APEC summit in Shenzhen on Nov 18-19, with the Trump-Xi bilateral and the first US-China-Russia trilateral on Nov 19: if exchange-rate expectations are now the dominant channel, as the article argues, does the PBOC see the RMB's recent strength as a tool for stabilizing those expectations, or as a side effect of the dollar's own cycle that it would rather not own?

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